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Kyle C. Meng
Empirical research on anthropogenic climate change is constrained by two fundamental facts: climate change
is unprecedented and its impacts occur gradually. This implies that neither evidence from recent history nor
the near future can directly inform policy. Under such circumstances, empirical research must find historical
analogs capturing particular features of future climate change and policy, which, combined with theory,
can provide credible out-of-sample predictions. The four papers in this dissertation use new data settings
and methodologies to causally examine central questions related to climate change mitigation, adaptation,
innovation, and impacts. Results from these papers can help inform future climate-related research and
various issues regarding the political economy of climate policy.
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Anthropogenic, or human-induced, climate change is among the biggest threats facing modern human society.
As such, rigorous research to understand various physical and social dimensions of climate change is critical
for design of appropriate policy responses. Unfortunately, two aspects of anthropogenic climate change pose
fundamental challenges for researchers. First, anthropogenic climate change is unprecedented. This implies
that historical evidence is limited for informing how society may respond to future climate change. Second,
anthropogenic climate change will occur gradually, with delayed and possibly irreversible effects over long
time horizons. Thus, while suitable data may one day become available, it may not be reasonable for policy
interventions to wait until conclusive evidence. In short, researchers are tasked with addressing questions
that have never been answered before and which the cost of waiting for additional information may be too
high.
Given these circumstances, traditional climate change research in the natural and social sciences has had
to rely heavily on modeling assumptions. In atmospheric physics, climate modelers have developed sufficient
confidence in the first principles governing atmospheric dynamics to forecast future surface temperature
using Global Circulation Models (GCM) (Houghton et al., 2001). This confidence, however, is lower for
variables that are harder to model due to lack of data (i.e. icesheet movements and aerosols), computational
limits (i.e. biosphere feedbacks), or limits of predictability arising from chaotic behavior.
Forecasts are arguably harder in climate-related social science research. Traditionally, there are two
approaches to empirical economic analyses of climate change. The Integrated Assessment Model (IAM)
addresses the normative question of how much global greenhouse gas abatement should occur by imposing
a global climate damage function into standard dynamic optimization frameworks (Nordhaus, 2008). The
1
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW 2
parameterization of the damage function remains controversial (Weitzman, 2010) and potentially untestable.
The second approach uses numerically solved general equilibrium models to address the positive question of
much carbon mitigation would cost for different sectors of the economy. Despite the richness and advances
of modern computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, many still have difficulty capturing important
features related to climate policy such as induced technological change (Jacoby et al., 2006) and political
dynamics.
A third strand of analyses in the economics of climate change has recently emerged following method-
ological advances together with increasing data availability and computing power. Enlisting developments
in statistical inference, this literature uses historic variation in local weather to examine effects on a variety
of outcomes such as agricultural output, health, conflict, labor supply, and GDP (Schlenker, Hanemann
and Fisher, 2005; Descheˆnes and Greenstone, 2007; Burke et al., 2009; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009a; Feng,
Oppenheimer and Schlenker, 2012; Hsiang, 2010; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2010; Welch et al., 2010; Descheˆnes
and Greenstone, 2011; Hsiang, Meng and Cane, 2011; Dell, Jones and Olken, 2012). While this literature
has strong internal validity, there are questions regarding how suitable the impacts of idiosyncratic weather
shocks are for informing the impacts of future climate change which, among other things, are spatially
correlated, occurring over a long time horizon, and perhaps to some degree predictable. Furthermore, this
literature has to date largely focused on the impacts of climate change and has only recently turned towards
questions around climate policy (Fowlie, 2010; Calel and Dechezlepretre, 2012).
The papers that constitute this dissertation draw heavily from this recent empirical literature. However,
this research departs from previous work both in the types of questions tackled as well as along several
methodological dimensions. For example, the use of prediction markets in Chapter 2 to estimate the cost of
an unrealized climate policy represents, to the best of my knowledge, the first attempt to forecast climate
policy costs outside a CGE setting. Similarly, the climatic patterns exploited in Chapters 3 and 5 to explore
climate adaptation in China and the effects of El Nin˜o on civil conflicts respectively provide methodolog-
ical departures from previous climate impacts research. As such, these papers can be viewed as bridging
the methodological contributions from the recent climate impacts literature with the canonical theoretical
frameworks behind IAM and CGE approaches.
Below, I provide a brief summary of each paper and the particular data settings and methodologies which
allow me to explore questions on climate change mitigation, adaptation, innovation, and impacts.
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1.2 Chapter summaries
Chapter 2: The Cost of Potential Cap-and-Trade Policy: An Event Study using Prediction
Markets and Lobbying Records What are the costs of climate policy? While recent empirical research
has enriched our understanding of potential climate impacts, the cost of climate policy remains uncertain
as there are few examples of realized policy for researchers to evaluate. To address this difficulty, I develop
a forecasting technique by combining data from stock, prediction, and lobbying markets to estimate the
expected cost of the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill had it been implemented. Prediction markets,
introduced in the political economy literature, approximate beliefs about climate policy prospects and can
be employed to recover regulatory costs even in the absence of actual policy. Together with cap-and-trade
lobbying expenditures revealed by firms, I can partially identify the policy’s total cost to listed and unlisted
firms. To the best of my knowledge, this paper provides the first reduced-form forecasts of U.S. cap-and-trade
policy. More generally, this approach can help transform reduced-form methods into a tool for forecasting.
Chapter 3: Adapting to Predictable Weather: Chinese Farmers and the Monsoon Onset (with
Wolfram Schlenker and Liangzhi You) The impacts of future climate change hinge critically on how
human society adapts to changing climatic conditions. The overall impact of climate change may vary
depending on whether margins of adaptation are available at relatively low-cost. In this chapter, Wolfram
Schlenker, Liangzhi You, and I examine one particular empirical setting in which the regular spatial movement
of monsoonal rain onsets makes near-term future rainfall predictable for rice framers in southern China.
Timing of monsoonal onsets in “upstream” counties predicts local total rainfall during the growing season.
We find that farmers respond to this information by optimally adjusting area planted for rice cultivation.
However, the overall risk reduction potential from this particular form of adaptation is limited.
Chapter 4: Political Access and Innovation: Evidence from Lobbying Records and Patents
Climate mitigation will require large-scale private investments in new technologies. It has been hypothesized
that firms innovate less when channels of political influence are available. However, this hypothesis has never
been rigorously tested due to the unobservable nature of political connections. In this chapter, I employ a
novel solution by linking members of Congress to firms through revolving door lobbyists. Using both panel
and dynamic regression discontinuity designs, I find that firm R & D expenditures increase following the
departure of a linked member of Congress. My finding suggests that frictions in our political system are
considerable and should be accounted for in the design of optimal climate policy.
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Chapter 5: Civil Conflicts are Associated with the Global Climate (with Solomon M. Hsiang
and Mark A. Cane) In this paper, Solomon Hsiang, Mark Cane, and I examine an often-hypothesized
relationship between climate change and civil conflict. Previous empirical work has been largely inconclusive.
Our contribution is to explore a crucial feature of climatic change that had been previously overlooked: its
spatially aggregated nature. Standard economic theory suggests that risk sharing fails under sufficiently large
aggregate shocks. We study the impacts of the El Nin˜o Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which periodically
leads to hotter and dryer conditions for roughly half the planet. We find that civil conflict onsets double in
the tropics during El Nin˜o events.
Chapter 6: Directions for Future Research and Policy Implications In this concluding chapter,
I first discuss natural extensions and broader research implications that follow from this dissertation. In
particular, this discussion will provide suggestions on how empirical research on the costs and benefits of
climate policy may proceed. I also discuss several challenges in enacting climate policy that touch upon
political economy issues raised by parts of this dissertation.
Chapter 2
The Cost of Potential Cap-and-Trade Policy:
An Event Study using Prediction Markets and Lobbying Records
Kyle Meng1
Abstract
Efforts to understand the cost of climate policy have been constrained by the limited number of policies
available for evaluation. This paper develops an empirical method for forecasting the expected cost to firms
of a proposed climate policy that was never realized. I combine prediction market prices, which reflect
market beliefs over regulatory prospects, with stock returns to estimate the expected cost to firms of the
Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill, had it been implemented. I find that Waxman-Markey would have
reduced the market value of all listed firms by $160 billion. Sectors with higher carbon and energy intensity,
import penetration, and exposure to U.S. product markets exhibit larger losses. A regression discontinuity
test using the policy’s allowance allocation rule finds a relative gain for sectors expecting free allowances.
Because the values of unlisted firms are not observed, I use firm-level lobbying expenditures within a partial
identification framework to obtain bounds for the costs borne by unlisted firms. I conclude by comparing
estimates from this method with forecasts by prevailing computable general equilibrium models of climate
policy.
1Columbia University. I thank Ethan Kaplan, Wolfram Schlenker, and in particular Bernard Salanie´ for their guidance.
This paper has benefited from critical suggestions from Joe Aldy, Doug Almond, Scott Barrett, Linda Bui, Ray Fisman, Olle
Folke, Larry Goulder, Michael Greenstone, Rema Hanna, Geoff Heal, Nat Keohane, Wojciech Kopczuk, Erich Muehlegger,
Suresh Naidu, Matt Neidell, Johannes Urpelainen, Tom Vogl, Gernot Wagner, Marty Weitzman, and seminar participants
at Harvard Kennedy School, NBER EEE Summer Institute, Environmental Defense Fund, and Columbia University. I am
particularly grateful to Richard Goettle, Jennifer Morris, and Sergey Paltsev for kindly explaining CGE methodology and
sharing output from the IGEM and EPPA models. Finally, I thank Xiaojia Bao, Jonathan Dingel, Solomon Hsiang, Chandra
Kiran Krishnamurthy, Maxim Pinkovskiy, James Rising, Joseph Shapiro, Jan von der Goltz, and Reed Walker for their insightful
comments. All remaining errors are my own. Research support from the NSF GRFP.
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2.1 Introduction
The decision to regulate climate change relies heavily on the estimated costs and benefits of climate policy.
Recent empirical studies have strengthened our understanding of the potential impacts of anthropogenic
climate change (Schlenker, Hanemann and Fisher, 2005; Descheˆnes and Greenstone, 2007; Burke et al.,
2009; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009a; Feng, Oppenheimer and Schlenker, 2012; Hsiang, 2010; Graff Zivin and
Neidell, 2010; Welch et al., 2010; Descheˆnes and Greenstone, 2011; Hsiang, Meng and Cane, 2011; Dell,
Jones and Olken, 2012). However, few examples of implemented policies to date have constrained efforts to
understand the costs of climate policy. For the United States in particular, opportunities to apply standard
program evaluation techniques have been limited in the absence of policies that reveal the shadow price of
carbon.
This paper develops an empirical method for forecasting the cost of a potential climate change policy. I
combine data from prediction markets with stock prices and lobbying expenditures to estimate the expected
cost to firms of the Waxman-Markey bill, a cap-and-trade policy that passed the U.S. House of Representa-
tives in 2009 but was ultimately never implemented. Importantly, this method uses the public and private
information revealed by market participants and firms to recover the policy’s total cost to firms within a
transparent, structurally minimal framework.
Market beliefs over the likelihood of an event occurring can be approximated by prediction market prices
(Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2007; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2009; Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2011,
2012). When combined with stock prices, prediction markets can be used in an event study to estimate the
abnormal stock returns associated with a probable event, even if this event is never realized. This paper
examines changes in firm values in response to price fluctuations for a cap-and-trade prediction market
available from 2009 to 2010. I find that the expected incidence of Waxman-Markey would have reduced the
market values of U.S. listed firms by a total of $160 billion.
In addition to estimating the expected cost of cap-and-trade policy, this paper extends the existing
literature by developing a general empirical framework for the use of prediction markets in event studies.
Within this framework, I demonstrate how estimation concerns over omitted variable bias and selection of
benchmark controls as well as specific prediction market concerns over thin trading and contract expiration
can be addressed empirically. Thus, this framework can be generally applied to forecasting the cost to firms
of proposed, and possibly unrealized, policies for which prediction markets are available.
I demonstrate that the distribution of estimated effects across sectors is generally consistent with cli-
mate policy incidence. Specifically, I find the strongest effects in sectors with greater carbon intensity and
energy intensity, import penetration, and exposure to U.S. product markets. Had it been implemented,
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Waxman-Markey would have distributed free allowances to manufacturing sectors with historic energy in-
tensity greater than 5%. Using this allowance allocation rule as a basis for a regression discontinuity design,
I find that manufacturing sectors with energy intensity slightly greater than 5% experience a gain in value
from the expected allocation of free allowances relative to sectors with energy intensity slightly lower than
5%. Remarkably, this implies that market participants were responding not only generally to climate policy
prospects, but also to the specific distributional consequences of the Waxman-Markey bill.
A proposed cap-and-trade system should also affect unlisted firms, which represent 9% of annual U.S.
corporate profits but whose market values are not observed. Using a partial identification framework with
missing outcomes (Manski, 2003), I address this difficulty by augmenting my analysis with information
that reveal bounds for the cost of cap-and-trade expected by unlisted firms. My particular solution employs
Congressional lobbying expenditures, a variable for which information related to Waxman-Markey is available
for both listed and unlisted firms, together with the observation that lobbying expenditures may reveal the
magnitude of cap-and-trade costs but not the sign of these costs. To implement this procedure, I first show
that lobbying expenditures predict estimated Waxman-Markey costs for listed firms. I then match listed
and unlisted firms according to lobbying expenditures to predict the absolute Waxman-Markey costs borne
by unlisted firms.
Within the partial identification framework, I find that Waxman-Markey would have cost listed and
unlisted firms between $73 and $240 billion. Extending the canonical emissions trading models of Mont-
gomery (1972) and Rubin (1996), I approximate that the component of the aggregate marginal abatement
cost attributed to firms is between $0.9 and $3.0 per ton of CO2 in 2015. Because this method only recovers
the expected cost to firms and not the impact on consumers, these estimates do not capture the full welfare
effects of the policy.
There are two reasons why the approach adopted by this paper is well suited for estimating the cost of
climate policy. First, the induced innovation hypothesis (Hicks, 1932) suggests that climate policy would
trigger significant technological advances (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2003). While this has been explored
theoretically (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Nordhaus, 2002; Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti, 2003; Ace-
moglu et al., 2012), induced technological change can present modeling difficulties for prevailing structural
forecasting methods (Jacoby et al., 2006). By being agnostic over the structure, direction, and rate of tech-
nological change, and instead relying on the expectations of market participants, this paper incorporates the
broadest information set available on the potential technological frontier. Second, climate policy is likely
to trigger political activity. Because climate policies are typically designed to last several political cycles,
future rent-seeking opportunities will likely exist for altering the distributional consequences of these policies.
Estimates from this paper would incorporate political dynamics as long as such expectations are held by
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market participants.
There is a long tradition of employing event study methodology to evaluate the costs of regulation (see
Schwert (1981) for an early review). Two recent papers use traditional event study methodology to examine
the costs of environmental regulation (Linn, 2010; Bushnell, Chong and Mansur, 2012). However, I am
not aware of analyses of environmental regulation using the prediction market event study presented by
Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2009). The paper closest in spirit to
this analysis is Bushnell, Chong and Mansur (2012) which examines abnormal returns during the April
2006 allowance price crash in the EU-ETS. Bushnell, Chong and Mansur (2012) perform an intensive margin
analysis by examining abnormal returns under an operating cap-and-trade system. This analysis is conducted
along the extensive margin with attention paid towards recovering an expected cost to firms in the absence
of an existing emissions trading system.
Finally, this paper is a positive and not normative analysis of carbon mitigation. That is, the objective
here is to provide empirical estimates of the expected costs of Waxman-Markey as it was written in legislation.
Whether Waxman-Markey was an optimal mitigation policy is a different question involving not just an
examination of international mitigation costs but also a realistic approximation of the global damage function
under future climate change scenarios (Heal, 2009; Greenstone, Kopits and Wolverton, 2011). Thus, the
estimates from this paper cannot be compared to those generated by integrated assessment models studying
optimal climate policy (Stern, 2006; ?).
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. In the next section, I provide institutional details
on cap-and-trade and the Waxman-Markey bill. Section 2.3 introduces a theoretical framework showing how
the total and marginal abatement cost of a cap-and-trade policy to firms can be recovered using potentially
observable market values. Section 2.4 develops an empirical framework which details how a potential cap-
and-trade policy can be estimated using prediction markets with Section 2.5 providing the main event study
estimates with robustness and heterogeneity results. Section 2.6 presents a partial identification framework
to bound costs for unlisted firms using lobbying expenditures. The aggregate effect is provided in Section
2.7 which is followed by a discussion in Section 2.8 of how my estimates compare with forecasts by prevailing
computable general equilibrium models of climate policy.
2.2 Background: Waxman-Markey
Over the past two decades, emissions trading, known popularly as “cap-and-trade”, has become an increas-
ingly important regulatory instrument for controlling regional and global pollutants such as greenhouse gases
(Stavins, 1998; Aldy et al., 2010). In a typical cap-and-trade system, the regulator issues emission allowances
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each year which total the annual cumulative emissions permitted by the policy. Regulated firms must then
purchase or are given allowances to cover their annual emissions. Following the success of the U.S. SO2
trading system introduced in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, variants of cap-and-trade have been
implemented domestically and internationally. Well-known systems currently in operation include provisions
of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Unions Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), and the U.S. Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Economically, the compliance flexibility provided by cap-and-trade has
been shown to yield lower costs than traditional command-and-control policies (Carlson et al., 2000; Eller-
man et al., 2000). Politically, and in particular for the United States, this regulatory tool is considered more
palatable than comparable Pigouvian tax schemes.
This backdrop has made cap-and-trade the centerpiece of U.S. domestic climate policy efforts over the last
decade. After a series of failed Senate cap-and-trade bills in the early 2000s, the Democratic-led 111th House
of Representatives introduced the American Clean Energy and Security Act in the spring of 2009. Known
informally as the Waxman-Markey bill after its primary sponsors, the legislation specified a declining annual
limit on aggregate emissions eventually covering 85% of greenhouse gas emitting sectors (see Figure 2.1).
Waxman-Markey required that covered emissions decline by 17% in 2020, 42% in 2030, and 83% in 2050,
all relative to 2005 levels. As cost containment measures, Waxman-Markey included generous provisions for
inclusion of domestic and international offsets credits2 and the banking and borrowing of past and future
allowances. To further build political support for the policy, the bulk of the annual allowances were to be
freely distributed in the early years of the regulation. In particular, manufacturing industries deemed both
energy intensive and trade sensitive were to be granted free allowances for the initial years of the policy.3
Altogether, 60% of cumulative allowances were to be distributed freely over the lifetime of the policy. While
central to Waxman-Markey, cap-and-trade was not the only component of the legislation. Alongside emissions
trading were supply-side interventions such as a renewable energy portfolio standard, incentives for carbon
capture and storage and nuclear power, as well as demand-side interventions such as incentives for electric
vehicles, efficient building codes, and consumer advocacy programs. This analysis, therefore, evaluates the
joint effect of cap-and-trade in conjunction with other components of Waxman-Markey.
The Waxman-Markey bill passed the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009, marking the first time
cap-and-trade legislation had passed either Houses of Congress.4 Despite President Obama’s support for a
2Offsets are defined as reductions achieved outside the emissions system. They are typically project-based reductions below
a business-as-usual baseline. Common sources of offsets are domestic sectors that are difficult to include under a national cap
such as agricultural and forestry and credits from international abatement projects.
3Specifically, Waxman-Markey deemed a 3-digit NAICS manufacturing or iron and steel production related sector as eligible
for free allowances if for that sector both 1) energy intensity (measured as cost of energy inputs over total output) or carbon
intensity (measured as 20 times sum of direct and indirect tons of CO2 emissions over total output) was over 5% and 2) trade
intensity (measured as sum of import and export value over sum of output and import value) was over 15%. The number of
free allowances were initially set based on recent output levels and designed to decline in later years.
4In the bicameral U.S. legislative system, a piece of legislation must pass both Houses of Congress before being sent to the
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Senate bill with a similar cap schedule, prospects for cap-and-trade declined shortly after House passage.
With the exception of Republican Senator Lindsay Graham joining Senate cap-and-trade efforts on Nov 4,
2009, the rest of 2009 and 2010 witnessed the gradual demise of cap-and-trade. Prospects for cap-and-trade
were affected by the failure to reach a new binding international agreement at the UNFCC Copenhagen
negotiations and further declined following Scott Brown’s Senate victory which weakened the filibuster-proof
supermajority needed by the Democrats. On April 23, 2010, Senator Lindsay Graham withdrew support for
cap-and-trade. Three months later, on July 22, 2010, a little over a year after House passage of Waxman-
Markey, the Senate formally dropped deliberation over a comparable cap-and-trade bill.5 As prima-facie
evidence that these events affected stock prices, Figure 2.2 plots the cumulative 2-day stock returns for several
prominent companies during four of these major events. These companies, which were the seven highest
spenders on Waxman-Markey related lobbying (see Table 2.12), generally exhibited negative abnormal stock
returns on June 26, 2009 and Nov 4, 2009 and positive abnormal returns on Apr 23, 2010 and July 22, 2010.
This politically turbulent period provides a suitable setting to study the market effects of cap-and-trade
regulation for two reasons. First, as documented above, political developments within this period provided
large variation in cap-and-trade prospects from their peak in the summer of 2009 to their eventual decline
one year later. Second, in contrast to previous Congresses in which several cap-and-trade bills were under
consideration simultaneously, the 111th Congress only seriously considered the Waxman-Markey bill and its
Senate variant. Without the potentially confounding effects of other climate and energy-related legislation,
estimates from this period should better reflect direct concerns over Waxman-Markey.
2.3 Theoretical framework
This section presents a theoretical framework which maps market values onto the marginal abatement cost
under a cap-and-trade system. Following the modeling framework of Montgomery (1972) and Rubin (1996),
I first explore the joint cost minimization problem for firms and households which solves for an aggregate
marginal abatement cost. In practice, however, the regulator can never implement the joint cost problem,
but can instead set up a cap-and-trade system. To that end, I analyze the cost minimization problem under
emissions trading in which the equilibrium allowance price equals the aggregate marginal abatement cost.
An extension of this equivalence result yields an expression approximating the aggregate marginal abatement
cost for the policy. Because I do not observe the impact of the policy on households, I can only recover the
portion of the aggregate marginal abatement cost attributed to firms. Throughout, I use a general objective
President. Thus, passage of Waxman-Markey by the House of Representatives needed to be followed by a similar cap-and-trade
bill approved by a Senate filibuster-proof supermajority.
5These events are further summarized in 2.D.
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function to avoid specifying market structure and production technology. The section concludes with a
discussion about heterogeneity in cap-and-trade costs across firms.
2.3.1 Joint-cost minimization
Banking and borrowing provisions in most cap-and-trade legislations allow aggregate annual emissions caps to
be ostensibly treated as a cumulative stock.6 This insight allows one to translate the dynamic setting of a cap-
and-trade policy into the canonical Hotelling model of optimal extraction for a known stock of nonrenewable
resource (Hotelling, 1931). This was explored in Rubin (1996)’s dynamic model of emissions trading which
extended the canonical static model of Montgomery (1972) first establishing the cost effectiveness of emissions
trading. Following this framework, I explore a joint cost minimization problem in which N − 1 firms and a
representative household choose annual emissions eit to optimally deplete a fixed known stock of R emissions
over t ∈ [0, T ], the lifetime of the policy.7 For simplicity, firms and the representative household are treated
identically within this framework, a point I return to later.
I define a concave, twice-differentiable, general profit function with emissions eit. The optimal control













s0 = R, sT ≥ 0, eit ≥ 0 ∀i
where δ is the exogenously determined rate of interest.8 Solving the current value Hamiltonian yields the
following first order conditions:
pi′i(eit) = Λt ∀i (2.1)
Λ˙t − δΛt = 0 (2.2)
ΛT sT e−δT = 0 (2.3)
where Λt is the positive current value shadow price at year t and can be naturally interpreted as the marginal
6Waxman-Markey permits unlimited banking and limited borrowing of future allowances. Specifically, borrowing of al-
lowances vintage 2 to 5 years into the future are subject to a 15% interest. Such constraints result in allowance price increases
below the rate of interest (Rubin, 1996; Schennach, 2000). Because I am primarily interested in estimating the allowance price
during the first year of the policy, for simplicity, this model sets allowance prices to follow Hotelling’s rule.
7This setup differs from the Montgomery (1972) model along three dimensions. First, I introduce a household production
sector in which the representative agent maximizes “profit” from the household production of a utility good. Second, the
objective function is written in terms of firm profits and not the difference between unconstrained and constrained profits.
Lastly, I deviate from Rubin (1996)’s setup by writing an equation of motion in terms of depletion rather than accumulation.
These choices were made for expository simplicity but are mathematically immaterial.
8I assume that cap-and-trade regulation ends in 2050 as written in Waxman-Markey to avoid explicit assumptions about
both business-as-usual emissions and cap-and-trade regulation beyond 2050.
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abatement cost as it corresponds to the marginal profit associated with an extra unit of allowed emissions.
Equations 2.2-2.3 summarizes two well-established features of the Hotelling problem. First, a simple rear-
rangement of Equation 2.2 yields Hotelling’s rule, Λt = Λ0eδt, which states that the marginal abatement
cost rises at the rate of interest. Second, observe that Hotelling’s rule together with the transversality




i=1 eitdt = R. That is, total emissions must equal R by the end of













it )dt. An envelope theorem-type argument implies:
9
Λ0(R) = V ′(R) (2.4)
Furthermore, a concave, nondecreasing, and nonnegative value function, together with a positive shadow
price, yields Λ0 ≥ 0 and dΛ0(R)dR < 0. That is, the marginal abatement cost rises as the cumulative cap
under the policy tightens. Now consider a linear approximation for Λ0 between the optimum value for a
no-policy, business-as-usual scenario with cumulative emissions Ro, and the optimum value under a policy
with cumulative emissions constrained at R:
Λ0(R) ≈ V (R)− V (R
o)
R−Ro (2.5)
Observe that given the concavity of V (R) and since R < Ro, a linear approximation understates Λ0(R) to
a degree that depends on the concavity of V (R).
2.3.2 Cap-and-trade
In practice, however, the regulator never solves the joint cost problem, but can introduce a cap-and-trade
system. Here, the regulator’s role is to create R cumulative allowances such that in each period Afit is given
freely to firm or household i and Aat is auctioned off.
10 Denote yit as the number of allowances sold (>0) or





e−δt [pii(eit) + τtyit] dt
s.t. s˙it = A
f
it − eit − yit
si0 = 0, siT ≥ 0, eit ≥ 0 ∀i
9See (Weitzman, 2003, p. 159)
10Observe that Montgomery (1972) and Rubin (1996) assume that all allowances are distributed freely, that is Aat = 0 ∀t.
This is inconsistent with Waxman-Markey.
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where τt is the allowance price. The first order conditions from the current value Hamiltonian are:
pi′i(eit) = λit (2.6)
τt = −λit (2.7)
λ˙it − δλit = 0 (2.8)
λiT sT e
−δT = 0 (2.9)
























it − e∗it − y∗it)dt
]
= 0 (2.11)
Rubin (1996) shows that the market equilibrium satisfying Equations 2.6 - 2.11 achieves E∗∗t = E
∗
t and
−Λt = τ∗t . That is, the decentralized emissions trading solution yields the same efficient emissions allocation
as the joint cost problem and the marginal abatement cost obtained from the joint cost problem equals the
equilibrium allowance price. Now, suppose one could observe the aggregate difference in optimal firm and
































= V (R)− V (Ro) + ΛoAa (2.14)
where the second line uses Rubin (1996)’s equivalence result. The third line employs the definition for the
current value shadow price, uses Equation 2.10, sets Aa =
∫ T
o
Aat dt, and substitutes the optimal value from
the joint cost problem. Dividing Equation 2.14 by the cumulative abatement under Waxman-Markey, R−Ro,





Equation 2.15 states that the marginal abatement cost can be recovered by estimating the differences in firm
and household values under business-as-usual and Waxman-Markey scenarios. Furthermore, it requires no
further assumptions on the function pii(eit). The numerator can be interpreted as the total level of abatement
adjusted for the number of auctioned allowances. Observe that the Coase independence property, whereby
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the equilibrium allowance prices are unaffected by the initial distribution of allowances, holds throughout
this framework (Coase, 1960; Montgomery, 1972; Hahn and Stavins, 2010). However, recovering the policy’s
underlying marginal abatement price using potentially observable market values requires specifying the
cumulative number of auctioned allowances. This is because, as evident from the objective function, changes
in market values depend on the share of total allowances that are freely distributed.11 Because ∆vi and
R − Ro are both negative, a greater share of free allowances Aa would lower losses due to the policy which
increases the numerator in Equation 2.15. Thus, neglecting allowance auctioning would understate the true
marginal abatement cost.
Thus far, I have treated firms and the representative household alike. However, notice that I cannot
recover the aggregate marginal abatement cost because I do not observe cap-and-trade effects on households.







where I refer the first and second terms as the firm and household components of the aggregate marginal





This paper only estimates ΛFo (R). Unlike the aggregate marginal abatement cost or allowance price shown
in Equation 2.16, estimates from this paper only capture the component of overall welfare loss associated
with changes in firm value. Changes in household utility, which may be negatively affected by cap-and-trade
due to pass-through of policy incidence onto output prices, is not recovered by this paper.
2.3.3 Heterogeneity
Finally, I consider heterogeneity of cap-and-trade cost across firms in a static context. Removing the time
index, I specify the following profit function at the optimal emissions level:
v∗i = pqi(e
∗
i )− Ci(qi(e∗i ), w) + τ(Afi − e∗i ) (2.18)




marginal impact of cap-and-trade on profits can be obtained via the envelope theorem:
11I thank Michael Greenstone for raising this point.















Cap-and-trade affects profit through changes in input and output prices. The first term, which is negative,
suggests that firms with carbon and energy intensive inputs would exhibit greater losses. The second term
summarizes the pass-through effect. Firms that can pass-through a greater portion of regulatory costs onto
output markets should experience lower losses. High pass-through is captured directly by a low elasticity of
demand or indirectly by low rates of import penetration. The third term captures the positive effect from
the distribution of free allowances. Finally, Equation 2.19 does not capture the regulatory exposure of a firm
with both domestic and international operations. Intuitively, all else equal, firms with a greater share of
overall exposure to U.S. output markets would experience greater losses than firms with higher international
market exposure. In Section 2.3.3, I examine empirical evidence for all four effects.
To recap, the central empirical challenge is to estimate ∆vi for all firms. Section 2.4 details the proce-
dure for estimating the cost of Waxman-Markey for listed firms using prediction markets while Section 2.6
generates cost bounds for unlisted firms using lobbying expenditures.
2.4 Empirical methodology
2.4.1 Prediction market event studies
Traditional event studies examine abnormal stock returns in response to an unexpected release of information.
Isolating the moment when markets become aware of this information is a central challenge. This is typically
manifested in the selection of an event window in which the probability of policy realization is 0 prior to
the window and 1 afterwards. Any “fuzziness” in the release of information may result in estimates that
are sensitive to event window selection as demonstrated by Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2011) in their
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of U.S. presidential elections.
To address this issue, Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) employ prediction markets data. The
typical prediction market contract is a bet on the realization of a particular event at a certain date. When
that date is reached, holders of a contract receive $1 if the event is realized and zero otherwise with contract
prices fluctuating within the unit interval prior to the termination date.12 Under certain assumptions about
prediction market participants,13 the price of the contract can be interpreted as the real-time average market
12Actual Intrade contract prices range from $0 - $10. I normalize prices to match probabilities.
13Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show that two assumptions are required in order for prediction market prices to equal mean
beliefs: 1) utility has a log form and 2) trader wealth and beliefs are independent. For other standard utility functions, the
divergence between prediction market prices and mean beliefs is shown generally to be quite small when 1) traders are risk
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belief over event realization. Thus, prediction market prices obviate the need to specify event windows.
Instead, each trading day in which a prediction market price is observed can be treated as an “event” such
that the estimated effect is the change in abnormal returns normalized over changes in market beliefs. This
is referred to as the “event period”.
Availability of prediction market prices provides two important advantages over traditional event studies.
First, it mitigates concern over fuzzy information release while increasing the sample size for estimating
abnormal returns. Second, and more importantly, prediction market prices allow researchers to estimate
abnormal returns for a probable event even if this event is never realized. In other words, the use of prediction
markets can transform event studies into a tool for policy forecasting, a feature that is widely applicable to
different policy issues but has thus far been little explored in the literature (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2009;
Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2012). There are, during any legislative period, a number of important
policies that fail to become law but whose costs remain of interest, perhaps to inform future legislative
efforts. Prediction markets have been offered for recently proposed U.S. legislation reforming health care,
immigration, and social security regulation.14 Unfortunately, for many of these policies, available prediction
markets often exhibit thin trading. As demonstrated in my empirical framework below, thin trading affects
estimation procedure and choice of robustness tests.
2.4.2 Intrade cap-and-trade market
From May 1, 2009 to Dec 31, 2010,15 the online trading exchange Intrade hosted a prediction market contract
on the prospects of a U.S. cap-and-trade system. This contract was titled: “A cap and trade system for
emissions trading to be established before midnight ET on 31 Dec 2010”. Intrade further defined this contract
noting:
“A cap and trade system will be considered established once federal legislation authorizing the cre-
ation of such a system becomes law, as reported by three independent and reliable media sources.
Emissions trading under the system does not need to begin for the contract to be expired.”
Figure 2.3 plots the price time series for this contract. A price of $.50 indicates that, on average, the market
believed cap-and-trade had a 50% chance of being realized before the end of 2010. Each solid red line identifies
a major political event mentioned in Section 2.2 that had direct effects on the prospects of cap-and-trade
averse, 2) prices are within the $0.20 − $0.80 range, and 3) the distribution of beliefs exhibit relatively low dispersion. In the
case where trader wealth and belief are correlated, the prediction market price reflects the wealth weighted average belief in
the trading population.
14A list of all Intrade prediction markets is available here:www.intrade.com/v4/reports/special/all-intrade-markets/
all-intrade-markets.xlsx
15Intrade began offering this contract on March 25, 2009. However, trading began only on May 1, 2009, which marks the
start of the event period.
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passage in the U.S. Senate. Dashed gray lines indicate events with indirect effects. Importantly, Figure 2.3
shows that this prediction market was indeed responsive to major cap-and-trade political developments (see
2.D for a summary of these events). Total trading volume during these 9 major events constitute 17% of all
contracts transacted prior to Senate withdrawal of cap-and-trade legislation on July 22, 2010..
Two aspects of this prediction market fall short of the ideal. First, the contract describes a generic
cap-and-trade system without explicit mention of Waxman-Markey, its particular parameters, and associ-
ated auxiliary policies. However, one can be reasonably confident that prediction market participants were
reacting predominantly to a policy similar to Waxman-Markey. First, President Obama explicitly supported
a cap-and-trade bill with a cap schedule similar to Waxman-Markey during the event period, a point that
was noted on Intrade’s cap-and-trade message board at the time.16 Secondly, whereas some details of a leg-
islation can vary across House and Senate versions, important features such as the cap schedule are usually
unaltered in order for the two bills to be reconciled without additional floor votes. Thus, Senate efforts were
likely constrained by the abatement levels specified in Waxman-Markey.17
A second, and more troubling concern, is the relative thinness of this market. During the event period,
11,260 contracts were traded for a total value of $190,000. An average of 20 contracts were transacted
daily. By comparison, the prediction market used in Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) had an average
of 129 trades for every 10-minute interval during election night. Transaction-level data acquired privately
from Intrade indicates that there were 143 unique traders participating in the market.18 It also reveals the
presence of two large volume traders. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 plot the buying and selling volumes of Large
Traders 1 and 2 relative to the total traded volume for the event period. Large Trader 1, a large buyer in
the market, was responsible for 38% of all contracts sold. Conversely, Large Trader 2 was responsible for
22% of all contracts purchased.
Thinly traded prediction markets might be vulnerable to manipulation. Specifically, one might worry
that Large Trader 1 wanted to inflate prediction prices whereas Large Trader 2 targeted lower prices. Several
lines of evidence suggest otherwise. First, the direction of Intrade price fluctuations shown in Figure 2.3
for major event days intuitively match the cap-and-trade implications of those political developments. In
particular, Large Trader 1’s buying activity could not prevent the fall in prediction market prices following
Senator Graham’s exit. Second, the buying and selling patterns of Large Traders 1 and 2 respectively do not
16Intrade cap-and-trade message board available here: http://bb.intrade.com/intradeForum/posts/list/4343.page
17Nonetheless, one cannot eliminate the possibility of Intrade participants betting on different cap-and-trade systems. Indeed,
a cursory examination of Intrade’s cap-and-trade message board reveals that some participants, though perhaps not those
involved in betting, thought sectoral-level emissions trading schemes were more plausible in 2010.
18While Intrade does not provide information on where traders are located, Intrade has said in a public letter to the
U.S. CFTC that “our 82,000 plus membership are predominantly resident in the United States” and that “78% of traffic to
Intrade.com in the period 1 January to 30 June [2008] was from the U.S.” Available here: http://www.intrade.com/news/
misc/CFTC_Intrade_Comment_Reg_Treatment_Event_Mkts.pdf
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appear in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 to be consistent with active price manipulation. That is, one would expect the
buying volume of Large Trader 1 to be largest on the major event days indicated by vertical dashed lines
and similarly for the selling activity of Large Trader 2. With the exception of Senator Graham’s exit, the
observed pattern of transactions appears to suggest noise trading rather than price manipulation. In Section
2.5.2, I conduct a series of statistical tests that fail to detect any effect of price manipulation.
This robustness of prediction market prices to the activity of individual traders is consistent with some
theoretical and empirical results on price manipulation in betting markets. Adapting a standard model of
market microstructure, Hanson and Oprea (2009) demonstrate theoretically that the presence of a price
manipulator can actually increase prediction market accuracy by increasing the incentives for informed
trading. Recent experimental research shows that price manipulators are unable to distort price accuracy
(Robin, Oprea and Porter, 2006) nor influence the beliefs of third party observers (Hanson et al., 2011).
With the exception of brief transitory effects, similar price robustness to manipulation has been found in
racetrack (Camerer, 1998) and presidential betting markets (Rhode and Strumpf, 2004).
2.4.3 Empirical framework
In this section, I formally develop an empirical framework to illustrate the implications that thinly traded
prediction markets have on event study estimation procedure and choice of robustness tests. I use ` = 1...L
to denote a listed firm. Recall from Section 2.3 that one is interested in estimating ∆v` = v`(R)−v`(Ro), the
difference in discounted present value of firm ` under business-as-usual and Waxman-Markey scenarios. To
simplify notation, I now write this difference as v` − vo` . Unfortunately, neither is directly observed because
the U.S. government has never passed cap-and-trade legislation nor was the probability of cap-and-trade
realization ever zero within the event period. Instead, at each date t, I observe the pair [v˜`t, θt], denoting
the actual market value of firm ` and the prediction market price. Market value lies between my two values
of interest, that is v˜`t ∈ [v`t, vo`t], and is a function of the prediction market price.
To show this formally, suppose there are three climate policy states, p ∈ [w, a, o], indicating the Waxman-
Markey, alternative, and no-policy states respectively. For simplicity, I define the alternative policy as all
possible climate mitigation policies that are not Waxman-Markey, including a similar policy with a later
implementation date. Define the random variable qpt ∈ [0, 1] as the average population belief at time t
that potential climate policy p will be realized. Applying the law of total probability for a risk-neutral
representative trader, I can write:




`t + (1− qwt − qat )vo`t
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where va`t is firm value under the alternative policy. In words, the observed market value of firm ` at time
t is the expected value of the firm given uncertainty about climate policy passage. Defining the effect of
Waxman-Markey as γ` =
v`t−vo`t
vo`t
and likewise for the alternative policy effect, γa` results in:
19







Taking logs and first differences of Equation 2.20 yields an expression for stock returns, r`t:
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t ) ≈ γ`qwt + γa` qat , and thus:20




t + ∆ ln v
o
`t (2.21)
To obtain an econometric specification, I make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 ∆θt is an unbiased estimate of ∆qwt
Assumption 1 states that the prediction market price can be used as a proxy for changes in average market
beliefs over Waxman-Markey realization. In particular, Assumption 1 encapsulates the two earlier noted
concerns over whether the prediction market proxies for Waxman-Markey beliefs and biases due to thin
trading. A second assumption states:
Assumption 2 E[∆θt∆qat |∆ ln vo`t] = 0, within the event period
That is, changes in average market beliefs on Waxman-Markey prospects are uncorrelated with beliefs over
other plausible climate policy within the event period after controlling for normal market performance. This
allows me to replace ∆qat with an error term `t which together with Assumption 1 yields:
r`t = γ`∆θt + ∆ ln vo`t + `t (2.22)
In Section 2.5, I conduct a series of tests examining the validity of Assumptions 1 and 2. There is a
fundamental tradeoff between identification and precision in the estimation of Equation 2.22. I am interested
in the aggregate effect of the Waxman-Markey bill on all listed firms. Suppose ∆ ln vo`t = α` + β`ηt. The
most natural procedure is to run the following value-weighted time series regression on aggregate market
returns:
19The definition of the policy space allows γ` to be time-invariant within the event period.
20During the event period, the average θt = 0.24 while the average estimated Waxman-Markey effect is γ = −0.02. Average
beliefs and effects for alternative climate policies are likely even lower. Such small values allow the approximation to be
reasonable. Econometrically, this results in attenuation bias.
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γ` with vo` being firm value under the no-
policy scenario. However, as Roll (1977) has noted, ηt is not directly observed. Instead, one can run the
following feasible bivariate time series regression:
mktt = α˙+ γ˙∆θt + ˙t (2.24)
Observe that estimates of γ˙ will typically suffer from omitted variable bias unless one has cause to believe
cov(ηt,∆θt) = 0. This assumption may be plausible during the night of a presidential election which allows
Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007) to run bivariate regressions similar to Equation 2.24 at 10-minute
intervals. Thin trading in the cap-and-trade prediction market prevents me from using high-frequency returns
during major event periods. Instead, I can estimate Equation 2.24 using longer return periods which include
the five days with major political developments directly affecting Waxman-Markey prospects as shown in
Figure 2.3. For these major events, it is more plausible that cap-and-trade prospects and macroeconomic
shocks are uncorrelated.
While point estimates from Equation 2.24 may be unbiased during these major events, estimation pre-
cision is low given the small sample size. To increase precision of my estimates, I also perform a panel
regression for the entire event period with benchmarks for normal market performance to mitigate concerns
about omitted variable bias in the full sample. A panel approach would also allow me to explore hetero-
geneity of Waxman-Markey effects across firms. The finance literature suggests two benchmark models. The
CAPM model includes a firm fixed effect, α`, and an aggregate market return index, mktt. The seminal
work of Fama and French (1993) advises the use of returns from a value-based portfolio, hmlt, and size-based
portfolio, smbt, as additional controls in a 3-factor model to account for common risk factors associated with
book-to-market ratio and firm size.
Panel regressions with benchmark controls have one major drawback in this context. An implicit as-
sumption in event studies is that benchmark controls are not affected by the treatment of interest. While
this may be likely for firm or sector specific treatments, cap-and-trade is expected to have general equilib-
rium effects across the entire economy. It is therefore possible that changes in Waxman-Markey prospects
directly affect the aggregate indices in the CAPM and 3-factor Fama-French models resulting in estimates of
abnormal return that are biased towards zero. To address this additional concern, I also construct separate
benchmarks using the weighted returns of listed firms with low carbon intensity. Specifically, I construct
value-weighted indices for all firms in 6-digit NAICS sectors in which 2006 carbon intensity from both own
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operations and inputs was below 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 mton CO2 per billion. Because these firms are likely to
experience relatively smaller direct effects of cap-and-trade regulation via input prices and compliance costs,
use of low carbon intensity benchmarks as control should alleviate concerns over treatment spillover. Con-
trolling for low carbon intensity performance would also provide a cleaner control for the no-policy scenario
if one believes that the prospects of alternative climate policies are priced into the aggregate indices used
in the CAPM and 3-factor Fama-French models. However, benchmarking abnormal returns relative to low
carbon intensity firms would not entirely eliminate concerns over treatment spillover. Low carbon intensity
firms would still experience the effects of cap-and-trade regulation through general equilibrium changes in
output prices. Furthermore, because low carbon intensity benchmarks are constructed for a subsample of
firms, low carbon intensity benchmarks may not fully capture common risk factors that are correlated with
cap-and-trade prospects.21 Concern over this fundamental tradeoff between identification and precision for
time series and panel approaches would be alleviated if point estimates across the two methods are similar
as demonstrated in Section 2.5.1.
My panel specification is:
r`t = γ`∆θt + Ftβ` + `t (2.25)
where Ft = {1,mktt}, {1,mktt, hmlt, smbt}, {1, ci.05t }, {1, ci.10t }, and {1, ci.15t } for the CAPM, 3-factor Fama-
French, and low carbon intensity benchmark models respectively. I estimate Equation 2.25 for all firms
continuously listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during the policy period.22 However, with over 5,000
listed firms, panel regression of Equation 2.25 requires joint estimation of over 20,000 parameters in the
3-factor Fama-French model, which runs into computational limits. Instead, I estimate Equation 2.25 firm-
by-firm and report both the equally and value-weighted average effect for all listed firms. A seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) model is used to conduct inference on the aggregate effect.23 In the standard
SUR framework, errors are correlated across firms but are iid over time and block homoscedastic.24 Thus, the
resulting standard errors are not robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. To address this concern,
I also perform panel regressions for a random subsample of firms imposing both heteroscedastic-robust and
sector-level clustered standard errors to examine whether the SUR error structure is too restrictive.
Assumption 1 fails when prediction market prices are a biased estimate of the average market over
Waxman-Markey realization. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show that with certain utility functions, a
21There are 5, 23, and 82 6-digit NAICS sectors that are below 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 carbon intensity in 2006.
22I exclude firms that are not continuously listed during this period because firm entry and exit in response to cap-and-trade
regulation is not explicitly modeled.
23In a system of equations, if regressors are identical, firm-by-firm SUR is identical to systems GLS and achieves any efficiency
gains provided by GLS (see (Greene, 2003, p. 341-344))
24Specifically, denoting Σ as the variance-covariance error matrix from Equation 2.25, the element σit,js = E[i
′
j |Ft] ∀ t = s
and 0 otherwise.
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favorite-longshot bias and reverse favorite-longshot bias can occur for prediction market prices below $0.20
and exceeding $0.80 respectively. To address this concern, my benchmark specification uses only trading
days in which prediction prices lie between $0.20-$0.80.
Thin trading in the cap-and-trade prediction market may violate Assumption 2 due to small sample
bias, price volatility arising from market overreactions, or transitory distortions from price manipulation. To
address these concerns, I estimate both Equations 2.24 and 2.25 using 2-day intervals. The use of longer time
intervals also account for Intrade prediction markets having later closing hours than the primary U.S. stock
exchanges as well as the occurrence of after-hours stock trading.25 Important political developments that
occur after 4pm ET on trading days would be reflected in Intrade closing prices but may not be incorporated
in stock market closing prices.
Finally, the need to control for ∆ ln vo`t also raises the issue of how to select an estimation window for
normal market performance parameters. Traditional event studies are performed in two steps. First, a
normal market performance model estimates parameters for a pre-event period considered unadulterated by
the event of interest. In the second step, abnormal returns are defined as predicted residuals within the event
window. There are two reasons why this standard pre-event procedure is ill-suited for this analysis. First,
prediction markets data allow for an event period rather than a single event. Because the sample period is
now lengthened, estimation of abnormal returns requires additional care if normal market parameters are
thought to vary across pre-event and event periods. Second, because θt is not observed prior to the start
of the Intrade contract, normal market parameters estimated pre-event would have to impose θt = 0 before
May 1, 2009. This is an unreasonable assumption as prior Congressional deliberations of cap-and-trade
legislation would indicate a strictly positive, though unobserved, θt prior to May 1, 2009.26
2.5 Listed firms: prediction market event study
This section presents event study results for listed firms. A summary of each data source is discussed in 2.C.
First, I show the Waxman-Markey effect for all listed firms using different benchmarks of normal market
performance. Estimates are provided for both the aggregate time series regression for the subset of major
25Intrade closing prices are observed 2am on weekdays and 3am on weekends. If after-hours stock trading were to occur, the
effect of information released after 4:00pm ET on trading days or over weekends would not be picked up using observed daily
returns.
26While not preferred, I also show estimates using a pre-event procedure for robustness. For the pre-event procedure, I first
estimate normal market parameters in a pre-event period from January 1, 2008 - May 1, 2009:
r`t = β`1mktt + β`2hmlt + β`3smbt + c` + `t
In a second step, estimated parameters from step one are used to estimate average abnormal returns, aar`t, within the event
period May 1, 2009 - Dec 31, 2010:
aar`t = γ`∆θt + E[r`t|cβ`1, cβ`2, cβ`3, bc`] (2.26)
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events and firm-level panel regressions for the full event period. Next, I provide robustness results that help
validate Assumptions 1 and 2. Finally, I present heterogeneity results along several dimensions that are
both consistent with general climate policy incidence as well as to a specific feature of the Waxman-Markey
cap-and-trade bill.
2.5.1 Main result
Table 2.1 shows the equally-weighted average effect, value-weighted average effect, and total aggregate cost of
the Waxman-Markey bill for all continuously listed firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from May 01, 2009
to December 31, 2010. All variables are in 2-day intervals to address concerns about price volatility, investor
overreaction, price manipulation, and difference closing hours between stock and Intrade markets. In Panel
(a), I estimate a time series regression of aggregate market returns on the difference in prediction market
price as shown in Equation 2.24. The sample used is the subset of five events with political developments
that are directly related to Waxman-Markey prospects and are likely to be uncorrelated with macroeconomic
shocks.27 My point estimate shows that had Waxman-Markey been implemented, listed firms would have
lost a total of $160 billion. However, because the time series is conduct over a small sample, precision of my
estimates are very low.
To obtain more precise estimates, I estimate panel regressions using Equation 2.25 in Panel (b) of Table
2.1 with different benchmarks for normal market performance. Specifically, I use the standard CAPM and
3-factor Fama-French models in Rows (2) and (3) as well as low carbon intensity benchmarks constructed
from listed firms with carbon intensity below 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 mton CO2 per billion in Rows (4)-(6) to
address concerns about treatment spillover. To avoid favorite-longshot bias and reverse favorite-longshot
bias in the prediction market prices, I only include trading days in which θt ∈ [0.2, 0.8].
All models in Panels (b) show negative and statistically significant effects. Across the five models, average
effect for listed firms range from -1.6% to -2.4% while the total cost range from -$120 to -$190 billion. A few
points are worth noting. The CAPM model yields slightly lower estimates than the 3-factor Fama-French
model but do not fall outside the latter’s 95% confidence interval. This suggests that cap-and-trade prospects
might be positively correlated with the profitability of small market cap and high book-to-market firms.
Consistent with the earlier discussion about treatment spillover, estimates in Panel (b) using low carbon
intensity benchmarks are more negative than estimates using aggregate market benchmarks. However, the
small magnitude of the difference between estimates in Rows (2)-(3) and Rows (4)-(6) suggests that concerns
27These special events, corresponding to the red vertical lines in Figure 2.3, were 11/4/2009, 12/20/2009, 1/27/2010,
4/23/2010, and 7/22/2010. I exclude the day of Waxman-Markey passage, 6/26/2009, because prediction price movements
in response to that event occurred over the weekend during which stock markets were closed. For events that fall on a weekend,
I construct returns based on the next available trading day. See 2.D for a summary of these events.
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about treatment spillover are relatively minor when using aggregate market benchmarks. Most importantly,
the similarity in point estimates between the time series approach in Panel (a) and the panel approach
in Panel (b) suggests that the tradeoff between identification and precision across these two approaches is
relatively minor.
Finally, Figure 2.6 presents the 3-factor Fama-French model result in a scatterplot of abnormal returns
averaged across all firms against the change in prediction market price. It shows that abnormal returns are
roughly linear in prediction market changes within the support of observed prediction price changes.
2.5.2 Addressing validity of Assumption 1
In the robustness checks for this section, I present the equally weighted average Waxman-Markey effect all
listed firms. My robustness results will be compared against the panel regression of 2-day returns using the
3-factor Fama-French benchmark model as shown in Row (3) of Table 2.1. Again, the sample is restricted
to just trading days in which θt ∈ [0.2, 0.8].
Assumption 1 fails when prediction market prices are a biased estimate of the average market belief over
Waxman-Markey realization. Table 2.2 explores whether thin trading and price manipulation might generate
this bias. Column (1) replicates the main result. To examine whether thin trading affects my estimates,
in Column (2) I restrict the sample to only days with trading volume which exceeded the sample mean
of 30 trades. The Waxman-Markey effect is stable though the standard errors increase under the reduced
sample size. In Column (3), I conduct a less arbitrary test by interacting the daily trading volume with
the prediction market variable. The interacted coefficient is small and statistically insignificant while the
uninteracted prediction market variable is largely unaffected suggesting that concerns over thin trading are
not well warranted.
As an initial test of price manipulation, I restrict the sample to just trading days in which neither Large
Traders 1 nor 2 were active in the market in Column (4). While the sample size drops by one-third, the
Waxman-Markey effect falls within the 95% confidence interval of my main result in Column (1) and is itself
statistically significant. Simply examining days without the involvement of Large Traders 1 and 2, however,
does not preclude other trading days in which the market was dominated by relatively few traders. Using
transaction-level data with unique trader identifiers, I construct a daily buyer-based normalized Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index (HHI).28 This index captures the relative competitiveness of the prediction market for any
given day. In Column (5), I restrict the sample to just days with HHI<0.25. The standard error for Column
28Formally, for trading day t, there are j = 1...Jt traders each purchasing sjt share of all prediction market contracts
transacted that day. The normalized Herfindahl-Hirshman Index is H∗t =
Ht−1/Jt
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(5) is large as the sample is reduced to only 9 days but the point estimate is similar to my main result in
Column (1). The HHI cutoff used in Column (5) is nonetheless arbitrary. My final, and most stringent
test, interacts the prediction market variable with the daily HHI. The uninteracted prediction market term
in Column (6) can be interpreted as the average effect of Waxman-Markey after removing the influence of
prediction market bidding competitiveness. The Waxman-Markey effect in Column (6) is slightly larger, but
still within the 95% confidence interval of my main result in Column (1).
Another possible violation of Assumption 1 concerns Intrade contract expiration. The cap-and-trade
prediction market employed in this analysis expired on December 31, 2010, regardless of whether cap-and-
trade regulation were to eventually pass Congress. Thus, while the prospects of cap-and-trade realization
might indeed be declining in 2010, a component of the price movements shown in Figure 2.3 might also reflect
expectations that policy realization is unlikely to occur before December 31, 2010. In practice, however, this
was unlikely, as a specific legislation, having failed in the current Congress, is rarely reintroduced with
identical features in a subsequent Congress. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether markets expected
Waxman-Markey prospects to exist following the end of the 111th Congress. If so, this introduces a bias
between the prediction market price and average market beliefs which would increase as the expiration date
nears. In 2.A, I detail an adjustment procedure to separate average market beliefs, the true variable of
interest, from concerns over contract expiration. This procedure uses information from a similar Intrade
prediction market with an earlier expiration date at the end of 2009.
In Table 2.A1, I find that adjusting for contract expiration yields a coefficient that is similar to my main
result. While using the adjusted prediction market price in general results in more positive point estimates,
they fall within the uncertainty of my main result. This is because whereas the adjustment procedure
illustrated in Figure 2.A3 inflates prediction market price levels to account for concerns of impending contract
expiration, much of this adjustment is already removed from the unadjusted prediction market price after
first-differencing.
2.5.3 Addressing validity of Assumption 2
Assumption 2 requires that Waxman-markey beliefs, as approximated by prediction market prices, are
uncorrelated with alternative climate policies after controlling for normal market performance. As discussed
in Section 2.2, cap-and-trade dominated climate policy debates in the United States during the event period.
Figure 2.7 plots the number of U.S. news article compiled by Google that contained the term “cap-and-trade”
and terms capturing several alternative climate policies during the event period.29 Observe that the U.S.
29Google News tabulates any news articles containing a particular term of interest. Thus, it is possible that an article about
“cap-and-trade” would also include mention of “energy policy”.
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media cited cap-and-trade far more than alternative climate policies during the event period. However, it also
appears that media interest in cap-and-trade declined in 2010 as coverage of alternative policies intensified.
To see whether this poses a violation of Assumption 2, in Table 2.3 I augment the controls for normal
market performance to include indices that possibly capture the contemporaneous prospects of alternative
climate policies. Column (1) replicates my main result. Column (2) shows that the estimated Waxman-
Markey effect is unperturbed by the inclusion of a linear trend, suggesting that first-differencing effectively
removes common trends in the data. 2009-2010 was a particularly volatile period for oil prices, witnessing
both a historic high and decline in global prices. Given the tight coupling between oil prices and carbon
emissions, one might be concerned that prediction market prices were driven by daily oil price movements.
In Column (3), I include oil price returns as a control which has little effect on the coefficient of interest. EU-
ETS allowances (EUA) prices provide another proxy for alternative climate policy prospects. In particular,
EU-ETS allowance prices might capture beliefs over an international climate policy which might be correlated
with Waxman-Markey prospects. Column (4) shows that the Waxman-Markey effect increases slightly when
controlling for changes in 2015 futures EUA prices but that the coefficient lies within the 95% confidence
interval of my main result in Column (1). In Column (5), I control for beliefs over alternative climate policies
by including changes in the frequency of alternative climate policy headlines from Google News as shown in
Figure 2.7. These controls have little effect on the coefficient of interest. Finally, in Column (6) a kitchen sink
regression is performed using a vector of monthly macroeconomic indicators commonly used in the finance
literature to predict the aggregate market risk premium (see Welch and Goyal (2008)).30 Unsurprisingly,
given the known low predictive power of these variables, the estimated effect falls within the 95% confidence
interval of my main result.
Previous prediction market event studies noted concerns about reverse causality with time series analyses
(Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2011). My panel approach partly addresses this concern by removing
common risk factors. Table 2.4 explores this further by adding lead and lag terms to my 3-factor Fama-
French specification. Across all models, the coefficient of interest attenuates slightly but remain statistically
significant at the 5% level. Column (1) replicates my main result. In Column (2), a 1-period lagged return
is included and is not statistically significant. This result also mitigates concerns about serial correlation
in the residuals. Column (3) includes a lagged prediction market term which is not statistically significant
suggesting that markets incorporate information on policy prospects within a 2-day window. In Column (4),
a lead prediction market term is included and is not statistically significant implying there is no evidence of
30Due to computational limits, I am unable to control for the entire set of Welsh-Goyal variables, instead only choosing
those with predictive power (Welch and Goyal, 2008). These controls include the variance of returns on the S&P 500 (svar),
the book-to-market value of the DJIA (bm), the long-term yield (lty) and rate of return (ltr) on U.S. government bonds, a
12-month moving sum of net NYSE issues over total capitalization (ntis), and inflation from the CPI (infl).
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stock markets anticipating future prediction market activity.
Finally, in Table 2.5, I consider different trading day subsamples. Figure 2.7 and Intrade’s message board
suggest that both media and investor beliefs over alternatives climate policy prospects were increasing at the
start of 2010 as Waxman-Markey beliefs were declining, possibly violating Assumption 2. In Columns (2)
and (3), I run separate regressions for trading days in 2009 and 2010 showing that the coefficient is relatively
stable across the two years though the reduced sample size in Column (3) yields larger standard errors.
In Columns (4) and (5), I test whether market participants responded asymmetrically to the direction of
prediction market changes by restricting the sample to just trading days in which ∆θt ≥ 0 and ∆θt < 0
respectively. I find no evidence of asymmetric effects. Finally, in Column (6) I include all trading days
in which Intrade prices were available. While this is not preferred given the favorite-longshot and reverse
favorite-longshot biases associated with prediction markets when θt /∈ [0.2, 0.8], estimates from the full sample
are within the 95% confidence interval of my main result in Column (1).
2.5.4 Other robustness checks
Section 2.4.3 noted concerns about block heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in SUR standard errors. In
Table 2.A2, I conduct a joint panel regression for a 2% random sample of firms allowing for heteroscedastic-
and cluster-robust standard errors. The latter allows arbitrary forms of cross-sectional and serial correlation
within the same 3-digit NAICS sector. I find that concerns over a restrictive SUR error structure are not
warranted as the alternative standard errors displayed in Table 2.A2 are similar to SUR standard errors in
Table 2.1. Furthermore, it appears that 3-digit NAICS clustered standard errors yield more precise estimates
possibly due to the presence of negative cross sectional and serial correlation within an aggregate sector.
Table 2.A3 replicates Table 2.1, but with normal market parameters estimated using a pre-event procedure
from January 1, 2008 - May 1, 2009 specified in Equation 2.26. Observe that both the estimates and standard
errors using the pre-event period procedure resemble my within-event period estimates in Table 2.1.
All prior specifications used 2-day returns. In Table 2.A4, I replicate Panel (b) of Table 2.1 using 3-
day returns. The average effects are lower for all five benchmark models though they are only statistically
distinct for the low carbon intensity benchmark models. Longer returns are not preferred as they increase
the likelihood of omitted variable bias.
2.5.5 Heterogeneity
Equation 2.19 of Section 2.3.3 details the channels through which cap-and-trade effects may differ across
firms. This section examines whether the pattern of heterogeneity in estimated Waxman-Markey effects
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conform to these predictions. All results shown are the equally weighted average effects of Waxman-Markey.
Table 2.6 displays the Waxman-Markey effect estimated separately for each 2-digit NAICS sector. As
expected, large negative, though not statistically significant effects, are observed for the mining, utilities,
transportation, and construction sectors. Interestingly, the overall impact on manufacturing is small, a point
I return to below. Statistically significant and large negative effects are experienced by the information, real
estate, finance, waste remediation, and accommodation sectors. With the exception of the accommodation
and finance sectors, this aggregate sectoral heterogeneity largely resembles the findings in Bushnell, Chong
and Mansur (2012).
Carbon and energy intensive sectors have cap-and-trade sensitive input costs and should experience higher
relative losses. Unfortunately, carbon intensity cannot be easily compared across 2-digit NAICS sectors.31
For more valid comparisons, I examine 3-digit NAICS manufacturing sub-sectors for which I observe both
average carbon and energy intensity.
Figure 2.8 plots coefficients estimated separately for each 3-digit NAICS manufacturing sector against
average carbon intensity, defined as mton of CO2 per billion output, obtained from the U.S. Department of
Commerce for 2006. A clear negative relationship is shown. A similar relationship is shown in Figure 2.9
using average energy intensity, which is defined as cost of energy inputs over value of total output and is
provided by the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for 2005. Table 2.7 supports this evidence
showing analogous regression results. Columns (1) and (3) include all 3-digit NAICS manufacturing sectors
while Columns (2) and (4) drop the textile mills sector, a 2σ outlier.
I can also test for the presence of a specific feature of the Waxman-Markey bill. Under Waxman-Markey,
manufacturing sectors with historic energy intensity greater than 5% were granted free allowances. Using
6-digit NAICS energy intensity data from the NBER-CES database, I test whether there is a discontinuity
in estimated Waxman-Markey effects at 5% energy intensity. Figure 2.10 provides graphical evidence by
plotting my estimated Waxman-Markey effects as local polynomial functions of energy intensity on both
sides of the 5% cutoff indicating that a discontinuity exists. Sectors with energy intensity slightly higher
than 5% experience higher abnormal returns from the expected allocation of free allowances than sectors with
energy intensity immediately less than 5%. A density continuity test using the McCrary (2008) procedure
did not find a discontinuity in the distribution of firms at the 5% cutoff (not shown) suggesting that markets
did not expect firms to sort around the discontinuity. Turning to regression results, Table 2.8 shows estimates
from the following local linear model for manufacturing firm ` in sector s within various bandwidths:
31In most standard carbon accounting frameworks, emissions associated with the utilities sector are considered indirect
emissions and thus not comparable to direct emissions generated by other sectors.
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γ̂`s = α1 +α21[EnInt`s > .05] +α3(EnInt`s − .05) +α41[EnInt`s > .05](EnInt`s − .05) + cs + µ`s (2.27)
where EnInt`s is the 6-digit NAICS energy intensity matched to the firm, and cs are 3-digit NAICS fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 6-digit NAICS level. The discontinuity of interest is captured
by α2 and is displayed in Table 2.8. I estimate a discontinuity of 6% regardless of whether I use the optimal
bandwidth selected by the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) procedure in Column (1) or the range of
bandwidths shown in Columns (2)-(5).32 Furthermore, placebo tests in Figure 2.11 show that discontinuities
are not present at other energy intensity cutoffs. Remarkably, this evidence implies that market participants
were anticipating the benefits of free allowance distribution in their valuation of Waxman-Markey effects.
Market anticipation of gains from free allowances may explain why the average effect for manufacturing firms
overall is relatively small in Table 2.6. Furthermore, it suggests that the relationship between estimated
Waxman-Markey effects and carbon and energy intensity shown in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 may be steeper if not
for the distribution of free allowances.
Equation 2.19 indicates that cap-and-trade effects are lower for firms that pass-through a greater share
of regulatory costs onto output markets. One proxy for pass-through is the import share for a firm’s output
market. All things equal, higher import shares imply lower pass-through rates as households can more readily
substitute regulated domestic goods with unregulated international goods. In Table 2.9, I estimate the
average Waxman-Markey effect separately for firms with different 4-digit NAICS import shares as provided
by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Foreign Trade Division. All estimated firm effects are first demeaned at the
3-digit NAICS level to account for the heterogeneity shown in Table 2.6 and Figures 2.8, and 2.9. While
the standard errors are large given the reduced sample size, point estimates for each 10% import share bin
display a negative monotonic relationship. That is, sectors with higher import shares experience greater
losses from Waxman-Markey incidence. Figure 2.12 plots these coefficients.
A U.S. cap-and-trade policy should have different effects for firms operating primarily in the U.S. than
firms with more internationally oriented portfolios. Intuitively, in the absence of equally stringent climate
regulation in other major emitting countries, cap-and-trade regulation in the U.S. will have either zero or
even slightly positive effects for firms with greater non-U.S. market exposure in the presence of regulatory
leakage. To examine heterogeneity as a function of U.S. product market exposure, I use firm-level geographic
business segment data provided by the CRSP-Compustat merged dataset. This data subdivide firms into
32The standard errors presented in Table 2.8 do not explicitly use the uncertainty associated with my estimated Waxman-
Markey effects. Regressions using a parametric bootstrap procedure drawing from the estimated variance-covariance matrix of
Waxman-Markey effects were also conducted. Resulting standard errors are nearly identical to those shown in Table 2.8.
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country and region-specific business segments allowing construction of a U.S. market exposure index based
on the share of total corporate-wide revenue from U.S. business segments.
Table 2.10 estimates the average effects for firms within different bins of average U.S. revenue share in
2009-2010. Again, I first remove 3-digit NAICS means. Columns (1)-(4) show estimates for bins widths
of 0.25. Column (5) includes firms with only US-based revenue. Observe that point estimates decrease
monotonically with U.S. market exposure though coefficients are not significant due to the reduced sample
size. Interestingly, firms with low U.S. product market exposure in Column (1) yield small positive effects
hinting at the potential gains due to international leakage of a U.S. cap-and-trade policy in the absence of
comparable mitigation policies internationally. Figure 2.13 plots these coefficients.
Finally, in Table 2.11, I present the average effect for firms in each market cap decile defined as market
value at the end of 2009 with 3-digit NAICS means first removed. I find that relative effects are more
negative for medium-sized firms. Relative to their 3-digit NAICS sector, small and large sized firms appear
to exhibit small positive gains. These coefficients are plotted in Figure 2.14.
2.6 Unlisted firms: bounding analysis
It is unlikely that cap-and-trade would only affect publicly listed firms. Cap-and-trade should alter the
profitability of firms regardless of ownership structure. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce,
unlisted firms represent 9% of annual U.S. corporate profits. The challenge, however, is that the market
value of unlisted firms is typically not observed. As I demonstrate below, this maps naturally into a partial
identification framework with missing outcomes.
2.6.1 Lobbying expenditure data
The objective of the bounding analysis is to obtain information that might possibly reveal the cost of cap-
and-trade expected by unlisted firms. My solution employs Congressional lobbying expenditures, a variable
for which cap-and-trade related information is available for both listed and unlisted firms. I identify all
firms that have explicitly lobbied on Waxman-Markey and related climate bills during the 111th Congress as
indicated in lobbying records collected by the Senate Office of Public Records.33 Special care was taken to
drop lobbying firms, trade organizations, and advocacy organizations that lobbied on Waxman-Markey but
33Each lobbying form indicates the lobbying institution (a private company if internal lobbying or lobbying firm if external
lobbying), the client served, names of lobbyists employed, a list of lobbying issues, and the total amount paid by the client to
the lobbying institution (see 2.C for further details). To isolate cap-and-trade related lobbying, I extract the names of clients
from lobbying records that indicate either H.R. 2454, H.R. 587, H.R. 2998, S.1733, or S.1462 in the “specific lobbying issues”
entry on the lobbying form. If multiple issues are noted on a lobbying form, total lobbying expense will include all issues. This
would mean that not all amount indicated was spent on cap-and-trade lobbying. However, a spot check of lobbying records
showed that most forms noting cap-and-trade lobbying largely included issues that were closely related.
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represent industry-level interests and not that of individual firms.34 These records reveal that 456 separate
firms lobbied on Waxman-Markey of which 225 were unlisted.
Overall, $1.5 billion worth of lobbying records indicated Waxman-Markey lobbying of which 9% was
spent by unlisted firms.35 Table 2.12 lists the firms with the highest lobbying expenditure. As expected, this
list is dominated by the energy sector. Observe also that nearly all high spending firms are publicly listed
companies with two notable exceptions being Koch Industries and Energy Future Holdings. Figure 2.15 plots
the distribution of lobbying expenditure by firm listing. There are two important features to note. First,
roughly one quarter of firms lobbying on Waxman-Markey spend between $6,000 - $125,000 suggesting that
the cost of entry into the lobbying market is fairly low. This partly alleviates concerns about free-riding in
the lobbying market. Second, unlisted firms lobbying on cap-and-trade spend an average of $647,000 which
is an order of magnitude less than the average $5,792,000 spent by listed firms.
My bounding procedure relies on the following observation. Lobbying expenditure may reveal the mag-
nitude of cap-and-trade costs borne by firms but does not indicate whether these effects are positive or
negative. For example, a firm expecting $1 million in cap-and-trade costs might spend the same amount lob-
bying as another firm expecting $1 million in cap-and-trade benefits. Thus, I can match listed and unlisted
firms according to lobbying expenditure to predict the absolute cost of cap-and-trade. Without knowing the
distribution of positive or negative effects borne by unlisted firms, the conservative approach is to assign
costs to be either positive or negative for all unlisted firms.
2.6.2 Partial identification framework
I formalize this exercise by adopting the partial identification framework with non-random missing outcomes
introduced by Manski (2003). Continuing with prior notation, describe L listed and U unlisted firms with
N = L + U , by the random variables (∆v, Z,X), where ∆v is the cost of Waxman-Markey, Z is a binary
variable equaling unity if a firm is listed and X is a scalar denoting lobbying expenditures on Waxman-Markey
in a space Ω ⊂ R≥0. ∆v is only observable when Z = 1. The total cost of the policy is:
N · E[∆v] = E[∆v|Z = 1] · L+ E[∆v|Z = 0] · U (2.28)
E[∆v|Z = 0] is not observed. Importantly, in this context and others, it would be unreasonable to assume
that E[∆v|Z = 0] = E[∆v|Z = 1]. That is, the distribution of cap-and-trade costs differs for listed and
unlisted firms. One could bound E[∆v|Z = 0] using the empirically observed lower bound, ∆v = minZ=1 ∆v,
34In general, it is difficult to identify which firms are associated with certain trade or advocacy organizations. Fortunately,
expenditures by trade and advocacy organizations constitute only 5% of total Waxman-Markey lobbying expenditures.
35Because of the structure of the lobbying records, it is unclear if $1.5 billion was spent only lobbying on Waxman-Markey.
For the purposes of the bounding procedure, what matters is the order of lobbying expenses for firms and not its actual value.
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and upper bound, ∆v = maxZ=1 ∆v, for listed firms such that ∆v ≤ E[∆v|z = 0] ≤ ∆v. However, as Lee
(2009) has argued, in applications where the range of observed costs are large, this “worst-case” scenario
procedure generates bounds that may be too wide to be informative. In my context, it would be unreasonable
to assign unlisted firms with bounds equalling the lowest and highest cost estimated for a listed firm.
I make two assumptions in order to perform the bounding analysis. First, I assume that unlisted firms
that do not lobby are on average unaffected by Waxman-Markey. Second, the absolute cost of Waxman-
Markey for an listed firm weakly bounds that of a unlisted firm conditional on positive lobbying expenditure.
The first assumption can be written:
Assumption 3 Revealed preference: E[|∆v| |Z = 0, X = 0] = 0
In words, Assumption 3 states that unlisted firms that did not lobby on average will not experience cap-
and-trade costs. While this assumption might appear unreasonable, it is relatively innocuous as the bounds
I estimate for unlisted firms that lobbied are relatively wide given the overall value of unlisted firms in the
U.S. economy. My second assumption states:
Assumption 4 Bounding: E[|∆v| |Z = 0, X = x,X > 0] ≤ E[|∆v| |Z = 1, X = x,X > 0] ∀ x ∈ Ω
Assumption 4 states that conditional on positive lobbying expenditures, the absolute costs of Waxman-
Markey for a listed firm weakly bounds the costs absolute costs borne by an unlisted firm. Because both
assumptions are based on the costs borne by unlisted firms which is unobserved, they are fundamentally
non-refutable. In Figure 2.A4 and Table 2.A5, I provide suggestive evidence that Assumption 4 is reasonably
valid. Figure 2.A4 shows that lobbyists hired exclusively by listed firms to lobby on Waxman-Markey have
higher average total lobbying revenue (across all lobbying activity) than lobbyists hired exclusively by unlisted
firms. Table 2.A5 shows that this is largely true even conditional on the sector of the hiring firm.36
I can now rewrite the second term in Equation 2.28:












E[|∆v| |Z = 1, X = x,X > 0] · Ux (2.29)
36This is suggestive evidence. Because I only observe total lobbying revenue and not lobbying wages, I cannot infer units of
lobbying effort purchased by each firm.
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where Ux is the number of unlisted firms spending x amount on lobbying. The first line applies the property
of the absolute value, the second line uses the law of total probability, the third line employs Assumption 3,
and the final line uses Assumption 4. The expression above illustrates why Assumption 3 is needed. While
the overall value of unlisted firms in the U.S. economy is only 9%, they make up 97% of all incorporated
firms according to the Bureau Van Dijk Orbis database. This implies a large value for U0 and thus large
uninformative bounds in the absence of Assumption 3.
Implicit in Assumption 4 is the notion that absolute Waxman-Markey costs can be predicted by lobbying
expenditures. Figure 2.16 provides evidence by plotting the log absolute firm-level cost of cap-and-trade
obtained from Section 2.5 against the log lobbying expenditure for all listed firms appearing in the lobbying
record. Table 2.13 confirms a statistically significant linear relationship showing regressions of the form:
log
∣∣∣γ̂`v̂o` ∣∣∣ = α+ η logLobbyExpense` + cs + µ`s (2.30)
where γ̂` is the estimated effect of Waxman-Markey from Section 2.5 and v̂o` is the predicted market value
under business-as-usual.37 LobbyExpense is the total amount spend lobbying on Waxman-Markey and cs
are sector fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.13 show that η is positive and statistically significant
regardless of sector fixed effects inclusion. Interpreting this cross-sectional elasticity, a 1% increase in lobbying
expenditures is associated with a 0.48% increase in absolute cap-and-trade related costs.
Applying the property of the absolute value, I can now recover an identification region for the total cost
of cap-and-trade:
H{N · E[∆v]} =[E[∆v|Z = 1] · L−
∑
x∈Ω,x>0
E[|∆v| |Z = 1, X = x,X > 0] · Ux,
E[∆v|Z = 1] · L+
∑
x∈Ω,x>0














To summarize, the bounding analysis is performed in three steps. First, I estimate the relationship between
absolute cap-and-trade costs and lobbying for listed firms that appear in the lobbying records using Equation
2.30. In a second step, I predict out-of-sample absolute cap-and-trade costs for unlisted firms lobbying on
Waxman-Markey. Finally, I assign predicted costs to be either negative or positive for all unlisted firms. As
a visual illustration of these generated bounds, Figures 2.17 and 2.18 plot the distribution of firm-level costs
estimated for all listed firms in the lobbying record (red) together with the predicted negative and positive
37This is obtained by rearranging Equation 2.20 so that vˆo` =
eV`
θγˆ`+1
, where the bar denotes the average over the event
period.
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costs for matched unlisted firms (gray).
2.7 Aggregate costs
2.7.1 Total cost to firms
Equation 2.31 summarizes the identification region which combines event study estimates for listed firms
with bounds for unlisted firms. Table 2.14 displays the total change in firm value estimated according
to the various benchmark models shown in Panel (b) of Table 2.1. Averaging across the five benchmark
models, Waxman-Markey is expected to lower the value of listed firms by $160 billion. Including unlisted
firms, losses due to Waxman-Markey have a lower bound of $73 billion and an upper bound of $240 billion.
The particularly wide bounds generated for all firms gives assurance that Assumption 3 is reasonable. My
conservative upper bound estimate attributes 35% of the upper bound total Waxman-Markey cost to unlisted
firms that lobbied. This value is large relative to the 9% share of annual U.S. corporate profits attributed to
unlisted firms and suggests that my bounds may be wide enough to include all unlisted firms and not just
those that lobbied.
One can conduct statistical inference on the lower and upper bounds of the identification region. To do
so, I follow the principle developed by Imbens and Manski (2004) for a confidence interval that asymptot-
ically covers the true parameter of interest with fixed probability. Unfortunately, an analytically tractable
confidence interval cannot be derived for the bounds shown in Equation 2.31. Instead, I use a parametric
bootstrap procedure which draws from the estimated listed firm effects and associated variance-covariance
matrix (see 2.B for further details).
Figure 2.19 plots the uncertainty associated with the estimates shown in Table 2.14. For each model, I
plot the estimated total change in listed firm value along with a 90% confidence interval in thick black lines.
The interval shown by thin brown lines indicates the identification region for aggregate losses for listed and
unlisted firms. Using the parametric boostrap procedure specified in 2.B, I plot as dashed gray lines the 90%
confidence interval for the lower and upper bounds of the identification region.
2.7.2 Marginal abatement cost to firms
Equation 2.17 of Section 2.3 provides an approximation for ΛFo (R), the component of the aggregate marginal
abatement cost attributed to firms during the initial year of the policy. Rewriting now with the identification
region obtained in Equation 2.31, the lower and upper bounds are:

















Choice of abatement parameters in the denominator requires some discussion. Recall that Ro is the
cumulative business-as-usual emissions. During the event period, the most widely used estimates for future
business-as-usual emissions was provided by the Energy Information Administration in its 2009 Annual En-
ergy Outlook (AEO2009).38 This analysis, shown as the dashed line in Figure 2.1, forecasted U.S. emissions
to rise at a rate of 0.25% until 2050 and reflects the more pessimistic economic outlook during 2009.
R is based on the Waxman-Markey cap schedule and offset provisions. Waxman-Markey allowed up to
2,000 mtons of domestic and international offsets annually into the cap-and-trade system as a cost contain-
ment measure. Most analyses at the time, however, concluded that this limit would rarely bind during the
policy’s lifetime. This is because domestic marginal abatement cost was expected to remain low relative
to the marginal abatement cost of offset projects at abatement levels near the annual limit (EPA, 2009).
Because I do not explicitly model offset supply, I assume an annual offset usage of 1,400 mtons following EPA
analysis.39 The resulting cap schedule including offsets is represented by the solid gray line in Figure 2.1. My
estimates would be high if actual offset use falls below 1,400 mtons annually. Altogether, these abatement
parameters imply a cumulative abatement of 40.8 gtons of CO2 during the policy’s lifetime. Lastly, Aa is
40% of cumulative allowances over the policy period as specified by the policy.
Table 2.15 presents the estimated lower and upper bound 2015 marginal abatement cost to firms for my
five benchmark models in Panel (b) of Table 2.1.40 Column (5) shows the average marginal abatement cost
to firms across the five benchmark models. The mean lower and upper bound firm marginal abatement cost
in 2015 are $0.9 and $3.0 respectively.
The firm marginal abatement cost estimated in Table 2.15 are based on best-guess abatement parameters.
Prediction and stock market participants, however, may have assumed different rates of offset usage and
business-as-usual emissions, which in turn would affect the implied value. The surface plot in Figure 2.20
shows firm marginal abatement cost sensitivity along discrete values of business-as-usual emissions rates
between -2.0 - 1.0% per year along the x-axis and annual offset usage between 1,000 - 2,000 mtons CO2
38The AEO2009 also informed business-as-usual projections for a number of CGE modeling analyses of Waxman-Markey,
notably the EPA-funded ADAGE and IGEM analyses
39Under Waxman-Markey, offset credits are valued at 4/5 of an allowance. Thus, a offset limit of 1,400 mtons is equivalent
to an extra 1,120 mtons of emissions.
40Emissions trading were to begin in 2012 under Waxman-Markey. However, firm marginal abatement cost for 2015 are
presented in line with standard CGE models. To obtain prices in 2015, I first obtain 2012 firm marginal abatement cost
(denoted in 2009 dollars) and assume Hotelling’s rule with an EPA designated 5% interest rate.
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per year along the y-axis. Observe that the surface plot is relatively flat for most offset usage level when
business-as-usual rates are positive with values around $3 - $5 per ton of CO2. To obtain firm marginal
abatement cost of over $10 per ton, I would need to assume both high annual offset usage and negative
business-as-usual emission rates. The latter, in particular, seems unreasonable.
2.8 Comparing with CGE models
A natural exercise is to benchmark my estimates. Unfortunately, because neither Waxman-Markey nor
another cap-and-trade policy has yet been implemented in the U.S., direct benchmarks for my estimates
are not available. To date, multi-sector computational general equilibrium (CGE) models are the prevailing
technique for estimating the cost of cap-and-trade policy (see 2.E for a summary of CGE models) and thus
serve as a potential benchmark for my estimates. Such comparisons, however, require a degree of caution.
In particular, CGE estimates may differ from this paper for reasons relating to the internal structural
assumptions of CGE models as well as the scope of typical CGE analyses.
CGE forecasts are based on structural representations of the economy with parameters that capture future
input prices, elasticities of demand, and future technological change. Parameters assumed for CGE models
may differ from market expectations. In particular, whereas demand elasticities may be well-approximated
using available empirical evidence, expectations over technological change may diverge given the unprece-
dented nature of climate policy and the presence of private information over the cost of carbon mitigation
technologies. Furthermore, technological change is typically modeled in the CGE environment through au-
tonomous trends and substitution across input factors which may not adequately capture the important
dynamics of induced technological change (Kolstad et al., 2010; Jacoby et al., 2006).
Regarding the scope of CGE analyses, CGE models typically analyze the welfare impacts of a specific,
stand-alone cap-and-trade policy at the domestic sectoral level. This differs from my estimates which include
the entire suite of policies under Waxman-Markey, and not just the cap-and-trade component. Furthermore,
by using firms as the unit of analysis, I cannot exclude non-U.S. effects on firms with international operations
nor can I capture the dynamics of future firm entry within a sector. Ryan (2011) shows that the latter is
particularly relevant for estimating the cost of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments on the US cement
industry. Lastly, insofar as market participants expected political activity to alter final policy details before
implementation, my estimates may correspond to a slightly different policy than that examined by CGE
models which do not endogenize political dynamics.
Finally, CGE estimates often are themselves inputs into the policy process and as such may affect the
ultimate policy outcome. Endogeneity of CGE estimates in the political process, in particular, would result
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in a divergence between CGE forecasts and actual costs regardless of other sources of forecast accuracy.
In Figure 2.21, I present the ratio of lower and upper bound cost estimates from this paper to comparable
estimates from the IGEM and EPPA models, the two most prominent academic CGE models.41 In particular,
I compare my estimates with the CGE forecasted change in net-present discounted capital income which
represents the closest proxy for firm profits within the CGE environment.42 Unfortunately, capital income
reflects accounting and not economic profits.43 To produce a more valid comparison across the two methods,
I consider a scenario whereby capital investments within the CGE environment are adjusted for the market
cost of capital.44
Using this measure for comparison, Figure 2.21 shows that my lower and upper bound estimates are
17% - 55% of CGE estimates. Though it is difficult to isolate which of the reasons noted above may
explain the difference in estimates between these two methods, it is illustrative to explore why actual costs
of environmental policies may have diverged from ex-ante structural forecasts in the past. In the case of
the Montreal Protocol, overestimates were attributed to a failure in correctly predicting the development of
CFC substitutes (Cook, 1996). For the U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade system, models did not foresee lower input
costs arising from the availability of cheap low-sulfur coal (Carlson et al., 2000; Ellerman et al., 2000). The
blue bars in Figure 2.21 indicate the ratio of actual costs to ex-ante structural forecasts for the Montreal
Protocol, U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade system, and the E.U. Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS). An evaluation
of structural forecasts for these past major environmental policies suggests that actual costs were between
30% - 75% of ex-ante forecasts.45 In this light, CGE modeling choices regarding future input prices and
technological change may explain some of the difference between Waxman-Markey estimates from this paper
and CGE models.
2.9 Conclusion
This paper develops and implements a reduced-form method for forecasting the cost to firms of potential
cap-and-trade policies. Through an event study using prediction markets, I estimate the expected cost
to firms of the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill, had it been implemented. Information from lobbying
records augment the analysis to include bounds for unlisted firms. I find that Waxman-Markey was expected
41I thank Richard Goettle at IGEM and Jennifer Morris and Sergey Paltsev at EPPA for providing this output.
42I am grateful to Larry Goulder for this suggestion.
43The assumption of constant returns to scale and perfect competition in most CGE models implies a zero-profit condition.
44Discounting within a CGE model is conducted using the risk-free interest rate. The discount rate for stock prices, on the
other hand, is the sum of the risk-free interest rate and a risk premium associated with holding the risky asset. I increase
the discount rate used for net present value calculations for CGE outputs to the sum of the risk-free interest rate inherent in
each model and 3.3% equity risk premium obtained from Robert Shiller’s data (data available: http://www.econ.yale.edu/
~shiller/data.htm).
45Not all prior structural forecasts of environmental regulations were performed using CGE models. See 2.E for more details
on prior forecasts.
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to reduce the value of listed firms by $16 billion. When including bounds for unlisted firms, the total cost
of the policy to all firms is between $73 and $240 billion. To the best of my knowledge, this paper provides
the first reduced-form forecast of the cost of cap-and-trade. More generally, this approach provides a general
empirical framework for using prediction markets as a tool for policy forecasting.
Estimates from this paper and CGE models provide complementary roles in the policy process. The main
advantage of this method is that it accesses the broad information set revealed by market participants and
firms to estimate the expected cost to firms within a structurally minimal framework. However, unlike CGE
models, I do not estimate the cost to households and thus am unable to recover the full welfare effects of the
policy. Another disadvantage is that I am unable to correspond my estimates to a specific level of abatement
as markets may have anticipated implementation of a slightly altered policy. CGE models, on the other hand,
structurally evaluate cap-and-trade policies under specified abatement parameters. This is valuable for the
policy process as it allows for counterfactual policy evaluations as well as assessments of policy benefits.
CGE models also provide details about disaggregate impacts such as household consumption, energy input
mix, and commodity prices which all have important policy implications. Thus, it is likely that both CGE
models and the method developed in this paper will have value in the next round of climate policy debates.
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2.10 Figures



























2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
AEO2009 BAU W−M cap w/o offset W−M cap w/ offset
Notes: Dark solid line shows annual cap under Waxman-Markey for covered sectors. Gray solid line shows Waxman-Markey
cap with offsets set at 1,400 mton per year. Coverage of emissions cap is 68.2% in 2012, 75.7% in 2014 and 84.5% in 2016.
Dotted line shows business as usual under U.S. DOE Annual Energy Outlook 2009 projection.
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event time
7/22/2010: Senate drops W-M
Market GE Exxon PG&E
Ford Chevron Southern Fedex
Notes: Each plot shows cumulative returns 2 days before to 4 days after an event for an aggregate value-weighted market
index, General Electric, Exxon Mobil, PE&G, Ford, Chevron, Southern, and Fedex. Firms represent the seven highest spenders
on Waxman-Markey lobbying (see Table 2.12). General Motors excluded because it was not continuously listed during event
period. 6/26/2009: Waxman-Markey passes house. 11/4/2009: Graham joins Senate effort. 4/23/2010: Graham drops support.
7/22/2010: Senate drops cap-and-trade.
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Figure 2.3: Intrade: “Cap-and-trade for emissions trading to be established by 12/31/2010”
































May9 Aug9 Nov9 Feb10 May10 Aug10 Nov10
Notes: Times series of Intrade prediction market prices. Red solid (gray dashed) lines mark days with events directly (indirectly)
related to cap-and-trade prospects. (1) 6/26/2009: House passes Waxman-Markey. (2) 11/4/2009: Graham joins Senate
effort. (3) 12/20/2009: Copenhagen negotiations concluded. (4) 1/19/2010: Scott Brown wins Mass. Senate seat. (5)
1/27/2010: Graham-Kerry-Lieberman seeks non cap-and-trade alternatives. (6) 3/31/2010: Obama supports offshore drilling.
(7) 4/23/2010: Graham drops support. (8) 6/15/2010: Obama oval office speech. (9) 7/22/2010: Senate drops cap-and-trade
legislation. See 2.D for further detail on these major events.
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Figure 2.4: Large Trader 1 versus total market trading volume
655 2901
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time
all other traders #1 buys #1 sales
Notes: Time series of trading volume for entire cap-and-trade prediction market (red), shares bought by Large Trader 1 (dark
blue), and shares sold by Large Trader 1 (light blue).
Figure 2.5: Large Trader 2 versus total market trading volume
655 2901
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time
all other traders #2 buys #2 sales
Notes: Time series of trading volume for entire cap-and-trade prediction market (red), shares bought by Large Trader 2 (dark
blue), and shares sold by Large Trader 2 (light blue).
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−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1
2−day prediction price difference
Notes: Average 2-day abnormal returns with 3-factor Fama-French normal returns removed plotted against change in cap-and-
trade prediction market price. Only trading days with θt ∈ [0.2, 0.8]. Linear model (solid) with 90% confidence interval shown
along with local linear model (dashed).
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cap and trade carbon tax
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nuclear policy renewable portfolio
Notes: U.S. Google News volume for climate policy related terms from May 1, 2009 - July 31, 2010. Values normalized by
“cap-and-trade” volume.
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0 .5 1 1.5
carbon intensity in 2006 (mton CO2/billion output)
Notes: Average cap-and-trade effects for firms within a 3-digit NAICS manufacturing subsector plotted against carbon intensity
(mton CO2 per billion output) in 2006. AP: apparel. BT: beverage & tobacco products. CE: computer & electronic products.
CH: chemicals. EA: electrical appliances. FM: fabricated metal products. FO: food. FU: furniture. LE: leather. MA:
machinery. MI: misc. NM: non-metallic mineral. PA: paper. PE: petroleum and coal products. PI: printing. PM: primary
metals. PR: plastic and rubber products. TE: textile mills. TP: textile mill products. TT: transportation equip. WO: wood
products.





















































0 .05 .1 .15
energy intensity in 2005 (% of output)
Notes: Average cap-and-trade effects for firms within a 3-digit NAICS manufacturing subsector plotted against energy intensity
(% per output) in 2005. See Figure 2.8 for sector codes.
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Energy intensity in 2005 (% of output)
Notes: Discontinuity of estimated Waxman-Markey effects at 5% energy intensity with 3-digit NAICS average removed. Local
polynomial regression using an Epanechikov kernel with optimal bandwidth (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). 90% confidence intervals
shown.
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Energy intensity (% of output)
Notes: Estimated effects at different placebo discontinuities using a local linear model with 0.03 wide bins. 90% confidence
intervals shown.
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Import share
Notes: Average cap-and-trade effects for 4-digit NAICS sectors as a function of import share (2009-2010 average). 3-digit
NAICS average removed.




















[0, .25) [.25, .5) [.5, .75) [.75, 1) 1
US revenue share
Notes: Average cap-and-trade effects for 4-digit NAICS sectors as a function of revenue share from U.S. product markets
(2009-2010 average). 3-digit NAICS average removed.
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Cap−size decile
Notes: Average cap-and-trade effects as a function of cap size decile (10: largest). 3-digit NAICS average removed.
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Listed
Not Listed
Notes: Stacked histogram showing total spending on Waxman-Markey lobbying by listed and unlisted firms. Distribution
truncated at $4 million.
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log lobbying expenditure
Notes: Log absolute cost of cap-and-trade estimated from Equation 2.25 against log lobbying expenditure for listed firms that
have lobbied on Waxman-Markey. Linear model with 90% CI shown in gray. Dotted line from a local linear model.
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firm−level costs (billion USD)
Listed
Not Listed
Notes: Stacked histogram of estimated firm-level cap-and-trade costs for listed firms and negative bound costs for unlisted firms
that lobbied on Waxman-Markey. Distribution truncated at ± $2 billion.
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Listed
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Notes: Stacked histogram of estimated firm-level cap-and-trade costs for listed firms and positive bound costs for unlisted firms
that lobbied on Waxman-Markey. Distribution truncated at ± $2 billion.
































CAPM 3−factor FF 0.05 CI 0.10 CI 0.15 CI
Notes: Blue dot shows mean change in profit from Waxman-Markey for all listed firms with associated 90% confidence interval
shown as solid thick black lines. Solid thin brown lines indicate identification region for total change in profit for listed and
unlisted firms with thin dashed gray lines representing the associated 90% confidence interval for the identification region (from
250 bootstrap draws).
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Figure 2.20: Parameter space for estimated upper bound firm marginal abatement cost
Notes: Surface plot shows the estimated upper bound 2015 firm marginal abatement cost for under different values for business-
as-usual emission rates %/year and annual offset usage in mtons CO2.


























Montreal Protocol SO2 trading EU−ETS
(Cook, 1996) (Ellerman et al. 2000) (Convery et al, 2010)
Lower bound Upper bound
Actual cost/structural forecasts This study/structural forecasts 
Notes: Orange bars show the percentage of lower and upper bound total cost estimates from this paper relative to the change
in risk-adjusted discounted capital income under the Waxman-Markey bill averaged across the IGEM and EPPA CGE models
(output obtained from private communication with IGEM and EPPA modeling teams). IGEM uses an endogenous risk-free
interest rate of 2.63% while EPPA has an exogenous risk-free interest rate of 4%. Risk-adjusted NPV capital income obtained
by adding an aggregate market risk premium of 3.3% to existing risk-free interest rates. Blue bars show percentage of actual
costs relative to structural forecasts for the Montreal Protocol, SO2 cap-and-trade program, and the EU-ETS.
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2.11 Tables
Table 2.1: Prediction market event study: Main result
















Panel (a): Dep. var. is 2-day value-weighted market returns
(1) Aggregate 5 -0.011 -163.77
[0.18] [2741.73]
Panel (b): Dep. var. is 2-day firm-level returns
(2) Panel CAPM 111 -0.022* -0.0082*** -148.87***
[0.011] [0.0023] [42.74]
(3) Panel 3-factor FF 111 -0.016** -0.0067** -122.51**
[0.0065] [0.0022] [39.44]
(4) Panel < 0.05 CI 111 -0.022* -0.0087** -158.84**
[0.012] [0.0041] [74.17]
(5) Panel < 0.10 CI 111 -0.022* -0.0086** -156.20**
[0.012] [0.0042] [76.74]
(6) Panel < 0.15 CI 111 -0.024** -0.011** -192.08**
[0.012] [0.0045] [82.82]
Panel (a) from a bivariate time series of aggregate value-weighted market returns on change in pre-
diction market price for 5 major event days (see Equation 2.24). Panel (b) from panel regressions
(see Equation 2.25) of firm-level returns on change in prediction market price with CAPM, 3-factor
Fama-French, and value-weighted returns constructed from firms with carbon intensity below 0.05,
0.10 and 0.15 mton CO2 per billion output as benchmark controls. Only days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. SUR
standard errors with correlation across firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.2: Prediction market event study: thin trading and price manipulation
Dep var is 2-day stock return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high volume without high HHI
main volume interaction big trader concentration interaction
∆θt -0.016** -0.020** -0.013 -0.024** -0.019 -0.027*
[0.0065] [0.0086] [0.0082] [0.010] [0.018] [0.016]
∆θt x volume | HHI -0.000087 0.016
[0.00014] [0.021]
Number of firms 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316
Number of days 111 21 111 37 9 111
Equally weighted average effect shown. Only days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. Column (1) replicates 3-factor
Fama-French main result. Column (2) includes only high volume trading days (> sample mean
volume of 30 trades). Column (3) adds an interaction of prediction market price with trading
volume. Column (4) includes only trading days without top 2 influential traders. Column (5)
includes only days with HHI<0.25. Column (6) adds an interaction of prediction market price
with daily HHI index. SUR standard errors with correlation across firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table 2.3: Prediction market event study: additional controls
Dep var is 2-day stock return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
main trend oil price EUA Google News Welsh-Goyal
∆θt -0.016** -0.015** -0.017*** -0.022** -0.016** -0.025**
[0.0065] [0.0065] [0.0064] [0.011] [0.0066] [0.012]
Number of firms 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316
Number of days 111 111 111 111 111 111
Equally weighted average effect shown. Only days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. Column (1) replicates
3-factor Fama-French main result. Column (2) includes a linear trend. Column (3) includes
change in crude oil price. Column (4) includes change in EU-ETS 2015 futures price. Column
(5) includes Google News volume for “climate change”, “carbon tax”, “energy policy”, and
“nuclear policy”. Column (6) includes monthly Welsh-Goyal controls. SUR standard errors
with correlation across firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Prediction market event study: leads and lags
Dep var is 2-day stock return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lagged lagged lead
main returns prediction prediction
∆θt -0.016** -0.015** -0.015** -0.014**







Number of firms 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316
Number of days 111 110 110 109
Equally weighted average effect shown. Only days with θt ∈
[.2, .8]. Column (1) replicates 3-factor Fama-French main re-
sult. Column (2) includes lagged stock returns. Column (3)
includes 1 lagged prediction price. Column (4) includes 1 lead
prediction price. SUR standard errors with correlation across
firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: Prediction market event study: other trading day samples
Dep var is 2-day stock return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
main 2009 2010 ∆θt ≥ 0 ∆θt < 0 full sample
∆θt -0.016** -0.019** -0.013 -0.017* -0.015 -0.0099*
[0.0065] [0.0088] [0.0091] [0.010] [0.015] [0.0055]
Number of firms 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316 5,316
Number of days 111 84 27 81 30 155
Equally weighted average effect shown. Only days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. Column (1)
replicates 3-factor Fama-French main result. Column (2) includes only 2009 trading
days. Column (3) includes only 2010 trading days. Column (4) includes only days
with ∆θt ≥ 0. Column (5) includes only days with ∆θt < 0. Column (6) includes
trading days with θt < .2 and θt > .8. SUR standard errors with correlation across
firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Prediction market event study: sectoral effects
2-digit NAICS sector γ Std. error. Number of firms
Agriculture (11) 0.024 [0.041] 11
Mining (21) -0.013 [0.032] 308
Utilities (22) -0.017 [0.015] 123
Construction (23) -0.018 [0.026] 51
Manufacturing (31-33) -0.0039 [0.0091] 1,656
Wholesale trade (42) -0.013 [0.015] 77
Retail trade (44-45) 0.0058 [0.018] 213
Transportation & Warehousing (48-49) -0.0034 [0.018] 161
Information (51) -0.024** [0.011] 406
Finance and Insurance (52) -0.023*** [0.0086] 1,407
Real Estate (53) -0.049* [0.025] 147
Professional, Scientific, & Technical Services (54) -0.014** [0.012] 278
Administrative, Waste Mgmt & Remediation Services (56) -0.035** [0.016] 76
Education Services (61) 0.016 [0.035] 24
Health Care and Social Assistance (62) -0.0011 [0.021] 75
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation (71) -0.011 [0.024] 37
Accommodation & Food Services (72) -0.052** [0.025] 72
Other Services (81) -0.0085 [0.028] 18
Equally weighted average effect shown. 3-factor Fama-French model using 2-day returns. Only days
with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. Each row shows a separate seemingly unrelated regression for firms within a 2-digit
NAICS sector. Includes only firms continuously listed within the same NAICS category during event
period. SUR standard errors with correlation across firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: Prediction market event study: carbon intensity and energy input share
Dep var is 3-digit manufacturing coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all manu TE dropped all manu TE dropped
carbon intensity -0.039** -0.030***
[0.015] [0.0064]
energy input share -0.45** -0.30***
[0.19] [0.075]
Observations 21 20 21 20
R2 0.206 0.292 0.228 0.236
Regressions of estimated equally-weighted average cap-and-trade effects at the
3-digit NAICS manufacturing level on sectoral carbon intensity (CO2 per billion
output) and energy input share (% of output). Columns (1) and (3) include all
3-digit manufacturing NAICS sectors. Columns (2) and (4) omits the textile
mills sector, a 2σ outlier. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Prediction market event study: discontinuity at 5% energy intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Discontinuity 0.060** 0.049 0.063** 0.063** 0.060**
[0.026] [0.035] [0.032] [0.028] [0.025]
Bandwidth 0.044 ± 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Number of firms 1,638 203 408 1,114 1,669
Regression discontinuity of estimated firm-level Waxman-Markey
effects at 5% energy intensity in 2005. Local linear model with
triangular kernel and 3-digit NAICS sector fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at 6-digit NAICS level. ± in Column (1) indicates
bandwidth obtained from the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012)
optimal bandwidth selection procedure. Columns (2)-(5) show
estimated discontinuity with different bandwidths. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: Prediction market event study: import share heterogeneity
Dep var is 2-day stock return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
imp share imp share imp share imp share imp share
∈ [0, .1) ∈ [.1, .2) ∈ [.2, .3) ∈ [.3, 4) >=.4
∆θt 0.0051 0.0052 0.0011 -0.0048 -0.0054
[0.013] [0.012] [0.010] [0.016] [0.012]
Number of firms 468 236 411 565 268
Number of days 111 111 111 111 111
Equally weighted average effect shown. 3-factor Fama-French model. Only
days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. All regressions with 3-digit NAICS average removed.
Import share variation at 4-digit NAICS level. Column (1) just firms with
import share ∈ [0, .1). Column (2) just firms with import share ∈ [.1, .2).
Column (3) just firms with import share ∈ [.2, .3). Column (4) just firms with
import share ∈ [.3, .4). Column (5) just firms with import share ≥ .4. SUR
standard errors with correlation across firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Prediction market event study: US revenue share
Dep var is 2-day stock return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
US share US share US share US share US share
∈ [0, .25) ∈ [.25, .5) ∈ [.5, .75) ∈ [.75, 1) =1
∆θt 0.012 0.0043 0.0070 -0.0037 -0.0065
[0.016] [0.0091] [0.0081] [0.0072] [0.0092]
Number of firms 237 361 457 555 1201
Number of days 111 111 111 111 111
Equally weighted average effect shown. 3-factor Fama-French model. Only
days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. All regressions with 3-digit NAICS average removed.
US revenue share variation at 4-digit NAICS level. Column (1) just firms
with US revenue ∈ [0, .25). Column (2) just firms with US revenue ∈ [.25, .5).
Column (3) just firms with US revenue ∈ [.5, .75). Column (4) just firms
with US revenue ∈ [.75, .1). Column (5) just firms with US revenue=1. SUR
standard errors with correlation across firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 2.11: Prediction market event study: cap size
Market cap decile ∆θt Std. error. Number of firms
1 -0.0022 [0.020] 532
2 0.016 [0.016] 532
3 0.0057 [0.013] 531
4 -0.014 [0.012] 532
5 -0.025** [0.010] 531
6 -0.0083 [0.0078] 532
7 -0.0025 [0.0064] 532
8 0.0038 [0.0066] 531
9 0.012 [0.0079] 532
10 0.011** [0.0049] 531
Each row shows a separate seemingly unrelated regres-
sion for firms within cap size decile (10=largest). Equally
weighted average effect shown. 3-factor Fama-French
model. Only days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. All regressions with
3-digit NAICS average removed. SUR standard errors with
correlation across firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.12: Top firms lobbying on Waxman-Markey by expenditure
Lobby expenses ($) Listed
GEN ELECTRIC 89,650,000 1
PG&E 55,140,000 1
FEDEX 50,037,074 1
EXXON MOBIL 49,580,000 1
CHEVRON 41,729,000 1
SOUTHERN 36,940,000 1
GEN MOTORS 36,351,000 1
FORD MOTOR DEL 34,769,000 1
KOCH IND 34,613,000 0
BOEING 31,286,000 1
MARATHON OIL 29,830,000 1
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER 28,152,466 1
BP 25,560,000 1
UNITED TECH 24,963,415 1
NORFOLK SOUTHERN 22,545,177 1
PEABODY ENERGY 21,266,000 1
JP MORGAN CHASE 20,800,000 1
LOCKHEED MARTIN 19,710,000 1
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 19,390,582 1
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 19,220,828 1
DUKE ENERGY 18,987,464 1
CONOCOPHILLIPS 18,372,210 1
WAL MART STORES 17,890,000 1
TOYOTA MOTOR 17,729,578 1
MONSANTO 16,800,000 1
ALTRIA 16,390,000 1
DELTA AIR LINES 16,105,879 1
UNION PACIFIC 16,039,854 1
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 16,015,000 1
DOW CHEM 16,007,000 1
DU PONT EI DE NEMOURS 15,793,514 1
EXELON 15,106,248 1
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 15,027,438 1
HEWLETT PACKARD 15,015,720 1
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL 14,430,000 1
ENERGY FUTURE HLDGS 12,591,447 0
HONEYWELL INT 12,492,000 1
CSX 11,512,078 1
PROCTER & GAMBLE 10,375,530 1
PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE 10,010,000 1
VISA 9,630,000 1
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Table 2.13: Cost of cap-and-trade vs. lobbying expense
Dep var is log absolute cap-and-trade cost
(1) (2)






Sector FEs NO YES
Regressions of log absolute value of cap-and-trade
on log Waxman-Markey lobbying expenditure.
Robust standard error clustered at aggregate sec-
tor level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.14: Estimated change in profits for listed and unlisted firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAPM 3FF <0.05 CI <0.10 CI <0.15 CI Avg.
Listed firms -148.87 -122.51 -159.25 -156.6 -193.11 -156.07
Unlisted firms (absolute cost) 82.04 78.52 86.21 87.87 81.87 83.30
Listed and unlisted firms (lower bound) -66.83 -43.99 -73.04 -68.73 - 111.24 -72.77
Listed and unlisted firms (upper bound) -230.91 -201.03 -245.46 -244.49 274.98 -239.37
All values in 2009 dollars. Listed firm estimates based on Panel (b) of Table 2.1. Each column uses a different
benchmark model. Unlisted firm bounds based on estimated relationship shown in Table 2.13.
Table 2.15: Estimated firm marginal abatement cost in 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAPM 3FF <0.05 CI <0.10 CI <0.15 CI avg
Lower bound firm marginal abatement cost 0.83 0.55 0.91 0.85 1.38 0.90
Upper bound firm marginal abatement cost 2.86 2.49 3.04 3.03 3.41 2.97
All values in 2009 dollars. Abatement assumptions include 1,400 mton annual offset usage, BAU emissions
rate at 0.2%/year, 40% cumulative auctioning, and discount rate of 5%. Each column uses a different
benchmark model.
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2.A Appendix: Adjusting for contract expiration
Intrade prediction markets are traded up to a certain date upon which contract holders are paid $1 if the
event is realized for each contract held. For the cap-and-trade prediction market, that expiration date
was December 31, 2010, coinciding with the end of the 111th Congress. Because it is rare that a piece
of legislation, having failed passage in the current Congress, is reintroduced with identical features in a
subsequent Congress, this expiration date should coincide with the expected final possible date of Waxman-
Markey approval.
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether markets expected Waxman-Markey prospects to exist fol-
lowing the end of the 111th Congress. If so, this introduces a bias between the prediction market price and
average market beliefs which would increase as the expiration date nears. One solution to this problem is
to estimate Equation 2.25 in first-differences, which removes a linear time trend from the price time series.
However, one might still be concerned about nonlinearities in this bias as a function of remaining trading
days not fully captured by a linear trend. To remove this bias, one would like to weight prediction price
levels using a kernel that varies with the number of remaining trading days.
Formally, the true variable of interest is qt(T ) where T = 12/31/2011, the date in which the cap-and-
trade system begins under the policy. I do not observe qt(T ). Instead, I observe a prediction market price
for a contract expiring on date T 1 = 12/31/2010 < T . I now define this as θt(d, T 1), where d = T 1 − t, the
number of remaining days until expiration. Specifically, it has the following piece-wise form:
θt(d, T 1) =

k(d)qt(T ), if d < D̂
qt(T ), otherwise
(B.1)
where k(d) is a weighting kernel which is a function of d and exists only when the remaining number of days
is less than some threshold D̂. In other words, k(d) captures any concerns about an impending contract
expiration. Importantly for this exercise, I assume k(d) to be discontinuous such that prediction market
participants only become concerned about contract expiration after a certain point when there are fewer
than D̂ days remaining.
The problem lies in estimating k(d). Fortunately, the availability of additional Intrade data allows for
an empirical estimate of k(d). The prediction market contract shown in Figure 2.3 was not the first cap-
and-trade contract offered by Intrade. Around the same time that the 2010-expiring contract begin trading,
InTrade offered an identical contract with an earlier expiration date set for T 2 = 12/31/2009 < T 1 < T .
This contract, with prices denoted as θt(d, T 2), lasted only eight months and is shown as a dashed line in
Figure 2.A1.
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Estimating k(d) requires the following assumption: for all trading days in which both contracts exist,
d ≥ D̂ for θt(d, T 1) and d < D̂ for θt(d, T 2). That is during 5/1/2009-12/31/2009, prices from the 2010-
expiring contract were unadulterated by concerns over contract expiration while prices from the 2009-expiring




∀t ∈ [5/1/2009, 12/31/2009] (B.2)
The solid line in Figure 2.A2 plots k(d) and appears trend stationary. To remove noise in k(d), the following
linear regression is performed:
k(d) = α0 + α1d+ d (B.3)
where d is a mean zero disturbance. The predicted kernel, k̂(d), is shown as the dashed line in Figure 2.A2.
The threshold D̂ is defined as the point at which k̂(d) = 1. To recover qt, I simply rewrite Equation B.1 to
obtain:
qt(T ) = adjusted θt(d, T 1) =

θt(d,T
1)dk(d) , if d < D̂
θt(d, T 1), otherwise
(B.4)
Figure 2.A3 plots the original θt(d, T 1) against the adjusted θt(d, T 1) using the predicted kernel from Equa-
tion B.3. Observe that the two time series begin diverging at the beginning of 2010 when d < Dˆ. This
divergence, which increases until the end of the 2010, inflates the original price series to remove any concerns
about contract expiration. Thus, while the prospects for cap-and-trade indeed collapsed when the Senate
formally withdrew cap-and-trade legislation on July 23, 2010, market beliefs over cap-and-trade prospects
were actually higher than what the original prediction market indicated.
Table 2.A1 replicates Panel (a) of Table 2.1 using the adjusted Intrade prices. These estimates are slightly
smaller but are not statistically different than those presented in Table 2.1.
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2.B Appendix: Aggregate cost uncertainty
In this section, I detail how uncertainty is incorporated into the bounding analysis. In Section 2.6, I con-
structed the following identification region using ` = 1...L listed and u = 1...U unlisted firms:














Because L̂B and ÛB are estimated, one can conduct statistical inference on the identification region. I follow
the principle developed by Imbens and Manski (2004) and extended by Stoye (2009) which provide a confi-
dence interval for a general partial identification framework that asymptotically covers the true parameter
of interest with fixed probability. Specifically, a (1− α) confidence interval has the general form:
CIα = [L̂B − cLB · se(L̂B), ÛB + cUB · se(ÛB)] (C.2)
where se(L̂B) and cLB are the standard errors and critical values for the estimated lower bound and anal-
ogously for the estimated upper bound. Unfortunately, I am unable to use the critical values suggested by
Stoye (2009) because the bounds for unlisted firms are estimated using the particular functional form shown
in Equation 2.30 which generates covariance terms between listed and unlisted firms that are not analytically
tractable. Instead, I perform a parametric bootstrap procedure.
In Section 2.5, I used a seemingly unrelated regression procedure to estimate γˆ, the vector of Waxman-
Markey effects for all listed firms, and an associated L x L variance-covariance matrix ΩˆL. The parametric
bootstrap procedure begins by drawing from this L x L multinominal normal distribution and follows the
steps described in the bounding analysis of Section 2.6. Specifically, for each iteration b = 1...250:
Step 1: Draw: γˆ(b) from N(γˆ, ΩˆL)










Step 3: Regress: log|∆v(b)` | = α+ η logLobbyExpense` + µ` for listed firms that lobbied.
Step 4: Predict: |∆vˆ(b)u | = eαˆ+ηˆ logLobbyExpenseu for unlisted firms.
























This procedure produces an empirical distribution for both the lower and upper bounds of the identification
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2.C Appendix: Data summary
Prediction market event study
Individual daily stock returns were obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Intrade
provides daily closing prices and trading volume for the contract “A cap and trade system for emissions
trading to be established before midnight ET on 31 Dec 2010” as well as the analogous contract ending
on 31 Dec 2009. Transaction-level data for the 2010-expiring contract acquired privately from Intrade.
Fama-French factors and monthly Welsh-Goyal variables were downloaded from Kenneth French’s46 and
Amit Goyal’s47 websites respectively. Daily crude oil prices come from the U.S. DOE Energy Information
Agency.48 EU-ETS 2015 future prices obtained from Bluenext Exchange.49 The 3-digit manufacturing
NAICS energy intensity was constructed from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.50 Recent
sectoral level carbon intensity was provided by the U.S. DOC Economics and Statistic Administration.51
4-digit NAICS trade import data obtained from U.S. Census Bureau’s Foreign Trade Division52 with related
output from U.S. DOC’s Bureau of Economic Analysis.53 Geographic business segment level revenue data
constructed from the merged CRSP-Compustat database. Business-as-usual emissions obtained from the
U.S. Department of Energy Information Agency’s Annual Energy Outlook 2009.
Lobbying expenditure bounding analysis
Since the passage of the Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995, all individuals engaged in lobbying members
of the federal government are required to register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the
Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR).54 Each lobbying record indicates lobbyist name (or names in the
case of a team of lobbyists), the name of the firm hiring lobbying services, the amount spent, and in some
cases the specific issue or legislation that is the target of lobbying efforts (see Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-
Rosen (2012) for further background on reports). A copy of these publicly available records are maintained
and organized by the Center for Responsible Politics which has examined the records allowing the data to
be collapsed to the lobbying firm level.55 To standardize company names for matching with CRSP data,
I use Bronwyn Hall’s name standardization code developed originally for patent data. Spot checks were









54The Lobbying and Disclosure Act defines a lobbyist “any individual who is employed or retained by a client for financial or
other compensation for services that include more than one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose lobbying activities
constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to that client over a six month
period.” From 1998-2006, lobbyists were required to file reports on a semi-annual basis. Since the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act of 2007, reports are required every quarter.
55The SOPR does not require lobbying firms to provide standard company identifiers used in other databases. There is thus
a problem of whether firms filing lobbying reports are truly separate entities. For example in 2009, General Electric, General
Electric Transportation, and General Electric Healthcare all filed lobbying records. CRP manually identifies the subsidiaries of
a parent company so that aggregation can be performed at the parent company level.
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2.D Appendix: Specific cap-and-trade related events
The period between the passage of Waxman-Markey on June 26, 2009 and the withdrawal of cap-and-trade
from the Senate on July 23, 2010 marked the peak and decline of cap-and-trade prospects in the US. A
number of important events during this period were instrumental in defeating cap-and-trade. This section
provides a short summary of each event along with a news link. Some important events probably affected
stock returns for other reasons besides Waxman-Markey prospects. For example, Scott Brown’s election
affected the likelihood of various policies. An asterisk (*) notes that this event is likely to have only affected
cap-and-trade policy prospects and hence was examined separately in this paper. As shown by the vertical
lines in Figure 2.3, these events were well captured by prediction market price movements.
June 26, 2009: House passes Waxman-Markey56
Initial hearings on draft legislation were held on the week of April 20, 2009 with the full bill introduced into
the House shortly thereafter on May 15, 2009. The bill was approved on June 26, 2009 by a vote of 219-212
with 8 supporting Republicans and 44 Democrats opposed.57
November 4, 2009: Lindsay Graham joins Senate climate effort (∆θt = 0.05)*
After passage of Waxman-Markey, efforts to pass legislation in the Senate were lead by Senators Lieberman,
an independent, and Kerry, a Democrat. The arrival of Lindsay Graham, a Republican Senator from South
Carolina buoyed cap-and-trade prospects.58
December 20, 2009: UNFCCC Copenhagen negotiations concluded (∆θt = −0.07)*
With the Kyoto Protocol expiring in 2012, countries were expected to negotiate a new international climate
treaty at Copenhagen. While a general agreement was reached in the final hour, the agreement was non-
binding and was generally regarded as not substantial enough to succeed the Kyoto Protocol.59
January, 19, 2010: Scott Brown wins Mass Senate seat
The Democrat’s tenuous supermajority in the Senate was lost when Scott Brown won Edward Kennedy’s
Massachusetts Senate seat in a special election.60
January 27, 2010: Graham, Kerry, Lieberman seek cap-and-trade alternatives (∆θt = −0.073)*
With cap-and-trade looking unlikely, Senate sponsors look for alternative policy ideas.61
March 31, 2010: Obama supports offshore drilling
After months of political pressure, President Obama agrees to expand domestic oil production.62
April 20, 2010: BP Deepwater Horizon spill begins
An explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform spills up to 4.9 million barrels of oil. Senator Graham
had pushed for offshore drilling as part of the Senate climate bill to engage Senate Republicans.
April 23, 2010: Lindsay Graham drops support of Senate bill (∆θt = −0.06)*
After political pressure from his constituents and party, Senator Graham criticizes Senate Democratic Lead-
ership over disagreements regarding immigration reform on April 23, 2010. Graham formally withdrew from
Senate climate efforts on April 24, 2010.63
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June 15, 2010: Obama oval office speech
President Obama focuses on energy issues in his first oval office speech.64
July 22, 2010: Senate drops cap-and-trade legislation (∆θt = −0.14)*
Without a filibuster-proof supermajority, Senate democrats drop consideration of cap-and-trade bill.65
2.E Appendix: Structural models for environmental policy
CGE models for cap-and-trade regulations
During deliberations for Waxman-Markey, several CGE modeling groups were contracted by organizations
and government agencies. The Environmental Protection Agency hired RTI and Dale W. Jorgenson Asso-
ciates to run the ADAGE and IGEM models respectively.66 Kolstad et al. (2010) provide a detailed peer
review of ADAGE and IGEM commissioned by the EPA. With the exception of IGEM which estimates pa-
rameters econometrically, parameters within CGE models are calibrated to match observed macroeconomic
activity. The offset usage assumptions adopted in this paper were based on EPA analysis (EPA, 2009). The
EPPA model is run by the Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Climate Change at MIT. 67 Model
runs were also commissioned by several advocacy organizations. The American Council for Capital Forma-
tion (ACCF) and National Association for Manufacturers (NAM) hired SAIC to run the U.S. EIA’s National
Energy Modeling System (NEMS).68 The National Black Chamber of Commerce hired CRA international
to run the MRN-NEEM model.69 The Heritage foundation hired Global Insight to run its IHS model.70
These models differ along many dimensions (see Fawcett, Calvin and de la Chesnaye (2009) for a recent
review). One important distinction pertinent for this analysis is whether agents in the models are myopic or
exhibit perfect foresight. Myopic CGE models are solved iteratively at each time step while in models with
perfect foresight agents optimize simultaneously over the entire policy time-horizon. The Hotelling model
introduced in Section 2.3 exhibits perfect foresight. Of the CGE models analyzing Waxman-Markey, IGEM,
ADAGE, and MRN-NEEM have perfect foresight whereas EPPA, NEMS, and IHS are myopic.
Another important area of distinction is whether the CGE models incorporated non-cap-and-trade com-
ponents of the Waxman-Markey bill. ADAGE, NEMS, and MRN-NEEM models include many non-cap-
and-trade provisions. IGEM and EPPA do not model those provisions. It is not clear from available IHS
documentation whether non-cap-and-trade provisions are modeled.
Models for previous environmental regulations
Most of the EU-ETS modeling forecasts summarized in Convery et al. (2010) are similar to the models used
for evaluating the Waxman-Markey policy described above. Structural models for earlier environmental
regulations were primarily partial equilibrium linear dynamic optimization models and thus not directly
comparable to modern CGE models. For many of the ex-ante Title IV SO2 forecasts under the 1990 Clear
Air Act Amendments, the EPA hired ICF consulting to run the Integrated Planning Model (IPM).71 A
similar methodology was used by the EPA for forecasting costs under the Montreal Protocol. Cook (1996)
notes that ex-ante EPA estimates for a 50% phase-out of CFCs by 1998 was $3.55 per kg while ex-post
estimates for a 100% phase-out of CFCs by 2000 was $2.20 per km. To make ex-ante and ex-post estimates
comparable, I conservatively assume that abatement costs are linear implying an ex-ante forecast cost of








71A summary of IPM available: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACE423.pdf
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2.F Appendix Figures
















Jul9 Oct9 Jan10 Apr10 Jul10 Oct10
2010−expiring contract 2009−expiring contract
Notes: Time series of daily prices for Intrade cap-and-trade contracts expiring at end of 2009 (dashed) and 2010 (solid). Red
vertical line marks start of 2010.



















Days until end of contract
Empirical kernel Predicted kernel
Notes: Time series of empirical (solid, blue) and predicted (dashed, red) weighting kernel, k̂(D) as a function of D days
remaining until contract expiration.
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2010−expiring contract Adjusted 2010−expiring contract
Notes: Time series of daily prices for Intrade cap-and-trade contracts expiring in 2010 (solid) and with adjustment for termi-
nation date using predicted weighting kernel in Figure 2.A2.
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Notes: Kernel density shows distribution of total lobbying revenue for lobbyists hired by unlisted and listed firms to lobby on
Waxman-Markey.
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2.G Appendix Tables
Table 2.A1: Prediction market event study: average effect using expiration adjusted prices
(1) (2)
mkt 3 FF
Panel (a): Dep var is 2-day stock return
adjusted ∆θt -0.017* -0.012**
[0.0095] [0.0055]
Number of firms 5,316 5,316
Number of days 111 111
Panel (b): Dep var is 3-day stock return
adjusted ∆θt -0.037*** -0.021**
[0.014] [0.0088]
Number of firms 5,316 5,316
Number of days 74 74
Specification using expiration adjusted prediction market
prices (see 2.A). Only days with θt ∈ [.2, .8] Column (1)
uses the CAPM model with an aggregate value-weighted
market index. Column (2) uses a 3 factor Fama-French
model. Panel (a) uses 2-day returns, Panel (b) uses 3-day
returns. SUR standard errors with correlation across firms.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.A2: Prediction market event study: standard errors







ROBUST [0.013] ** [0.014]**
NAICS3 CLUSTER [0.0091]*** [0.0093]***
Number of firms 104 104
Number of days 111 111
Comparison of firm-by-firm SUR standard errors and panel
regression standard errors using a 2% random sample
of firms. Only days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. Uncertainty
shown using firm-by-firm SUR, panel OLS, panel OLS with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, and panel OLS
with 3-digit NAICS clustered standard errors. Column (1)
uses the CAPM model with an aggregate value-weighted
market index. Column (2) uses a 3 factor Fama-French
model. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.A3: Prediction market event study: pre-event period average effect
(1) (2)
mkt 3 FF
Panel (a): Dep var is 2-day stock return
∆θt -0.0259*** -0.0250***
[0.00565] [0.00417]
Number of firms 4,999 4,999
Number of days 111 111
Panel (b): Dep var is 3-day stock return
∆θt -0.0504*** -0.0408***
[0.00802] [0.00719]
Number of firms 4,999 4,999
Number of days 74 74
Panel regressions at firm-by-day level estimated pre-event
period for trading days between 1/1/2008-5/1/2009 (see
Equation 2.26). Only days with θt ∈ [.2, .8]. Column (1)
uses the CAPM model with an aggregate value-weighted
market index. Column (2) uses a 3 factor Fama-French
model. Panel (a) uses 2-day returns, Panel (b) uses 3-day
returns. Standard error clustered at 3-digit NAICS level in
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.A4: Prediction market event study: 3-day return full sample average effect
Model Days avg. effect
(1) CAPM 74 -0.039**
[0.016]
(2) 3-factor FF 74 -0.022**
[0.0099]
(3) < 0.05 CI 111 -0.047***
[0.017]
(4) < 0.10 CI 111 -0.046***
[0.016]
(5) < 0.15 CI 111 -0.047***
[0.016]
Panel regressions (see Equation 2.25) of 3-day
firm-level return on change in prediction mar-
ket price with CAPM, 3-factor Fama-French,
and value-weighted returns constructed from
firms with carbon intensity below 0.05, 0.10
and 0.15 mton CO2 per billion output as
benchmark control. Only days with θt ∈
[.2, .8]. SUR standard errors with correlation
across firms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.A5: Lobbying revenue for lobbyists hired by listed and unlisted firms by sector
Listed Unlisted Difference
All sectors 456,101 353,290 -102,810***
N=952 N=461 [28517]
Agribusiness 483,269 220,956 -262,313***
N=54 N=42 [57998]
Comm/Elec 302,308 222,183 -80,125
N=97 N=15 [49476]
Construction 326,005 355,777 29,772
N=34 N=23 [82877]
Energy 551,979 342,697 -209,282***
N=310 N=180 [63040.24]
Finance 516,820 392,577 -124,243**
N=83 N=95 [38,444]
Health 496,607 351,135 -145,472
N=14 N=12 [71106]
Trans 478,796 373,606 -105,120
N=132 N=26 [58373]
Misc 366,404 428,873 62,469
N=228 N=68 [65130]
Each row conducts a t-test for differences in
means allowing unequal variance. Standard
errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Chapter 3
Adapting to Predictable Weather:
Chinese Farmers and the Monsoon Onset
Kyle Meng, Wolfram Schlenker, and Liangzhi You1
Abstract
Studying how farmers adjust to predictable weather changes is important both for understanding adap-
tation under future climate change as well as risk coping under existing weather shocks. This paper develops
and applies a new technique for estimating farming adjustments in response to information that predicts
future weather realizations. We exploit the regular northward movement of local monsoon onset over south-
east China which allows weather variation to be decomposed into predictable and unpredictable components.
Applying this technique for the 1980-2000 period, we find that rice area planted responds significantly and
in an optimal manner to predictive information available from monsoon onsets earlier in the year. This
response is strongest for counties that have lower access to irrigation and experience average onset later
in the year. We also find that the risk reduction potential of using predictive information is limited and
argue that both ex-post risk management and long run technological change will be important channels of
adaptation under climate change.
1Meng: Columbia University, Schlenker: Columbia University and NBER. You: International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute. The authors thank Doug Almond, Mark Cane, Xiaojia Bao, Solomon Hsiang, Ronald Miller, Suresh Naidu, Matt Neidell,
Cristian Pop-Eleches, Andrew Robertson, Chris Small, and Tom Vogl for helpful suggestions and comments. All remaining
errors are our own.
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3.1 Introduction
How do farmers protect themselves against weather fluctuations? Several recent studies have found that year-
to-year weather fluctuations have large macroeconomic costs (Hsiang, 2010; Dell, Jones and Olken, 2012).
Estimates of the impact of future climate change are sometimes obtained by extrapolating a historically
estimated relationship (Mendelsohn, Nordhaus and Shaw, 1994; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009a; Fisher et al.,
2012; Descheˆnes and Greenstone, 2012). A valid criticism to such an approach is that responses to predictable
changes may be different from responses to unpredictable year-to-year weather fluctuations. The goal of this
paper is to study how farmers might respond to predictive information they receive about future weather
realizations. While a behavioral response to weather predictions for a particular growing season may not
cover the full set of adaptation options available to a farmer, studying this behavior can be an informative
starting point for understanding adaption under climate change. Put differently, do we observe risk-coping
behavior in the form of responses to predictive information and if so what is the risk mitigation potential of
this behavior?
Studying this behavior requires decomposing annual weather fluctuations into plausibly predictable and
unpredictable components. We are able to achieve this by exploiting two particularities of agricultural
activity in southeast China: a predictive informational environment supplied by a highly regular monsoonal
system and rice cultivation practices that requires planting commitments before the start of the growing
season. We find that the rice area planted responds significantly and in an optimal manner to predictive
information available from monsoon onsets earlier in the year. This response is strongest for counties that
have lower access to irrigation and experience average monsoon onset later in the year. We also find that
the overall risk reduction potential of using this predictive information is limited. Together, this suggests
that the costs associated with unpredictable weather is high and that use of predictive information alone is
inadequate as a channel for adaptation.
The start of the primary growing season in southeast China is characterized annually by the arrival of the
East Asian Summer Monsoon (EASM), a meso-scale moisture system that develops over the South China
Sea each spring and migrates over several months northward through southeast China. As we demonstrate,
the EASM exhibits high spatial correlation allowing, as the monsoon “marches” northward, for “upstream”
information to be available to farmers located “downstream” on the monsoon’s path well before the start
of the local growing season. We use this climatic feature to separate annual weather into predictable and
unpredictable components.
Information, even if highly predictive of future weather, is useful only if forecasts are valuable for sowing
decisions. For example, upstream onset characteristics would not be valuable if predictive information prior
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to the start of the local monsoon was not useful. Our empirical strategy pairs the northward march of the
monsoon with two particular features of rice cultivation - its sensitivity to total rainfall during the entire
growing season and a necessary waiting period between when seeds are initially planted and saplings are
transplanted into monsoon-flooded paddies. This requires farmers to make critical planting decisions prior
to the start of the local monsoon. Thus, any available information that might predict total rainfall prior to
the start of the local monsoon becomes valuable.
The northward march of the monsoon and the timing of rice sowing in southeast China provides an
ideal setting in which a contemporaneous but spatially remote upstream monsoon onset informs upon future
downstream onset. Using these two features, our empirical test asks whether farmers in southeast China
responding to upstream features of the monsoon. In other words, does upstream monsoonal activity act as
“canaries in the coal mine” for farmers in downstream counties.
We answer this question through a series of analyses for southeast Chinese counties during the 1980-2000
period. We first show that rice yields respond nonlinearly to total rainfall during the growing season. Next,
we then construct an agronomic definition of local monsoon onset using a fine-scale daily rainfall dataset
and show that late onset over upstream counties predicts local growing season rainfall. Finally, we show
that this predictive information is used by farmers optimally in terms of how much rice is planted each
year. Furthermore, we find robust evidence that this adjustment is occurring most strongly during the brief
window when downstream farmers make planting decisions, consistent with the timing of steps for rice sowing
mentioned earlier. In one of our validation tests, we find this adjustment to increase for counties with low
levels of irrigation, which suggests that the value of this information increases in counties where accurate
prediction of total rainfall is more critical. The response is also stronger for counties with more upstream
counties to inform predictions.
While we find evidence of farmers utilizing predictive upstream information, the overall risk reduction
from using this information is limited. In a yield specification where we jointly estimate the effects of total
rainfall and upstream onset information, we find the curvature on the nonlinear yield relationship to be
largely unaffected by the addition of predictive upstream information. This suggests that while predictive
information can help mitigate the risks of unpredictable weather, its overall potential is limited. Therefore,
when considering future investments in adaptation, a central role remains for both the availability of ex-post
coping behaviors (i.e. such as various self- and cross- insurance schemes) as well as long term investments
in infrastructure and technology that may protect against the impacts of unpredictable weather shocks.
This paper is related to two lines of research. A central issue in estimating the economic impacts of
future climate change is understanding the degree and ways in which affected agents may adjust behavior
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under changing climatic conditions.2 Such information can both inform discussions on how to allocate future
climate adaptation investments as well as to help adjust potential biases in existing estimates of future climate
impacts that do no explicitly account for adaptation. This is particularly true for the agricultural sector where
climate impacts are expected to be particularly large (Schlenker, Hanemann and Fisher, 2005; Descheˆnes
and Greenstone, 2007; Fisher et al., 2012; Descheˆnes and Greenstone, 2012) and nonlinear (Schlenker and
Roberts, 2009a). One approach to understanding potential future adaptation measures is to examine historic
evidence of long-run adaptation or year-to-year adjustments.3
To date, previous studies examining the connection between historic weather variability and agricultural
outcomes to understand future climate impacts have used either hedonic or quasi-experimental estimation
techniques. Hedonic estimation implicitly includes long-run adaptation responses by assuming that each
land parcel is used optimally under historic local climate conditions (Mendelsohn, Nordhaus and Shaw,
1994; Schlenker, Hanemann and Fisher, 2005). Because the analysis is cross-sectional, the cost of climate
change is therefore the difference in yields between a parcel of land optimized under its historical climate and
that of a parcel of land optimized under a warmer climate. Even if one considers the assumption of optimal of
land use under historic climate conditions valid, hedonic studies do not examine a farmer’s decision directly
and hence provide little insight on how that local optimum might have been reached.
On the other hand, quasi-experimental techniques uses panel data to link yearly agricultural outcomes
to random annual weather shocks - define typically as deviations from the local annual mean with additional
semi-parametric controls (Descheˆnes and Greenstone, 2007). The quasi-experimental approach does not esti-
mate long-run adaptation measures and indeed might represent an upper bound for future climate damages
if adaptation in the long run dampen the costs of year-to-year random shocks. Because this technique is
designed to identify off the unpredictable component of annual weather fluctuations, it does not explicitly
estimate the mitigating benefits of adjustments made in response to predictive information. We view this
study as providing a bridge between the two prevailing methods. Like quasi-experimental techniques, we
use year-to-year variation in weather fluctuations in a panel data setup. However, because we explicitly iso-
late the predictable component of annual weather, we are able to uncover the mechanism by which farmers
respond each year to weather predictions.
This paper also relates to studies in the microeconomics of development literature examining how house-
holds utilize informal channels as insurance against losses from weather-induced economic shocks. Much of
this research has focused on examining the coping mechanisms employed after the realization of weather
2We follow the standard climatology distinction in defining climate as the mean interannual weather. A changing climate
is one in which the interannual mean or variance is shifting over time.
3As with the distinction between climate and weather, we want to distinguish between adaptation, which are defensive
measures undertaken to predicted changes in the climate with adjustments, which we define as defensive measures undertaken
to predicted changes in weather. This paper focuses on adjustments and not adaptation.
CHAPTER 3. ADAPTING TO PREDICTABLE WEATHER 73
shocks such as consumption smoothing (Paxson, 1992), gender selection in children (Rose, 1999), and vio-
lence against elderly women (Miguel, 2005). A related strand examines how cross-sectional variation in the
intensity of weather variation induces household risk coping behavior such as the diversification of asset hold-
ings (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993) or income diversification from non-farm employment (Rosenzweig
and Stark, 1989). With the exception of Gine´, Townsend and Vickery (2007), to date, there are no studies
to our knowledge that have examined how agents might engage in year-to-year risk reducing activity ex-ante
to the realization of a weather shock. This study differs from Gine´, Townsend and Vickery (2007), which
examines farming behavior in a monsoonal setting in India, by extending both the spatial and temporal
extent of analysis allowing for an examination of how such behavior hold over longer time periods and a
broader spatial extent.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides background into the East Asian Summer Monsoon
and rice cultivation practices in southeast China and a description of the data used. Section 3.3 presents
a simple model that maps individual farming decision onto county-level outcomes which we observe in the
data. Section 3.4 details our construction of the local monsoon onset and Section 3.5 shows evidence that
total rainfall is predictable by upstream monsoon onset. Section 3.6 provides our main results on farmer
responsiveness to upstream onset along with a series of robustness checks. Finally, Section 3.7 shows the
limits of predictive information in dampening the costs of weather fluctuations and is followed by a brief
discussion.
3.2 Background and Data
3.2.1 The EASM and rice cultivation in southeast China
China is the world’s largest producer of rice, accounting for 35% of total world production in 2008 (Food
and Organization, 2008). Rice is also China’s most produced grain with nearly all output used for domestic
consumption. Figure 3.1 maps where rice is grown within the country. With the exception of a few regions
in the dry northeast, most rice is grown in the semi-tropical southeast and in the Yangtze River basin. Rice
is a highly water-intensive crop. During most of its growing period, rice requires paddies flooded with fresh
water which for counties in southeast and central China are supplied by the East Asian Summer Monsoon
(EASM).
Pre-monsoon forecasts are possible because of the regular northward movement of the EASM. In mete-
orological terms, the annual onset of the EASM is defined as an abrupt change in wind directions over the
Indochina Peninsula. As with most monsoonal systems, this event is driven by the differential heating over
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land and ocean surfaces. The earliest signs of EASM precipitation appear typically between late April and
early May over the southern and central Indochina Peninsula. Upon initial onset, the subsequent northward
march of the EASM is characterized by three stages of northward progression (Ding and Chan, 2005). From
mid to late May, precipitation onset expands beyond the Indochina Peninsula into the South China Sea
coinciding with the start of the growing season in much of southeast China. In early to mid June, precipita-
tion reaches greater parts of East Asia triggering the Meiyu rainy season over the Yangtze River Basin and
the Baiu rainy season in Japan. By early July, the EASM in its final stage arrives in northern China and
introduces the Changma rainy season in the Korean Peninsula. While considerable interannual variation
exists in monsoonal activity along both spatial and temporal dimensions, the broad features of the annual
northward march of local monsoon onset over southeast China is sufficiently regular to allow for predictions
to be made using upstream monsoonal activity.
The rice planting process has two particularities that are relevant for this paper. To germinate, rice seeds
must first be planted in nurseries or flower beds. When a seedling emerges roughly one month later, it is
transferred permanently into a flooded paddy. Thus, farmers must make decisions on how much rice to plant
well in advance of the local monsoon onset. Second, for yield to be maximized, paddies must be flooded for
much of the growing season. These two circumstances particular to rice cultivation - the pre-monsoon sowing,
and the steady water requirements for much of the growing season - require that farmers must forecast total
growing season rainfall well before the start of the local monsoon.
3.2.2 Data sources
Our panel data covers the period from 1980-2000. We restrict our sample to the 1218 counties in southeast
China whose geographical centroids fall within the bounds [100◦E, 122◦E] and [18◦N , 36◦N ]. To construct
annual monsoon onset at the county level, we use a high resolution daily weather dataset compiled from 726
weather stations and gridded at a 1◦x 1◦ resolution (Feng, Hu and Qian, 2004). Daily precipitation data
run from 1951-2000. Using a combination of official statistics produced by China’s Ministry of Agriculture
and the China Statistic Bureau, we have area planted and yield at the county level for rice and maize from
1980-2003 as well as fixed start and end months of the growing season for each crop at the county level. Table
3.1 provide summary statistics for our key variables. Construction of the onset variables will be detailed in
Section 4.
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3.3 A simple farming decision model
We are interested in how individual farmers respond to predictive information. However, our empirical
analysis is conducted at the county level. In this section, we develop a simple farming decision model that
shows how heterogeneity in land fertility could lead to relationships observed for total area planted and
average yield at the county level. We first explore the case where rainfall is known before turning to a
setting in which rainfall is uncertain but with some predictability.
3.3.1 Model with known rainfall
Following Berck and Helfand (1990), we present a model which captures the extensive margin decision to
enter into agricultural production with heterogeneous farmers. Each farmer i is endowed with a fixed amount
of land, a¯.4 Farmers are heterogeneous in land fertility si, which is drawn from distribution g(si) with bounds
si ∈ [0, S¯]. The farmer decides each year whether or not to enter her land into production based on. If she
enters, crop yield, yi can be expressed as a function of total rainfall during the growing season over the
county, R, and her land’s fertility, yi = f(R, si). For now, we treat R as known. We assume that yields are
concave in R (i.e. ∂
2yi
∂R2 < 0), increasing in si (i.e.
∂yi
∂si
> 0) and that the cross derivative is positive (i.e.
∂2yi
∂R∂si
> 0). In other words, a more fertile plot of land not only increases yields but also increases yields
conditional on rainfall. The farmer has an outside option, ω, from non-farm employment which is constant
for all farmers within the county. Normalizing crop prices to unity, the farmer’s problem is to maximize the
following objective function:
max [f(R, si)a¯, ω] (3.1)
We define s∗ such that f(R, s∗)a¯ = ω. That is, s∗ is the fertility level of the marginal farmer who is indifferent
between farming and her outside option for a given level of rainfall. Farmers with si > s∗ will decide to
plant while farmers with si < s∗ will opt out of farming that year. For notational simplicity, we denote the









By assumption, the denominator is positive. However, the sign of the numerator depends on whether yield




dR is negative as farmers with more fertile lands
enter into production. Conversely, when yields are decreasing with rainfall, farmers with less fertile lands
4We assume each farmer has the same amount of land. This is reasonable for southern China where individual farm holdings
are typically small with fairly little variation in size across farmers.
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opt out in favor of their outside option.
This study observes farming activity at the county level, which requires that we aggregate over the
distribution of fertility levels across a county. We express aggregate land under production, or area planted,
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Intuitively, Equation 3.4 along with Equation 3.2 indicate that when ∂y
∗
∂s∗ > 0 and therefore
ds∗
dR < 0, farmers
at the margin choose enter into production which causes total area planted in the county to increase. This
relationship is reversed when ds
∗
dR > 0 and the marginal farmer is opting instead for her outside option.




















Equation 3.6 shows that the county-level yield response to total rainfall has two offsetting components. The
first terms captures the inframarginal effect of total rainfall on aggregate yield for farmers already under
production while the second term captures the effect on aggregate yields due to the entry or exit of farmers
at the margin. For example, as rainfall increases, yield for farmers already in production increases while at
the same time less fertile land has now entered into production which serves to lower aggregate yield. At the
point of optimality, a change in total rainfall results in a drop in yield for the marginal farmer which equals
the change in yield weighted across all inframarginal farmers.
Equation 3.6 also shows that the optimum for average yield occurs at a higher level of total rainfall than
the aggregate area optimum. To see that, recall that the aggregate area response in rainfall reaches an
optimum when ds
∗
dR = 0, or identically when
∂y∗
∂R = 0. At that level of rainfall, the second term of Equation
3.6 is zero. However, our assumption that ∂
2yi
∂R∂si
> 0 implies ∂yi∂R >
∂y∗
∂R = 0 for all si ∈ [s∗, S¯] such that
the weight yield across all inframarginal farmers is still increasing even when the aggregate area planted
optimum is reached. Intuitively, as aggregate area planted reaches an optimum, less fertile lands drop out
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of production which increases the average yield for land under production.
In summary, our model offers the following three predictions:
Proposition 1 There exists R∗Y such that R
∗
Y = argmax Y (R)
Proposition 2 There exists R∗A such that R
∗
A = argmax A(R)
Proposition 3 R∗Y > R
∗
A
3.3.2 Model with uncertain rainfall
We now extend our previous model to account for uncertain rainfall. Suppose rainfall can be written as
R = R +  where R and  ∼ (0, σ2) are the predictable and unpredictable components respectively. We
further assume that, ∂
3yi
∂R3 = 0. We can now rewrite our yield function by applying a second-order Taylor
approximation around R:








Which gives us the following expression for expected rainfall:






By assuming that ∂
3yi
∂R3 = 0, one can readily show that changes in total area planted shown in Equation 3.4
is unaffected by the introduction of rainfall uncertainty. However, changes in the average yield across the
























∂R2 as capturing the cost of rainfall uncertainty. Consider when
∂s∗
∂R∗ < 0 and marginal






∂R∗ > 0, with
dY




. In both cases the divergence in the marginal yield response between rainfall certainty and
uncertainty is increasing in σ2. Intuitively, given the (relative) certainty of the outside option, increasing
rainfall uncertainty dampens the marginal response of average yield to expected rainfall.
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3.4 Monsoon onset construction
3.4.1 Construction of local onset
In meteorological terms, the global onset of a monsoonal system is typically defined as a sudden change in
regional wind patterns. This definition, however, is too spatially remote to be relevant for local farming
decisions. A more appropriate variable of interest should capture the properties of rainfall occurring during
the local monsoon onset as that typically signals the beginning of the local growing season. Local monsoon
onset, however, is not easily defined. Figure 3.2 offers a schematic profile of annual rainfall for a given
location. Notice that one could define the local onset by characterizing the intensity, timing and duration
of both the initial wet spell as well as the subsequent dry spell. For the EASM, previous work in the
meteorological literature using pentad-level (5-day averages) rainfall data define the start of the local onset
as the first pentad during which rainfall exceeds the preceding average January level by 5mm (Wang and
Ho, 2002). However, in addition to relying on a fixed arbitrary threshold, this definition of local onset may
not be robust to “false starts” as high daily rainfall events might trigger the onset threshold without being
followed by a definitive rainy season (Moron et al., 2009). Such short events would unlikely coincide with
the beginning of the rice growing season as farmers typically transplant their seedlings when it is expected
that a sustained period of rain is approaching.
Daily rainfall data allows us to develop an onset definition that may be robust to false starts. Figure
3.3 plots the rainfall profile for a single county in southeast China averaged over the 21 year sample period.
While the “hump” from the April-September monsoonal rains is clearly observed in the profile, notice that
there is still considerable day-to-day variation even in the historical average. An onset definition using daily
rainfall data must therefore pick up the start of the monsoon in a way that is robust to large daily variation.
Following Moron et al. (2009), we apply an agronomic definition of local onset that is robust to day-to-
day variations in rainfall as well as to the possibility of false starts (Moron et al., 2009). Specifically, this
definition characterizes an onset both by the intensity and duration of the initial wet spell as well as the
duration, intensity, and timing of the subsequent dry spell. This definition has been applied to finding local
onset for monsoonal systems in the Philippines (Moron et al., 2009), Indonesia (Moron, Robertson and Boer,
2009), and India (Moron and Robertson, 2009) and was successful in finding considerable spatial correlation
in local onset dates for the first two countries. We define the start of the local monsoon as the first day of a
10 day wet sequence in which cumulative rainfall exceeds the historical average rainfall for all wet sequences
lasting 10 days for that county. This latter requirement allows for intensity threshold heterogeneity in the
onset definition for each county. We further specify that the wet sequence cannot be followed by a 10 day
dry spell in which 10 mm of cumulative rainfall occurs within 30 days of initial onset. While our local onset
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definition provides an improvement on the previous technique used in the literature, one might be concerned
that a definition of local onset including dry spell parameters for rainfall up to a month after initial onset
might not be relevant for farmers who make planting decisions only when a wet spell is observed. We address
this by varying the parameters for required length and duration of the dry spell and find that local onsets
are largely insensitive to how we characterize the dry spell requirements.5
Our onset construction method identifies the timing and intensity of onset for each county-year in our
sample. Figure 3.4 maps the average onset timing (in days of the year) for each county in southeast China
over the 21-year sample period according to our definition. Importantly, Figure 3.4 shows that the agronomic
definition of local onset successfully captures the known northwest movement of the monsoon. Figure 3.4
also shows a large group of counties in the southeastern-most part of the country where the local onset
definition detects onset in early March. The presence of this group of counties is also evident in Figure 3.5
which plots the roughly bimodal distribution of average onset day of all counties in the sample. This earlier
pattern of rainfall is known in southeast China as the “spring” or “pre-summer” rains. The presence of
this system of earlier rainfall would concern subsequent regression results if features of the spring rains were
uninformative for predicting downstream monsoon onset. Figure 3.6 plots a correlation map showing the
correlation coefficients between a vector of annual onset days for a county in this region (colored in black)
with that of every other county in the sample. Notice that there is considerable spatial coherence shown in
Figure 3.6 suggesting that while the spring rains is formally a separate climatic system, the timing of the
spring rains is correlated with the timing of local EASM onset and thus useful for farmers in predicting their
own onset. This is consistent with existing studies arguing that the release of latent heat during the spring
rains might contribute to the convective instability that supports the development of the EASM (Ding and
Chan, 2005).
3.4.2 Construction of upstream onset groups
Our analysis requires the selection of “upstream” counties for each county in our sample. Using the historic
onset date shown in Figure 3.4, we obtain for each county a group of upstream counties with average onset
timing occurring up to 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 days earlier. For each local county-year observation, we take
the annual deviation in onset timing and intensity averaged across the counties in each upstream group to
form an upstream onset variable. Formally, our upstream onset variable for either timing or intensity, is
5The start of local monsoon may be informed by a richer informational environment than just an increase in rainfall. Other
important signals of the arrival of the monsoon include, for example, changes in humidity and temperature. Unfortunately, we
do not have data to inform alternative definitions of monsoon onset nor is there existing literature that supports use of humidity
or temperature based onset definitions.






(onsetni,L,t − onsetni,L) (3.9)
where for local county i in year t, Ni,L denotes the number of counties in an upstream onset group with
historic onset occurring up to L days earlier. The term onsetni,L,t−onsetni,L is the deviation in onset timing
or intensity for upstream county ni,L in year t. Observe that time-invariant onset groups (that is ni,L is
not indexed by time). This assumes that a farmer located in county i will always look towards the group
of counties that historically has had onset up to L days earlier. As an example, Figure 3.7 shows the fixed
onset groups associated with a single county (in red). Counties with average onset more than 70 days, 50-70
days, 30-50 days, and 10-30 days earlier are in green, cyan, light blue, and dark blue respectively. The -50
day upstream onset group for the sample county is therefore the union of all upstream counties shaded in
green and cyan. The spatial pattern shown in Figure 3.7 also provides confidence that our measure of local
onset captures the broad northward annual march of EASM local onsets.
3.4.3 Construction of total rainfall during the growing season
We also construct total rainfall during the growing season for each local county-year observation. We do
not have actual start and end dates of the growing season for each county-year observation. Instead, we
have cross-sectional county-level data on the start and end months of the rice growing season which provides
a rough length of the growing season. To address this data limitation, we construct several definitions
for cumulative rainfall during the growing season and show that our results are not sensitive to variable
construction. For all definitions, we assume that the growing season starts each year with the local monsoon
onset.6 We then construct growing season rainfall assuming either a fixed length or a fixed end date for the
growing season and define total rainfall as the cumulative daily rainfall during the specified period. We also
construct variables where growing season rainfall is defined as the average daily rainfall during the growing
season.
3.5 Predicting total rainfall
This section provides the following evidence critical for establishing that upstream monsoon onset is predic-
tive of our weather variable of interest, total rainfall during the growing season. We first show that total
rainfall during the growing season is an important determinant for rice yield. We then provide evidence that
6These annual start dates obtained from our onset construction fall mostly within the start months specified in the cross-
sectional growing season data.
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the timing of monsoon onset over upstream counties strongly predicts local total rainfall during the growing
season. We do not find that the intensity of upstream onset predicts local total rainfall.
3.5.1 Rice yields and total rainfall
Earlier in the paper, we noted that the weather variable of interest for rice farmers is total rainfall during
the growing season. We verify the importance of total rainfall for yields in Table 3.2 which shows results
from regressions of the form:
log(yieldit) = α0 + α1totalRaini,t + α2totalRain2i,t + θ1pt+ θ2pt
2 + ci + µit (3.10)
where θ1p and θ2p are province-level linear and quadratic trends and ci are county fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the province level to allow for arbitrary serial and cross sectional correlation in county-
level errors within a province. The quadratic functional form captured by α1 and α2 is supported visually
by the local regression plot shown in the top panel of Figure 3.10. The coefficients for both models indicate
a significant inverted quadratic relationship between total rainfall and log yields with p-values for the joint
significance test below the 5% level for both models. Marginal effects show that log yields reach an optimum
when total rainfall is 560 mm or when average rainfall is 6.3 mm/day during the growing season. This
confirms Proposition 1.
3.5.2 Predicting total rainfall using upstream onset characteristics
We have shown that the variable of interest for the rice farmer is total rainfall during the growing season.
If this variable could be predicted at the start of the growing season, our modeling framework shows that a
farmer, given the fertility level of her land and value of her outside option, could then choose whether or not
to enter into rice production. However, total rainfall is uncertain at the time that critical crop decisions must
be made, which for rice cultivation occur around a month before the start of the monsoon. The question
is whether information available prior to the start of the local monsoon onset can be used to predict total
rainfall during the growing season.
The coefficients shown in Table 3.3 presents coefficients from separate regressions of growing season total
rainfall on the timing (Column 1) and intensity (Column 2) of local and upstream monsoon onset. The
regressions have the form:
totalRaini,t = γ0 + γ1upstrOnsetLi,t + θ1pt+ θ2pt2 + ci + µit (3.11)
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where upstrOnsetLi,t is either the timing or intensity of monsoonal onset for upstream counties with an
average onset occurring L days earlier. We also include the timing and intensity of local onset for our county
of interest in Row 1 of Table 3.3. The middle panel in Figure 3.3 provides visual justification for a linear
specification in Equation 3.11. Overall, we find that the timing of onsets for both local and upstream counties
strongly predicts local total rainfall during the growing seasons while only the onset intensity of local and
nearby upstream counties can be used to predict local total rainfall. The predictive ability of upstream onset
timing and not intensity of the EASM is further supported by Figures 3.8 and 3.9. Figure 3.8 plots the
annual deviation in onset timing for each county by year along with a fitted restricted cubic spline function.
Figure 3.9 performs the same analysis but for annual deviations in onset intensity. From visual inspection,
there appears to be greater spatial correlation in onset timing for counties in southeast China than there is
for onset intensity suggesting that early or late onsets are more spatially correlated for any given year across
southeast China than the intensity of onset.
It is not entirely surprising that one can only predict total rainfall using upstream onset timing and not
intensity. While the pace of movement of the monsoonal front is fairly uniform, the intensity of rainfall during
onset can have considerable spatial heterogeneity. Across large spatial scales, upstream and downstream
onset can be both positively or negatively correlated depending on topography and the spatial structure of
the system. For example, highly intense upstream onsets could be negatively correlated with the intensity
of downstream onset if intense upstream rains lower the moisture content of the system as it moves north.
Onset intensity correlation maps presented in Figures 3.A1 and 3.A2 suggest that there is not broad spatial
coherence in the correlation of onset intensity across counties.7
3.6 Area planted response
3.6.1 Main results
We now test whether farmers respond to this predictive information about future rainfall. In the previous
section, we show that late monsoon onsets for upstream counties is positively associated with local total
rainfall during the growing season. Together with the inverted quadratic relationship between rice yields
and total rainfall shown in Table 3.2, Proposition 2 in Section 3.3 predicts an inverted quadratic relationship
between rice area planted and the timing of onset for upstream counties. We test for this evidence by
estimating the following specification:
7One could examine the spatial correlation structure of onset intensity to study whether farmers respond differentially to
high or low upstream onset intensity. However, such analysis would require a more sophisticated model of farmer information
uptake involving a weighting of information provided by the onset intensity for upstream counties that are positive and negatively
correlated.
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log(areait) = β0 + β1upstrOnsetL2i,t + β2upstrOnsetL
2
i,t + θ1pt+ θ2pt
2 + ci + µit (3.12)
where areait is the rice area planted (in hectares). The bottom panel of Figure 3.10 provides visual justifica-
tion for the use of a quadratic functional form. Linear and quadratic province-level time trends are included
to account primarily for different nonlinear trends in rice area planted for each province. Fixed effects help
remove any unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at the county level. As discussed earlier (and shown in
Figure 3.8), for any given year, there is considerable spatial correlation in monsoonal activity over southeast
China. To address these issues in our estimation, we cluster our standard errors by province in all baseline
specifications. Robustness checks will examine alternative error structures.
Table 3.4 shows estimates for Equation 3.12 using local (Column 1) and each of the five upstream onset
groups (Columns 2-6) as regressors. Only the functional form for local and 30 day upstream onset timing are
jointly significant at the 10% level. The bottom panel of Table 3.4 shows the marginal effect for these two
significant onset timing variables. Notice that the magnitude of the marginal response is nearly an order of
magnitude larger for the timing of onset 30 days earlier than that of local onset. This suggests that farmers
are far more responsive to the timing of local onset than to upstream onset with area planted dropping by
3.1% for an upstream onset that is 20 days earlier than the historic average.
A stronger response to upstream onset information compared to the timing of local onset is consistent
with the pre-monsoon sowing requirements for rice cultivation. In order to have seedlings ready for transplant
at the start of the local onset, farmers must plant nurseries at least a month before the start of the local
monsoon and thus make use of predictive information available during that period to forecast total rainfall
over the growing season. Information available when seedlings are transplanted at the start of the local
monsoon are therefore less useful since the decision on how much to plant has already been made.
The inverted quadratic relationship estimated in Column (4) of Table 3.4 peaks around zero which based
on estimates of γ0 in Equation 3.11 (not shown) corresponds to a total predicted rainfall of 350 mm. This
falls below the yield optimum of 560 mm as suggested by Proposition 3.
3.6.2 Robustness
We examine the robustness of the 30 day upstream response in Table 3.5. Column 1 reproduces Column 4
in Table 3.4. In Equation 3.12, we posited that farmers respond to local and upstream onset timing after
controlling for long-term trends. Alternatively, one could test whether response in area planted is sensitive
additionally to within-year differences in onset timing of upstream groups by including year fixed effects.8
8We avoid the use of year fixed effects in our main specification because it presupposes a highly sophisticated model of how
farmers use predictive information.
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Inclusion of year fixed effects would also control for aggregate annual shocks to southeast China that may be
correlated with monsoonal activity. Column 2 shows that the joint p-value of the 30 day upstream timing
terms remain significant at the 10% level with inclusion of fixed effects. However, both the magnitude of the
marginal response and where the optimum occurs changes.
Earlier discussions on the spatial structure of the monsoon noted that upstream onset timing is highly
correlated with downstream onset timing. Thus, one might be concerned that the effect picked up in Column
4 of Table 3.4 is correlated with the effect of local onset timing. To address this, Column 3 of Table 3.5
jointly estimates a quadratic function of local timing and lagged 30 day upstream timing and finds that point
estimates are stable compared to our benchmark specification.
A typical province in southeast China is about 200-400 km across. Standard errors clustered by province
would thus allow limited spatial correlation. To address this issue, we estimate our benchmark specification
using an error structure that allows for spatial correlation of arbitrary form following Conley (1999) with an
extension by Hsiang (2010) to include serial correlation. Columns 4 and 5 account for spatial correlation by
using a Bartlett kernel of length 500 km and serial correlation of 3 and 5 years respectively. Columns 6 and
7 extends the kernel out to 1000 km for serial correlation of 3 and 5 years. In all specifications, the p-value
for the joint test remains significant at the 10% level.
3.6.3 Heterogeneity
We next reestimate our main result for various subsamples. Quadratic functional forms are potentially
sensitive to outliers. To check that influential observations are not driving our main result, Column 1 of
Table 3.6 shows that dropping observations where the lagged 30 day upstream timing is above or below the
99.5% and 0.5% percentile does not affect our benchmark result.
Much of southeast China is irrigated. The availability of irrigation can help dampen the variability of
rainfall over the course of the growing season and make accurate prediction of total rainfall less critical. This
is supported by Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.6 which estimates Equation 3.12 only for counties in the bottom
and top terciles in effective irrigated area for 2003 respectively. Implicit in this estimation is the assumption
that cross-sectional differences in irrigation use is unchanged during the 21 year sample period. The p-value
for joint significance of the 30 day upstream terms is below the 10% level for counties with low levels of
irrigation and not significant for counties with high levels of irrigation.
We further divide our sample by the historic timing of monsoon onset for the local county. Counties
with relatively early average monsoon onset are further south and thus have fewer upstream counties than
northern counties with later average monsoon. In particular, this means that upstream onset timing may
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be more predictive for counties in the north relative to counties in the south. Columns 4-6 of Table 3.6
examine separate subsamples for local counties with average onset in the early, middle, and late terciles.
Note that rice area planted responds significantly to upstream onset timing only for counties with middle
and late average while rice area planted for counties with early average onset do not appear to respond.
Finally, in our earlier discussion of the EASM, we noted that a large region of southern China is affected
by pre-monsoon spring rains which are weakly associated with the EASM. In Column 7 of Table 3.6, we
restrict our sample to just the 150 counties with average local onset after May. The coefficients on 30 day
lagged upstream timing terms are jointly significant. In the absent of noise provided by the early spring
rains, the magnitude of the area planted response for this subsample is much larger than that generated
from our full sample.
3.6.4 Responsiveness over time
We have shown evidence of rice area planting respond to the timing of upstream onsets in the full sample.
This response, however, changes over sample period. When we interact Equation 3.12 with dummies for
each five year period, we find that the area planted response is driven primarily by observations from the
1990s. Figure 3.11 plots the time series of the marginal response at the 75th percentile for each local and
upstream onset timing variable. For the 1980s, the marginal response is near zero for each onset lag variable.
This contrasts with the subsequent decade during which the marginal response for each onset lag variables
decreases to 0.2-0.4%. Only the local onset response remains unchanged, as expected since local onset
information comes too late in the rice planting schedule.
3.7 The limits of predictive information
We propose a simple test for the overall value of predictive information. Following Schlenker (2006), the
relationship between yield and total rainfall should have both a local inverted quadratic relationship associ-
ated with each crop variety and a global relationship constructed by connecting the outer envelope of local
optimal yields. If total rainfall were perfectly predictable, a farmer would choose a variety such that yield is
always along the outer envelope. If, however, total rainfall has a predictable and unpredictable component,
the farmer would select a variety according to her forecast of total rainfall. For any realized total rain-
fall, losses associated with unpredictable shocks would therefore be the difference between the optimal yield
along the outer envelope and the yield along the local quadratic for the chosen variety. We can estimate
both quadratic relationships by running the following specification:
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log(yieldit) = δ0+δ1totalRaini,t+δ2totalRain2i,t+δ3(totalRaini,t−totalRaini)2+θ1pt+θ2pt2+ci+µit (3.13)
where δ2 is the global quadratic coefficient and δ3 is the local quadratic coefficient (see (Schlenker, 2006) for
further details on this specification). Column 1 of Table 3.7 shows the estimated coefficients for Equation
3.13 along with the p-values for a test of joint significance for the local and quadratic functions. The signs
for both quadratic coefficients are negative though only the local quadratic function is jointly significant.
Column 2 estimates Equation 3.13 including all linear and quadratic upstream onset timing terms while
Column 3 further includes linear and quadratic local onset timing terms. By controlling for the predictable
component of total rainfall, the coefficients on Columns 2 and 3 can be interpreted as the effect of the
remaining unpredictable or residual component of total rainfall on rice yields. As one would expect, the point
estimates on the local quadratic coefficient become more negative going from Columns 1 to 3 suggesting that
the loss associated with fluctuations in total rainfall increases as the remaining variation in total rainfall
become more unpredictable. This is evident in the magnitude of the marginal effects shown in the bottom
panel of Table 3.7. However, standard errors are sufficiently large for the estimated coefficients that one
cannot draw statistical inference in comparisons across models (not shown). Thus, even when one controls
for the predictable component of total rainfall, the residual unpredictability of weather remains high and
largely unchanged. That farmers respond to predictive information even under such limited potential benefit
suggests that the total costs of unpredictable weather is potentially large.
3.8 Discussion
This paper finds empirical evidence of short-run forward looking behavior for rice farming in China. By
coupling the known spatial and temporal features of the annual East Asian Summer Monsoon with the
timing of rice cultivation, we are able to find robust evidence that farmers in China respond to predictive
information of growing season total rainfall. Furthermore, we find the response to this predictive rainfall to
be greater when access to irrigation is low and when the underlying information set is larger.
At the 2010 UN climate negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, countries agreed to launch the Green Climate
Fund which by 2020 is expected to disburse 100 billion US dollars annually in climate-related aid for develop-
ing countries (UNFCCC, 2010). Much of this funding will be allocated towards adaptation investments that
help to dampen the damages of future climate change. This funding will be particularly critical for many
developing countries where agricultural activity constitutes a large share of overall GDP. How this fund-
ing should be optimally allocated between investments in short-run (ex-ante and ex-post) risk mitigation
mechanisms and long-run technologies that protect crops against weather fluctuations is largely unknown.
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This paper provides some insight into one mechanism for adaptation: short-run response to predictive
future weather. However, even for a relatively regular system like the EASM, the usefulness of predictive
information has its limits. We find that total rainfall remains highly unpredictable even after controlling
for predictable information. This is not surprising as weather realizations over an entire growing season are
fundamentally chaotic and, despite potential improvements in forecasting ability, fundamentally bounded in
predictability. Our finding that farmers respond to predictive information, as marginally useful as it may
be, suggests that the costs associated with unpredictable weather shocks can be quite high.
This suggests that rather than focusing on improving the accuracy of and access to predictive information,
investments should be targeted towards ensuring that farming practices have lower need for predictive
information. That is, funding should be directed towards technologies that reduce the vulnerability of crop
output to unpredictable weather fluctuations. We also argue that a critical role remains for short-run ex-post
risk mitigation behavior. Future work aims to explore the determinants of this short-run adaptive behavior
as well as compare the relative effectiveness of this adaptation strategy in relation to ex-post mitigation
behavior.
Our results also inform upon the methodologies used in both the climate impacts and risk sharing
literatures. Weather shocks are typically defined as deviations from the annual mean. If, however, annual
deviations can be further decomposed into predictable and unpredictable components as in our context, one
can no longer interpret previous estimates as capturing the effects of random shocks. Instead, it is possible
that previous studies capture the combined effects of ex-ante and ex-post risk management. Furthermore, if
behavior responses to ex-ante predictive information affect outcomes of interest, previous estimates may no
longer be well identified.
Finally, we believe that the technique for identifying responses to predictive information developed in
this paper can be applied to other settings where climatic systems have regular spatial and temporal features
that provide predictive information. Monsoons are a regular feature in many parts of the world including
much of South Asia, the South Pacific, and western sub-saharan Africa. Regions regularly hit by hurricanes
or tropical cyclones also have reasonably predictable components as such systems cover large spatial scales
with relatively predictable storm tracks. In all these cases, a decomposition of weather into predictable
and unpredictable parts can help improve understanding of how affected individuals respond to predictive
information and how that response may improve under different interventions.
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Rice growing areas in China in 2009
Source: FAO












Local onset definition is parameterized by the timing, intensity, and duration of initial wet and subsequent dry spells.
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Figure 3.3: Daily rainfall averaged over sample period for one county (lat=33.3, lon=115.2)

















Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 3.4: Map of average onset timing for counties in southeast China
Map shows the average (1980-2000) monsoon onset day of year for all counties in the sample. Observe that the northeast march
of the monsoonal system is well captured by our agronomic onset definition.
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Figure 3.5: Kernel density for local monsoon onset timing for full sample
Kernel density of local monsoon onset day using entire sample of counties in sample for 1980-2000. Bimodality comes from
onsets associated with spring rains and monsoon onsets.
Figure 3.6: Onset day correlation map for county in Fujian province
Map of correlation coefficients between onset timing for counties in Fujian province (in black) and all other counties in the
sample. Spatial coherence shows that spring rains are correlated with monsoonal activity.
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Figure 3.7: Map of upstream onset groups for one county
Map shows fixed upstream onset groups for one county. Red: Local county (centroid: long=113, lat=38) shaded. Green:
counties with average onset more than 70 days earlier. Cyan: counties with average onset between 50-70 days earlier. Light
blue: counties with average onset between 30-50 days earlier. Dark blue: counties with average onset between 10-30 days earlier.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
deviations in local onset day cubic spline
Scatter points indicate the local deviation in onset day plotted by year for full sample. Dashed line is a restrict cubic spline
with 7 knots.



















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
deviations in local onset intensity cubic spline
Scatter points indicate the local deviation in onset magnitude plotted by year for full sample. Dashed line is a restrict cubic
spline with 7 knots.
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−30 day upstream onset timing
Local polynomial regressions to motivate use of functional forms. Dashed line is local polynomial fit using a Epanechnikov
kernel and bandwidth=10 mm (except for panel (c) where bandwidth =100 mm). Gray bars indicate histogram for regressor.
All variables are demeaned by county with province-level linear and quadratic trends removed. Panel (a) shows relationship
between log rice yield and growing season total rainfall. Panel (b) shows relationship between growing season total rainfall and
upstream onset timing for the -30 onset group. Panel (c) shows relationship between log rice area planted and upstream onset
timing for the -30 onset group.
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1980-1985 1995-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
Periods
-50 day response -40 day response
-30 day response -20 day response













Log area marginal response (at 75th percentile) to local and upstream onset day plotted for each five-year period. Each model
includes a full set of five-year indicator variables, linear and quadratic onset timing terms, county fixed effects, and linear and
quadratic province-level time trends. Standard errors clustered by province.
CHAPTER 3. ADAPTING TO PREDICTABLE WEATHER 95
3.10 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable obs. level Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Weather
total rainfall (mm) county-year 358.187 (158.702) 26.6 1530.6 25491
fixed length growing season
mean rainfall (mm/day) county-year 5.367 (2.023) 0.033 27.5 24184
fixed end growing season
local onset timing (day) county-year 111.04 (51.093) 1 272 25491
local onset intensity (mm) county-year 53.332 (24.905) 15 324 25491
>10 day upstream timing (day) county-year 73.511 (24.222) 1 125.6 23040
>20 day upstream timing county-year 71.806 (20.272) 1 116.768 20409
>30 day upstream timing county-year 66.98 (19.976) 2.077 111.334 19989
>40 day upstream timing county-year 63.481 (19.133) 2.556 107.483 18975
>50 day upstream timing county-year 59.326 (19.015) 1 103.345 18222
>10 day upstream intensity (mm) county-year 60.852 (7.013) 47.548 90.747 23040
>20 day upstream intensity county-year 62.013 (6.404) 50.5 90.747 20409
>30 day upstream intensity county-year 63.139 (6.407) 48.944 90.404 19989
>40 day upstream intensity county-year 64.034 (6.468) 48.944 90.747 18975
>50 day upstream intensity county-year 64.875 (6.721) 48.944 90.747 18222
Rice
area planted (ha) county-year 22758.982 (25351.062) 1 1268000 20023
yield (ton/ha) county-year 5.723 (1.719) 0.015 42.63 20010
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Table 3.2: Nonlinear relationship between yield and total rainfall during growing season
Dep. var is log rice yield
(1) (2)
total rain avg daily rain
COEFFICIENTS fixed length fixed end
total rain 0.000283** 0.0139**
(0.000109) (0.00562)
total rain2 -2.63e-07** -0.00111***
(1.22e-07) (0.000379)
Joint p-value 0.0408 0.0250
MARGINAL EFFECTS % change per mm % change per mm/day
(mm) (mm/day)
250 0.0152 3 0.723
500 .00205 6 0.0586
559 0 6.3 0
750 -0.0111 9 -0.606
Observations 20010 19510
within R2 0.317 0.333
Regressions of log rice yield on linear and quadratic annual rainfall terms with county
fixed effects and province-level linear and quadratic trends. P-value from a F-test on joint
significance of onset linear and quadratic terms. Column 1 (2) uses total (average daily)
rainfall for a growing season with fixed length (fixed end). Marginal effects shown for values
of total and avg daily rainfall during the growing season as % change in yield. Robust
standard errors, clustered by province, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3.3: Predictability of total rainfall using local and upstream monsoon onset characteristics
Dep. var is total rain, fixed length
(1) (2)
COEFFICIENTS onset timing onset intensity
local county 1.564*** 1.462***
(0.152) (0.0786)
> 10 day group 1.155*** 1.730*
(0.204) (0.905)
> 20 day group 0.941*** 2.144**
(0.254) (0.835)
> 30 day group 0.805*** 1.231*
(0.252) (0.678)
> 40 day group 0.663** 0.812
(0.275) (0.599)
> 50 day group 0.489* 0.249
(0.263) (0.675)
Each coefficient from separate linear regression with county fixed
effects and province-level linear and quadratic trends. Column
1 (2) shows coefficients from regressions of total rainfall (fixed
length) on onset timing (intensity) for local county and groups of
upstream counties. Robust standard errors, clustered by province,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.4: Responsiveness of area planted to local and upstream onset timing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COEFFICIENTS local >10 days >20 days >30 days >40 days >50 days
onset timing dev -0.000325 -0.000339 -0.000267 -0.000307 -0.000189 0.000192
(0.000195) (0.000370) (0.000492) (0.000586) (0.000782) (0.00102)
onset timing dev2 -8.44e-06 -3.18e-05 -5.81e-05* -6.14e-05** -5.08e-05 -4.76e-05
(7.14e-06) (2.18e-05) (3.06e-05) (2.68e-05) (2.98e-05) (2.87e-05)
Joint p-value 0.0847 0.112 0.144 0.0804 0.270 0.228
MARGINAL RESPONSE (% change in rice area planted per day)
(day)
-20 .00129 0.093 0.206 0.215 0.184 0.210
0 -0.0325 -0.034 -0.027 -0.0307 -0.019 0.019
20 -0.0662 -0.161 -0.259 -0.276 -0.222 -0.171
Observations 20023 17690 15182 14784 13840 13215
within R2 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031
Notes: Each model regresses log rice area planted on linear and quadratic terms of local and upstream
deviations in onset day. All models include county fixed effects and province-level linear and quadratic
trends. F-test on joint significance of linear and quadratic terms. Robust standard errors, clustered by
province, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal response, in % change in rice area
planted per day, shown only for models with jointly significant coefficients. Negative (positive) days indicate
early (late) onset relative to historic average.
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Table 3.7: Regressions of log yield on total rainfall plus onset variables
(1) (2) (3)
just plus plus
COEFFICIENTS total rainfall upstr upstr & local
total rain 0.000154 0.000184 0.000165
(0.000106) (0.000113) (0.000120)
total rain2 -1.62e-07 -1.88e-07* -1.71e-07
(1.04e-07) (1.04e-07) (1.09e-07)
total rain dev 2 -2.94e-07** -3.61e-07* -3.61e-07*
(1.38e-07) (1.84e-07) (1.82e-07)
Global p-value 0.320 0.234 0.321
Local p-value 0.0233 0.0583 0.0872
MARGINAL EFFECTS % change in yield per mm total rain
(mm)
-600 0.0353 0.0349 0.0434
-300 0.0176 0.0175 0.0217
300 -0.0176 -0.0175 -0.0217
600 -0.0353 -0.0349 -0.0434
Observations 20010 13204 13204
within R2 0.318 0.320 0.321
Notes: Each model regresses log rice yields on a linear, global quadratic, and local quadratic term for total
rainfall during a fixed growing season. County fixed effects and province-level linear and quadratic trends
are included. Standard errors clustered by province. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 includes no
upstream onset terms. Column 2 includes linear and quadratic terms for all upstream onset terms. Column
3 further includes local onset terms. Global total rainfall p-values shows the joint significance of the linear
and global total rainfall terms. Similarly for the local total rainfall p-values.
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3.A Appendix Figures
Figure 3.A1: Correlation map of onset intensity for county long=103, lat=33
Figure 3.A2: Correlation map of onset intensity for county long=112, lat=26
Chapter 4
Political Access and Innovation:
Evidence from Lobbying Records and R&D Spending
Kyle Meng 1
Abstract
Does political access help or hurt private innovation? Theory offers compelling arguments for either
relationship, yet empirical evidence is sparse because connections between firms and political actors are
typically not observed. I link firms to members of the United States Congress via revolving door lobbyists,
former legislative staff members who later serve as lobbyists. I then examine the effects of plausibly exogenous
exits by linked members of Congress on firm R&D spending using both panel and dynamic regression
discontinuity designs. Lobbying data suggests that the supply of revolving door lobbyists is short-run inelastic
following an exit by a linked member of Congress. I find that R&D expenditures increase dramatically in
the two years following a linked exit. This effect appears to be stronger for smaller sized firms.
1Columbia University. I thank Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Ethan Kaplan, Suresh Naidu, Richard Nelson, Bernard Salanie´, and
Bhaven Sampat for helpful comments and suggestions as well as participants at Columbia’s applied micro theory colloquium
and sustainable development forum. All remaining errors are my own.
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4.1 Introduction
Are political access and innovation substitutes or complements for private firms? Anecdotal examples of how
political influence may have suppressed investments in innovation often appear in the media. Environmental
groups claim that the lobbying efforts of energy companies2 and auto makers3 have been instrumental in
holding back the development of low-carbon technologies. The role of political access on innovation has
also been reported in the financial,4, telecommunications,5 healthcare,6 and computer industries.7 On the
other hand, political access may complement private innovation by encouraging the passage of favorable
regulations, increasing government procurement, or improving credit channels.
Despite these popular examples, there is little systematic empirical evidence showing how changes in
political access may affect a firm’s decision to innovate. The primarily constraint in this literature is the
unobservable nature of political connections. At the individual level, firm employees can engage government
officials through a variety of professional, social, and personal networks, most of which are not known to
the researcher. Furthermore, it is not clear that common observable channels of political influence such as
campaign contributions can be readily interpreted as measures of political access.8
This paper constructs and employs a unique data setting in order to observe political connections. I link
firms with the Congressional members they seek to influence via the set of what are known as “revolving door”
lobbyists (RDL). This allows me to observe for any given firm lobbying in Congress the members of Congress
a firm is presumably trying to influence. I call this the set of “linked” members of Congress. In recent years,
lobbying has become a major channel of political influence. In 2010, $3.5 billion was spent on lobbying,
roughly the same amount spent on campaign contributions for federal elections that year.9 The lobbying
industry provides an attractive channel through which to examine the role of political access for two reasons.
First, lobbying effort is a better measure of political access than campaign contributions as it captures direct
efforts to influence elected officials. Second, publicly available lobbying data for both Houses of Congress
provide a richness of detail not available from other forms of political influence. Specifically, lobbying data
indicate not only the set of existing lobbyists but also their compensation, clients, and policies on which they
are lobbying on. When merged with publicly available Congressional staff employment histories, this data







8For example, individual direct campaign contributions are capped by law while some uncapped donations to “soft” money
groups such as 527, Political Action Committees (PAC), or 501(c) organizations may not disclose donor names. It is also not
clear that political candidates can credibly commit during a campaign to allowing firm access conditional on an electoral victory.
9http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=2010
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group of revolving door lobbyists, it is plausible to assume given their existing personal relationships that
lobbying efforts are mainly directed at former Congressional employers. Revolving door lobbyists therefore
provides the crucial link between firms and the members of Congress they are trying to influence. Two
identification strategies are used to examine the effects of exits by linked members of Congress on firm R&D
spending. The first strategy uses a within estimator in a panel data setting to examine firm behavior before
and after the exit of a linked member of Congress due to either resignation or death, circumstances that
are more plausibly exogenous to firm behavior. A second identification strategy uses a dynamic regression
discontinuity design to examine firm behavior before and after the exit of a linked member of Congress due
to a close reelection defeat.
At first glance, it is not clear why exits by Congressional members should matter for firms. An exiting
Congress member is immediately replace by another elected official who presumably has former legislative
staffers that can be hired as lobbyists. I document three facts about the market for lobbyists. First, consistent
with earlier studies, the value of revolving door lobbyists come from connections to members of Congress who
were their previous employers. Second, I find that the hiring of new revolving door lobbyists drop following
a linked Congressional exit and drop even further if that seat is filled by a member of the opposing party.
This suggests that the supply of revolving door lobbyists is inelastic in the short run due to lobbyists being
poor substitutes across political parties. Finally, I find evidence that hiring of new revolving door lobbyists
increase for other firms within an affected firm’s sector following a linked Congressional exit suggesting that
political access becomes less costly for a firm’s competitors.
My primary outcome of interest is R&D expenditures. For the panel specification, I find that R&D
spending decreases by 7% in the year of the exit but then increases by roughly 25% and 22% two and three
years following a linked Congressional exit. My dynamic regression discontinuity estimates show that there
are no contemporaneous effects from a close election defeat for a linked member of Congress but that R&D
expenditures increase by 40% two years later. I reconcile these two estimates by showing that firms in my
dynamic regression discontinuity sample tend to be smaller by various measures of size and thus may be
sensitive to a loss in political connection.
Altogether, the weight of evidence suggests that political access and innovation are substitutes in the U.S.
political system. This is broadly consistent with a public choice view of political economy. Beginning with a
series of seminal papers by Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), Posner (1975), and Bhagwati (1982) a substantial
theoretical literature has explored the various welfare consequences of a society where private market activ-
ities interact with and has influence upon government institutions and its decisions (see Congleton, Hillman
and Konrad (2008) for a summary). In the 1990s, interest in rent-seeking took a turn towards concerns
about innovation and growth when economists observed that the stock of entrepreneurs in a society would
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allocate resources to equate marginal returns to labor regardless of the productivity or social benefits of such
activities. Through a series of historical case studies (Baumol, 1990) and cross-country growth regressions
(Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991), these papers argued that societies which on aggregate offered greater
returns to rent-seeking activities tend to also exhibit lower levels of innovation and growth.
The paper is structured in the following manner. Section 4.2 details the data used and how political
linkages between firms and members of Congress is constructed. Section 4.3 discusses the identification
strategy and modeling choices made. Section 4.4 provides a series of results for the market for lobbyists.
R&D spending results and auxiliary evidence are presented in Section 4.5.
4.2 Data Sources and Construction
The primary challenge of this paper is to identify links between firms and the elected officials they lobby
through revolving door lobbyists. Most of the analysis is conducted at the firm-by-year level. Two panel
datasets are constructed in this paper. For all panel datasets, a merge of lobbying records with Congres-
sional staff employment histories and Congressional exits is conducted to select the subset of revolving door
lobbyists from the universe of registered lobbyists. This is then combined with R&D spending obtained from
Compustat.
4.2.1 Identifying revolving door lobbyists
Since the passage of the Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995, all individuals engaged in lobbying members of
the federal government are required to register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Senate
Office of Public Records (SOPR).10 Each lobbying record indicates lobbyist name (or names in the case of a
team of lobbyists), the name of the firm hiring lobbying services, the amount spent, and in some cases the
specific issue or legislation that is the target of lobbying efforts.11 A copy of these publicly available records
are maintained and organized by the Center for Responsible Politics which has examined the records allowing
the data to be collapsed to the lobbying firm level.12 From 1998-2009, there were a total of 384,623 lobbying
records filed representing 38,610 lobbyists hired by 34,371 companies. Figure 4.1 plots the percentage change
in total number of registered lobbyists and total lobbying expenditures during this period. To identify the
10The Lobbying and Disclosure Act defines a lobbyist “any individual who is employed or retained by a client for financial or
other compensation for services that include more than one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose lobbying activities
constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to that client over a six month
period.” From 1998-2006, lobbyists were required to file reports on a semi-annual basis. Since the amendments made in the
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, reports are required every quarter.
11Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen (2012) offers an excellent background on these reports.
12The SOPR does not require lobbying firms to provide standard company identifiers used in other databases. There is thus
a problem of whether firms filing lobbying reports are truly separate entities. For example in 2009, General Electric, General
Electric Transportation, and General Electric Healthcare all filed lobbying records. To address this issue, CRP manually
identifies the subsidiaries of a parent company so that aggregation can be performed to the parent company level.
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subset of lobbyists who are former Congressional staffers, a list of current and past Congressional staffers
for the same time period was extracted from data provided by Lobbyist.info. A total of 4,327 current and
former Congressional staffers working for 1,396 members of Congress during this period were identified.
4.2.2 Congressional exits and circumstances
In order to link firms with the exits of elected officials they lobby, I use the universe of Congressional
exits and their circumstances assembled in the congressional member history database by Stewart III and
Woon (2011). Covering the exits of all members of Congress during 1998-2010, this data categorizes exits
due to election defeat, successful election to a different position, retirements, appointments, deaths, and
other miscellaneous circumstances. The data also includes the congressional member’s chamber seniority,
committee assignments, and committee seniority at the time of exit. In a handful of cases, the exact date
of exit announcement is also documented which is used for some within year analyses. Figure 4.2 displays
exits from Congress during this period disaggregated by exit circumstance. As expected, most Congressional
exits take place every two years when federal elections occur and primarily due to reelection defeats and
retirements.
4.2.3 Merge procedure
To provide an illustration of how political connections are constructed in the final dataset, Appendix 4.A and
Figure 5.A1 details the Congressional exit of Senator Frank Murkowski in 2002. Specifically, the lobbying
dataset, together with Congressional employment history from Lobbyist.info allows me to link members of
Congress with former staffers who now work as lobbyists. For these revolving door lobbyists, I can observe
the firms hiring their services and the amount paid. This information is then linked with R&D spending
from Compustat.
The merging of these several data sources required intensive string matching both for individuals and
firms. Where possible, established and data-specific string matching algorithms were used to minimize poten-
tial errors. Furthermore, so-called “fuzzy” merge algorithms were avoided to limit the presence of mismatched
strings in favor of “sharp” or exact merges.13 To match lobbyists from SOPR records with Congressional
staffers from Lobbyist.info, names were first standardized14 followed by a string merge conducted on last
name, first name, and middle initial. Out of the initial 5,905 current and former Congressional staffers, this
algorithm yield perfect matches for 4,327 individuals working for 1,396.15 Using the same name matching
13The final merged dataset was also constructed using fuzzy merged methods with main results that were qualitatively
similar to that employing sharp merge methods presented here.
14As an example, all first names showing Bill and Will are converted to William. Names were then capitalized.
15Staffers that had worked for multiple members of Congress were indicated separately for each member of Congress.
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procedure, the resulting lobbyist-level database is then linked to the dates and circumstances of members
of Congress who were former employers of current lobbyists. The merged database includes the exits of 116
Senators and 584 House members. This dataset is then collapsed to the firm-by-year level.
The next task is to merge firm names from the lobbying dataset to R&D data from Compustat. Each
dataset uses different firm identifiers. Furthermore, firm names of parent companies are not standardized
in the SOPR lobbying records resulting often in companies appearing under slightly different names and
abbreviations.16 To minimize mismatches, firm names from the lobbying and patent records were first cleaned
using the NBER Patent Data Project’s name standardization routine17 before being merged together. A
total of 2,695 companies were successfully merged creating an unbalanced panel for 1998-2009.18 A further
link between USPTO and Compustat firm identifiers was completed using the NBER Patent Data Project’s
dynamic correspondence.19 The version of the panel data containing Compustat variables includes 2,112
firms in an unbalanced panel from 1998-2009. Table 4.1 summarizes the number of linked Congressional
exits by circumstance across all firms for the final R&D panel dataset. Consistent with the time series




The results in this paper rests on the identifying assumption that linked Congressional exits established
via revolving door lobbyists are exogenous to firm behavior. Most congressional exits occur under different
circumstances with potentially complex causes. Electoral defeats are a function of the incumbent’s legislative
record, the salient political issues of the time, compositional changes in a candidate’s electoral base, local
and national economic conditions, and other drivers that may or may not be exogenous to the activities of
a single company. While individuals employed at a firm can contribute a limited amount to candidates and
16For example, Coca-Cola Corporation and Coca-Cola Corp represent the same entity but are different under sharp string
merges.
17This series of STATA code was first developed by Bronwyn Hall and extended by James Bessen. It can be found here:
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/posts/namestandardizationroutinesuploaded.
18Both the raw lobbying and patent panel datasets are unbalanced. If a firm doesn’t file a lobbying record, it is unlikely that
no lobbying activity has occurred. Rather, that activity simply doesn’t meet SOPR’s specific reporting requirements. Coding
that missing observation as zero would therefore bias results. Missing patent observations, however, can be coded as zeros. The
absence of patent filings does not necessarily mean that firm is uninvolved with inventive activity for that particular period but
rather might reflect a strategic decision not to patent. In other words, years in which a firm is not patenting are meaningful
observations and therefore should be coded as zeros. The final merged patent and lobbying dataset is therefore unbalanced
because of the lobbying dataset.
19This algorithm, developed by James Bessen, identifies firms and their subsidiaries in the patent. It
also dynamically tracks patent ownership when patents are sold to new firms. It can be found here:
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads
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election campaigns, corporations themselves are not permitted to do so during this sample period.20 Despite
this, one can not rule out the influence firms may have in affecting electoral outcomes.
To avoid this potential source of endogeneity, this paper will use two identification strategies. The first
strategy employs a fixed effects panel data estimator to examine how firm activity responds to the number
of Congressional exits in any year due to resignations or deaths for which the date of announcement is
observed. The identifying assumption is that it is plausible that the personal and idiosyncratic nature of
these Congressional exit circumstances are uncorrelated to other determinants of firm behavior. A second
identification strategy examines the effects of exits from linked members of Congress resulting from close
reelection defeats in a dynamic regression discontinuity design.
For the fixed effects estimator with continuous outcomes, y, for firm i in sector s and during year t, such




βlexitl + ci + γt + +θst+ ist (4.1)
where exitl is an integer indicating lead, current and lagged number of linked exogenous Congressional exits
associated with firm i in sector s during year t. ci and γt are firm and year fixed effects respectively,21
and θs indicate sector specific time trends. Firm fixed effects are included to control for unobservable time
invariant differences across firms. Year fixed effects control for aggregate level shocks that might jointly
affect Congressional exits and firm activity. These are particularly important given that Congressional exits
primarily occur during Congressional election years. Sectoral-level trends are used to remove secular trends
within a given sector. Finally, in the preferred specification, standard errors will be clustered at the firm
level to allow for arbitrary forms of serial correlation within a firm across time.
A poisson fixed effects model is used for count outcomes such as the number of lobbyists hired. For the
poisson fixed effects model, the conditional mean has the form:
E[yist|exitl, ci, γt, θs] = exp(
lags∑
l=leads
βlexitl + ci + γt + θst) (4.2)
In practice, Equation 4.2 is estimated using conditional maximum likelihood where firm fixed effects are
captured by conditioning on a sufficient statistic for ci, in this case
∑
t yist. The poisson distribution used in
Equation 4.2 also benefits from being a member of linear exponential family and provides consistent point
estimates via quasi-MLE under the correct conditional mean even if the likelihood function is misspecified (see
20The Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in favor of Citizens United in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commissions has since
permitted corporations to contribute funds directly to run advertisements for candidates in national elections. Prior to this
decision, corporations can directly invest in campaign outcomes primarily through so-called “soft-money” channels such as 527
groups.
21A standard Hausman specification test rejected a random effects model in each model.
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Cameron and Trivedi (1998) p.36-37). Poisson models require that the first and second moments be equal.
However, overdispersion, where the second moment is greater than the first, is a common feature in many
datasets. A standard test for equidispersion was rejected for each count outcome variable used (following
Cameron and Trivedi (2009), p. 561). To address this issue, I estimate a poisson fixed effects model with
cluster-robust standard errors which allows for arbitrary forms of overdispersion akin to heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors used for OLS.22 For both the linear and nonlinear poisson models, the lead and lag
coefficients of interest can be interpreted as the percentage change (in probabilities) of an outcome variable
for each additional linked Congressional exit. AIC/BIC tests are conducted to determine the number of
coefficients to include in Equations 4.1 and 4.2.
As a test of whether linked Congressional exits due to resignation and death are plausibly exogenous,
Table 4.2 displays the lead term from estimation of Equation 4.2 for the number of new RDL hires (Panel
a) and Equation 4.1 for log R&D spending (Panel b). Lead terms should not be significant if an exit is
unanticipated. In Column (1), I include all Congressional exits as the regressor. Column (2) uses only exits
from reelection defeat. Column (3) uses exits due to retirement, death, and resignation. Column (4) includes
only exits from death and resignation. Finally, Column (5) includes only the deaths and resignations for
which Stewart III and Woon (2011) provides a specific date of announcement. For these exits, we can verify
that exit announcement falls within the attributed calendar year and not before the observed exit year.
Table 4.2 shows that only the coefficient on the lead term in Column (5) are not statistically significant
across the two outcomes. For other exit circumstances, the lead term coefficient is significant for at least
one of the two outcomes. Thus, for all panel specifications using Equations 4.1 and 4.2, only the subset of
linked Congressional exits due with dated resignation and death are used.
One may still be concerned of firms privately affecting a linked Congressional member’s decision to
resign. To address this concern, my second identification strategy examines exits of linked members of
Congress following a closely lost election. Following the dynamic regression discontinuity estimator used in
Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010), this analysis is performed at the firm-by-Congressmember-by-year
level. Specifically, for firm i, in sector s, linked to member of Congress c during year t, I estimate the
following local linear dynamic regression discontinuity model:
22One could also use the negative binomial model which imposes a particular functional form and additional distributional
assumptions to model overdispersion explicitly. The cluster-robust poisson estimator is typically preferred as it requires fewer
additional assumptions.




[βτ lossDumc,t−τ + α1τ lossMarginc,t−τ + α2τ lossMarginc,t−τ (1− lossDumc,t−τ )]
+ ci + γt + θst+ isct (4.3)
where τ indexes event time relative to the year of a close Congressional reelection. The vector βτ is our
dynamic discontinuity coefficients of interest. It captures the difference in R&D spending over time for firms
linked to exiting members of Congress due to closed reelection defeats relative to firms linked to members
of Congress that stayed in office after narrow reelection victories. I allow τ to vary both from -1 - 5, as well
as from 1 - 5 following Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) to allow for added power in the estimation.
lossDumc,t−τ denotes an indicator variable which equals one when member of Congress c loses a close
reelection during year t − τ with lossMarginc,t−τ being the loss margin in vote shares. To further absorb
noise in R&D expenditures, I include firm fixed effects, ci, year fixed effects, γt and sector-level trends,
θst. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. My benchmark estimate of Equation 4.3 only includes
elections in which candidates win or lose within a margin of 2.5%. Different vote margins bandwidths are
used as robustness checks.
4.4 The market for revolving door lobbyists
This section details three empirical facts about the market for revolving door lobbyists (RDL). First, I show
that, consistent with earlier work by Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen (2012), the value of revolving door
lobbyists are in their political connections to members of Congress for which they were formerly employees.
Second, I show that revolving door lobbyists are poor substitutes across parties making the available supply
of valuable lobbyists short run inelastic. The stock of revolving door lobbyists takes time to rebuild after
Congressional exits and so therefore may encourage firms to reallocate resources along other margins. Lastly,
I document that exits have asymmetric effects on a firm’s competition, consistent with lobbyists being poor
substitutes across parties.
4.4.1 The value of revolving door lobbyists
In any given year, between 3%-12% of all federally registered lobbyists are former Congressional staffers
who are referred to as revolving door lobbyists. Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen (2012) document
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that these revolving door lobbyists make roughly double that of regular lobbyists. They also show that the
revenue received by a revolving door lobbyist decreases by 24% for each linked Congressional member in
office. To show that this result holds in subset of revolving door lobbyists, I show the change in revenue from
lobbying the year of and after a linked Congressional exit across various Congressional exit circumstances
in Table A4.A1.23 I find that lobbying revenue for RDL drop by 22% following a linked exit due to dated
retirements and resignations in Column (5).
4.4.2 The short-run supply of revolving door lobbyists
If linked Congressional exits were costly to firms, it must be because firms that were previously linked to
members of Congress are now less able to influence the newly incoming replacement member of Congress. To
show this, I demonstrate that the ability for firms to access important politicians decline following a linked
exogenous Congressional exit. I provide support for this claim through several lines of evidence in Table 4.3.
The use of five lagged terms is supported by the lag tests shown in Table 4.A2. Column (1) of Table 4.3
shows that the total number of revolving door lobbyists hired by the affected firm is unchanged following a
linked Congressional exit due to resignation or death. However, when I restrict attention to the subset of
revolving door lobbyists who are new hires - individuals who were previously not employed by the firm - I
find a dramatic decline of 28% in the year following an exogenous linked Congressional exit extending to a
60% drop four years following the exit.
Why don’t firms hire RDL linked with politicians replacing exiting members? One explanation might
be due to party affiliation. As former Congressional staffers, RDLs typically have some degree of party
affiliation. Thus, a former staffer of a Democratic Senator might be more readily hired by a firm with
a Democratic leaning than a firm with Republican leanings. From the lobbyist’s perspective, she might
not want to represent a company with a different political bias as it might affect her own credibility when
engaging with a former employer. To test this hypothesis, one can compare how hiring of new RDLs changes
in the presence and absence of a majority change in Congress. When a party takes majority control over
either the Senate or the House in Congress, its members get to serve as committee chairs. If RDLs are
indeed party specific and therefore poor substitutes across parties, then hiring of new RDLs will be affected
only when the exit of a committee chair occurs during a majority change in which case the incoming chair
is of a different party and therefore difficult to lobby for the affected firm. However, if the committee chair
exit were to occur during a year in which there were no majority change, the chair becomes occupied by a
23The name matching algorithm used in Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen (2012) differs slightly with that employed
in this paper. As validation check, I run a similar specification as the main model in Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen
with the exception that the regressor is now the number of linked exits per year rather than its inverse, the number of former
employers in office. I find statistically significant coefficients with a magnitude nearly identical to that presented in Blanes i
Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen.
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member of the same party whose lobbyists should be readily accessible to the affected firm.
Within my sample, there are two such transitional periods. At the end of 2006, the Republican led House
and Senate of the 109th Congress handed power over to the Democrats who took over both chambers during
the 110th Congress. Column (3) of Table 4.3 shows the effect of linked exits of committee chairs on new RDL
hires before and after 2006.24 For the firm linked to the exiting committee chair, hiring of new revolving
door lobbyists drop by 1600% in the four years following the exit. To test the opposite phenomenon, in
Column (4) I examine the effect of committee chair exits at the end of 2004 when the Republican led House
and Senate 108th Congress transitioned to the 109th Congress under the same leadership. In contrast to
Column (3), notice that hiring of RDLs appears to increase over time rather than exhibiting mean reverting
behavior, though the cumulative effect over four years is not statistically significant.
Altogether, this suggests that for a given firm, the supply of available revolving door lobbyists may be
short-run inelastic following a linked Congressional exit and that this may be because lobbyists are not
substitutable across political parties. This particular mechanism may explain why linked exits are costly to
firms and would therefore increase incentives to reallocate resources to other margins.
4.4.3 Competitor effects
One implication for a market in which revolving door lobbyists are poor substitutes across parties is that
linked Congressional exits should have an asymmetric effect on an affected firm’s competitors. When a linked
exit occurs and the affected firm is unable to retain its previous level of political access, it is probable that
competitors benefit from access to the new politician in office.
In general, it is difficult to identify a firm’s set of competitors. One crude aggregate measure of competitors
is to examine aggregate sector level outcomes less the outcome for the firm of interest. I use sectoral
definitions provided by CRP to construct competitor outcome indices. For outcome y and firm i in sector
s, the aggregate sectoral competitor index is
∑
j∈s yj 6=i. Table 4.4 mirrors Table 4.3 but uses the aggregate
sectoral competitor index as the outcome variable in the poisson fixed effects model. Column (1) shows that
the overall number of RDL hired by other firms in an affected firm’s sector increase by 0.7% following a linked
Congressional exit with hiring increasing by 1.1% overall four years afterwards. Most of this new RDL hiring
by a firm’s competitors occurs in the year immediately following the Congressional exit as shown in Column
(2). For the subset of linked exits involving an exiting committee chairman who is replaced by someone
from the same party, Column (3) shows that overall hiring of new RDL lobbyists by a firm’s competitors
increases the year following the exit but then decreases thereafter with no cumulative change over four years.
24The sample for exits shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.3 include all exits of members of Congress who were
committee chairs rather than just exogenous exits due to retirements and deaths due to power issues associated with examining
exits from only one year.
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However, when the exiting committee chairman is replaced by a member of the opposing political party,
hiring of new RDLs by a firm’s competitors increases steadily to 18% over a four year period. Viewed from
a market structure perspective, an increase in the number of firms lobbying is consistent with a Cournot
model in which loss of monopoly power by one firm lowers the barrier to entry for competitors.
4.5 R&D results
4.5.1 Fixed effects panel estimates
This section presents the R&D results. Table 4.5 estimates Equation 4.1 with each column including a
different vector of controls. Column (1) estimates Equation 4.1 with only firm and year fixed effects while
Column (2) adds sector-level trends. In Column (3), I include a variable that captures the number of linked
Congressional exits due to circumstances that I had previously argued may be endogenous to firm decision.
Inclusion of these other exits removes any remaining endogenous variation in exits due to resignation and
deaths. Across the three models, I observe a statistically significant 7-8% decrease in R&D spending during
the year of the linked exit. However, this is more than offset by a roughly 25% and 22% increase in R&D
spending two and three years following the exit. Furthermore, I observe an overall increase in R&D spending
five years following a linked exit though this cumulative effect is not statistically significant.
Remaining concerns about endogeneity of Congressional exits are addressed with dynamic regression
discontinuity estimates for close reelection losses of linked members of Congress. Figure 4.3 displays the
density of reelection lost margins for all Congressional incumbents during the sample period. A density
continuity test using the McCrary (2008) procedure did not find a discontinuity in the distribution of firms
at the 0% threshold suggesting that assuming random assignment around the discontinuity is reasonable. As
graphical evidence, Figure 4.4 shows log R&D spending the year before the reelection as local polynomial
functions of the incumbent loss margin suggesting firms are not anticipating losses in political influence.
Figure 4.5 provides a similar plot for log R&D spending two years after the reelection and shows a large
jump around close losses.
4.5.2 Dynamic regression discontinuity estimates
Table 4.6 shows the analogous dynamic regression discontinuity estimates from Equation 4.3. I present
coefficients βτ from Equation 4.3 for different sample periods. In Column (1) I include all observations with
τ ∈ [−2, 5] with coefficients for τ ∈ [−2, 0] restricted to be zero. For additional power, in Column (2) I expand
the sample to include τ ∈ [−3, 5] and only restrict coefficients with τ ∈ [−3,−2] to zero. I find a statistically
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significant increase in R&D spending of about 40% two years after a close reelection loss. While the timing
of this result is consistent with my fixed effects estimates using Congressional exits due to resignation or
death, the magnitude of the effect is much higher. To reconcile these two estimates, Table 4.7 presents
various measures of “size” for firms included in the fixed effects panel and dynamic regression discontinuity
samples. Firms in the panel sample have, on average, greater value in sales, assets, capital expenditures, and
R&D expenditures. Thus, by these measures, it appears that firms in the dynamic regression discontinuity
sample is generally “smaller” and thus may be more sensitive to a lost political connection.
4.6 Conclusion
Researchers and political observers have argued that political access may influence investments in private
innovation. This paper provides an empirical test of whether political access and innovation are complements
or substitutes by linking firms to the elected officials they hope to influence through revolving door lobbyists.
I find that political access and innovation are substitutes using two different identification strategies. Using
a fixed effects panel estimator, I find that R&D expenditures of firms increase by 25% and 22% in the second
and third year following a Congressional exit due to a resignation or death. For my dynamic regression
discontinuity estimator, I find that firms linked to a member of Congress exiting due to a close reelection
loss increase R&D expenditures by 40% two years following the exit. An examination of the market for
revolving door lobbyists suggests that such losses in political access can be costly because lobbyists are poor
substitutes across parties making the available supply of valuable lobbyists short run inelastic.
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Margin of loss election for an incumbent
Notes:Plot shows the density of reelection loss margins for all Congressional incumbents during the sample period. Local
polynomial fit with 90% confidence intervals. Open circles indicate averages for values within a 0.01 bin.
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Incumbent loss margin
Notes: Plot shows log R&D the year before an election as a local polynomial function of the incumbent loss margin. Model
uses a triangular kernel and optimal bandwidth of 0.035 (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Open circles indicate averages log
R&D values within a 0.005 bin with larger size indicating more number of observations.
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Notes: Plot shows log R&D two years after an election as a local polynomial function of the incumbent loss margin. Model
uses a triangular kernel and optimal bandwidth of 0.035 (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). Open circles indicate averages log
R&D values within a 0.005 bin with larger size indicating more number of observations.
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Notes: Plot shows β2 from Equation 4.3 for different bandwidth lengths.
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4.8 Tables
Table 4.1: Distribution of congressional exits and circumstances
Lobbying-Compustat panel, firm-by-year, (1998-2009)
Number of exits
Exit circumstance 0 1 2 3 4 >4
Congressional defeat 10,805 53 63 8 17 1
Other Defeat 10,912 12 21 1 1 0
Elected to another position 10,903 14 22 2 5 1
Retired 10,662 83 117 13 61 11
Died or resigned 10,843 37 35 8 20 4
Died or resigned with dates 10,870 23 23 8 19 4
Close Elections (+-1%) 10,924 11 10 1 0 1
Notes: Panel has 2,112 unique firms.
Table 4.2: Lead terms in tests for exogeneity of Congressional exit circumstances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
allExit election exogExit1 exogExit2 exogExit3
Panel (a): Dep var is number of new RDL hires
Lead(1).exit 0.104*** 0.137*** 0.0964** 0.0236 0.0305
[0.0315] [0.0431] [0.0431] [0.0473] [0.0522]
Number of lags (not shown) 4 4 4 4 4
Observations 14387 14387 14387 14387 14387
Model poisson FE poisson FE poisson FE poisson FE poisson FE
Panel (b): Dep var is log R&D spending
Lead(1).exit -0.0178 0.00145 -0.0327* -0.0509* -0.0516
[0.0182] [0.0399] [0.0193] [0.0288] [0.0333]
Number of lags (not shown) 4 4 4 4 4
Observations 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576
Model linear FE linear FE linear FE linear FE linear FE
Notes: Each model includes a lead, contemporaneous, and four lagged exit terms (contempora-
neously and lagged coefficients not shown). Column (1) uses all exits. Column (2) uses exits
from election defeats. Column (3) uses exits from retirements, deaths, and resignations. Column
(4) uses exits from deaths and resignations. Column (5) uses exits from only dated deaths and
resignations. All specifications include firm, sector, and year fixed effects as well as sector specific
trends. Robust standard errors clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.3: Revolving door lobbyists hiring after a linked Congressional exit: own firm effects
Dep var: RDL hires new RDL hires new RDL hires new RDL hires
(1) (2) (3) (4)
exogExit3 exogExit3 exogExit3 exogExit3
w/ other party chair w/ same party chair
exit 0.0625*** 0.0216 0.180 -0.123
[0.0224] [0.0425] [0.445] [0.265]
Lag(1).exit 0.0211 -0.278*** -0.518 0.0567
[0.0278] [0.0858] [0.406] [0.00206]
Lag(2).exit 0.0140 -0.0463 -0.480 0.498
[0.0180] [0.0312] [0.576] [0.395]
Lag(3).exit -0.00821 0.0597 -14.21*** 0.832
[0.0288] [0.0578] [0.826] [0.516]
Lag(4).exit -0.0590 -0.349*** -0.826 0.421**
[0.0458] [0.106] [0.575] [0.214]
cumulative effect 0.030 -0.591*** -15.849*** 1.685
[0.091] [0.192] [2.750] [1.400]
Observations 23864 18769 18769 18769
number of firms 3985 2813 2813 2813
model poisson FE poisson FE poisson FE poisson FE
year FE YES YES YES YES
sector FE YES YES YES YES
trends sector sector sector sector
clustering firm firm firm firm
Notes: Firm-by-year analysis using firm lobbying dataset. Poisson fixed effects regressions of
affected firm RDL hiring on number of contemporaneous and lagged exogenous linked exits
due to death or resignation (with exit date announcement). Column (1) shows total RDL
hiring. Column (2) shows new RDL hiring. Column (3) shows new RDL hiring after exits by
committee chairman replaced by member of different political party. Column (4) shows new
RDL hiring after exits by committee chairman replaced by member of same political party.
All specifications include firm, sector, and year fixed effects as well as sector specific trends.
Robust standard errors clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.4: Revolving door lobbyists hiring after a linked Congressional exit: competitor effects
Dep var: RDL hires new RDL hires new RDL hires new RDL hires
(1) (2) (3) (4)
exogExit3 exogExit3 exogExit3 exogExit3
w/ other party chair w/ same party chair
exit 0.00117 -0.000183 0.00744 0.0274
[0.000894] [0.00208] [0.00850] [0.0263]
Lag(1).exit 0.00749** 0.00661* 0.0343*** 0.0533*
[0.00312] [0.00379] [0.00948] [0.0281]
Lag(2).exit 0.00237 -0.000978 -0.0257** 0.0145
[0.00299] [0.00303] [0.0117] [0.0139]
Lag(3).exit 0.000561 -0.00627 -0.0350* 0.0357**
[0.00329] [0.00515] [0.0186] [0.0141]
Lag(4).exit -0.000275 -0.0126*** 0.000906 0.0462***
[0.00274] [0.00444] [0.0116] [0.0150]
cumulative effect 0.011* -0.013 -0.018 0.177**
[0.006] [0.009] [0.039] [0.083]
Observations 23864 18769 18769 18769
number of firms 3985 2813 2813 2813
model poisson FE poisson FE poisson FE poisson FE
year FE YES YES YES YES
sector FE YES YES YES YES
trends sector sector sector sector
clustering firm firm firm firm
Notes: Firm-by-year analysis using firm lobbying dataset. Poisson fixed effects regressions
of RDL hiring by other firms in the same sector on number of contemporaneous and lagged
exogenous linked exits due to death or resignation (with exit date announcement). Column
(1) shows total RDL hiring. Column (2) shows new RDL hiring. Column (3) shows new
RDL hiring after exits by committee chairman replaced by member of different political party.
Column (4) shows new RDL hiring after exits by committee chairman replaced by member
of same political party. All specifications include firm, sector, and year fixed effects as well
as sector specific trends. Robust standard errors clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
CHAPTER 4. POLITICAL ACCESS AND INNOVATION 121
Table 4.5: R&D response to exogenous linked Congressional exits
Dep var is log R&D
(1) (2) (3)
exogExit3 -0.0714** -0.0783** -0.0785**
[0.0319] [0.0374] [0.0375]
Lag(1).exogExit3 0.0105 0.0587 0.0524
[0.310] [0.314] [0.318]
Lag(2).exogExit3 0.193*** 0.259*** 0.240***
[0.0566] [0.0776] [0.0854]
Lag(3).exogExit3 0.136 0.218** 0.215*
[0.0847] [0.108] [0.113]
Lag(4).exogExit3 -0.0487 -0.0193 -0.0193
[0.0794] [0.114] [0.117]




Cumulative effect 0.185 0.420 0.391
[0.400] [0.491] [0.523]
Observations 1229 1229 1229
R-squared 0.209 0.250 0.250
number of firms 314 314 314
trends none sector sector
Notes: Firm-by-year analysis using lobbying-
Compustat firm dataset. Linear fixed effects regres-
sions of annual R&D expenditures on number of con-
temporaneous and lagged exogenous linked exits due
to death or resignation (with exit date announce-
ment). All models include year and firm fixed ef-
fects. Robust standard errors clustered by firm. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.6: Dynamic R&D response to exits from close election defeats






year t+1 0.117 0.0746
[0.280] [0.190]
year t+2 0.437* 0.338*
[0.240] [0.175]
year t+3 0.0917 0.0443
[0.228] [0.163]
year t+4 0.328 0.271
[0.254] [0.192]





number of firms 40 40
Notes: Local linear regressions for dynamic regres-
sion discontinuity design. All models include year
and firm fixed effects and sector level trends. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered by firm. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.7: Reconciling fixed effects and dynamic regression discontinuity estimates
number of firms Mean (millions) Std. Dev.
Fixed effects sample
Sales 314 19,298 42,000
Assets 314 101,366 272,442
Capital expenditures 314 1,030 3,035
R&D expenditures 314 834 1,680
Lobbying expenditures 314 1.6 3.1
Dynamic regression discontinuity sample
Sales 43 7,527 15,522
Assets 43 31,404 55,608
Capital expenditures 43 341 898
R&D expenditures 43 262 527
Lobbying expenditures 43 1.5 2.1
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4.A Appendix: Murkowski exit
The main purpose of the data collected for this paper is to link firms with the politicians they lobby. As
an illustration of how the various databases employed in this study are linked, this appendix will detail
the set of connections associated with a particular Congressional exit. From 1981-2002, Frank Murkowski
was the junior senator from Alaska where among his more prominent roles included serving as Chair of
the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee from 1995-2001. In 2002, Senator Murkowski left the
Senate to run for the governorship of Alaska, which he eventually won. This exit date and circumstance
was obtained from Stewart III and Woon (2011). That year, 11 of his former staffers (as indicated on
Lobbyist.info) were active lobbyists filing SOPR lobbying reports. These reports indicate the firms hiring
lobbyists and how much each lobbyist or team of lobbyists were paid. A subset of these former staffers are
shown in the middle column of Figure A5.A1. These revolving door staffers included former Chiefs of Staff,
a Legislative Director, and Legislative Assistants. In 2002, these former staffers were hired as both in-house
and out-house lobbyists by trade associations such as the US Chamber of Commerce, lobbying firms such as
BlueWaterStrategies and the StantonPark Group, and corporations such as Shell Oil. The third column of
Figure A5.A1 shows the companies hiring these lobbyists in 2002 and the amount indicated on that particular
lobbying report. These companies include Shell Oil, Toshiba, Delphi, AT&T, DaimlerChrysler, Microsoft,
and Ebay. Lobbying expenses range from $60,000 to $1,078,541.
4.B Appendix Figures
Figure 5.A1: An example of observed political connections: Senator Murkowski
Notes: Figure shows the set of revolving door lobbyists who were previously employed by Senator Murkowski and the set of
firms hiring them as lobbyists.
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4.C Appendix Tables
Table 4.A1: Linked exit on revolving door lobbyist revenue
Dep var is annual lobbying revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
all exits endo exits exog Exits1 exog Exits2 exog Exits3
exit 0.202*** 0.247*** 0.170*** 0.287*** 0.294***
(0.0299) (0.0480) (0.0391) (0.0709) (0.0788)
Lag(1).exit -0.199*** -0.197*** -0.207*** -0.117 -0.220*
(0.0380) (0.0593) (0.0498) (0.116) (0.125)
Observations 8888 8888 8888 8888 8888
within R2 0.314 0.310 0.310 0.307 0.307
Notes: Lobbyist-by-year analysis. Linear panel regressions of annual lobbying revenue
on the number of contemporaneous and lagged linked Congressional exits. Column
(1) uses all exits. Column (2) uses exits from election defeats. Column (3) uses exits
from retirements, deaths, and resignations. Column (4) uses exits from deaths and
resignations. Column (5) uses exits from only deaths and resignations available with
date of announcement. All specifications include lobbyist fixed effects and Congress
fixed effects. Robust clustered by lobbyist. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.A2: Lag tests for new RDL hires in firm lobbying dataset
Dep var is number of new RDL hires
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exogExit3 0.0650 0.0594 0.0576 0.0580 0.0526 0.0521
[0.0441] [0.0437] [0.0444] [0.0445] [0.0434] [0.0433]
Lag(1).exogExit3 -0.211*** -0.213*** -0.208*** -0.243*** -0.251***
[0.0692] [0.0695] [0.0696] [0.0711] [0.0723]
Lag(2).exogExit3 -0.0101 -0.00815 -0.0192 -0.0220
[0.0337] [0.0326] [0.0339] [0.0352]






Observations 14020 14020 14020 14020 14020 14020
number of firms 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219 2219
LL -7462.745 -7457.702 -7457.646 -7457.331 -7449.389 -7449.011
AIC 14993.490 14985.405 14987.292 14988.662 14974.777 14976.021
BIC 15250.130 15249.593 15259.028 15267.947 15261.610 15270.403
Model Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE
year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
trends sector sector sector sector sector sector
std errors firm firm firm firm firm firm
Notes: Firm-by-year analysis using firm lobbying dataset. Poisson fixed effects regressions of annual new
RDL hires on number of contemporaneous and lagged exogenous linked exits due to death or resignation
(with exit date announcement). Only firms with five years of continuous data used in all models to
minimize sample selection. All specifications include firm, sector, and year fixed effects as well as sector
specific trends. Robust standard errors clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.A3: Lag tests for R&D response to exogenous linked Congressional exits
Dep var is log R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exogExit3 -0.0793** -0.0795** -0.0791** -0.0783** -0.0783** -0.0783**
[0.0374] [0.0375] [0.0375] [0.0374] [0.0374] [0.0374]
Lag(1).exogExit3 -0.138 -0.0891 0.0654 0.0614 0.0587
[0.253] [0.226] [0.315] [0.314] [0.314]
Lag(2).exogExit3 0.113 0.266*** 0.262*** 0.259***
[0.0894] [0.0748] [0.0744] [0.0776]






Observations 1229 1229 1229 1229 1229 1229
R-squared 0.245 0.246 0.246 0.250 0.250 0.250
LL -28.932 -28.395 -28.103 -25.186 -25.172 -25.151
AIC 95.863 96.791 96.207 92.373 94.344 96.303
BIC 167.102 171.778 171.195 171.110 176.831 182.539
number of firms 314 314 314 314 314 314
Notes: Firm-by-year analysis using lobbying-Compustat firm dataset. Linear fixed effects
regressions of annual R&D expenditures on number of contemporaneous and lagged exoge-
nous linked exits due to death or resignation (with exit date announcement). All models
include year and firm fixed effects and sector level trends. Robust standard errors clustered
by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Chapter 5
Civil Conflicts are Associated with the Global Climate
Solomon M. Hsiang, Kyle C. Meng, and Mark A. Cane1
Abstract
It has been hypothesized that global climatic changes have been responsible for episodes of widespread
violence and even the collapse of civilizations (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Diamond, 2005). Yet previous studies
have not shown that violence can be attributed to the global climate, only that random weather events
might be correlated with conflict in some cases (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Levy et al., 2005;
Burke et al., 2009; Sandholt and Gleditsch, 2009; Buhaug, 2010). Here we directly associate planetary-scale
climate changes to global patterns of civil conflict by examining the dominant interannual mode of the
modern climate (Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987; Chiang and Sobel, 2002; Sarachik and Cane, 2010), the El
Nin˜o-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Historians have argued that ENSO may have driven global patterns of
civil conflict in the distant past (Grove, 2007; Davis, 2002; Fagan, 2009), a hypothesis that we extend to
the modern era and test quantitatively. Using data from 1950 to 2004, we show that the probability of new
civil conflicts arising throughout the tropics doubles during El Nin˜o years relative to La Nin˜a years. This
result, which indicates that ENSO may have played a role in 21% of all civil conflicts since 1950, is the first
demonstration that the global climate relates to the stability of modern societies.
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5.1 Main article
The idea that the global climate might influence the peacefulness of societies (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Diamond,
2005; Grove, 2007; Davis, 2002; Fagan, 2009) has motivated a growing body of research. However, much
of the support for this idea is anecdotal and the two methodologies dominating quantitative work on this
problem have yielded inconclusive results (Salehyan, 2008). The first of these approaches correlates multi-
century trends in regional climate with trends in wars (Zhang et al., 2007; Tol and Wagner, 2009), but such
correlations are weak (Tol and Wagner, 2009) and gradual social changes over multiple centuries confound
results. The second approach avoids confounding trends by correlating random changes in local annual
temperature or rainfall with local civil conflicts (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Levy et al., 2005;
Burke et al., 2009; Sandholt and Gleditsch, 2009; Buhaug, 2010), but different statistical assumptions have
yielded different results and the notion that random local temperature or rainfall shocks are analogs for
global climate changes have been criticized on three grounds: (1) The global climate may affect a large
number of interacting environmental variables that influence conflict but are not adequately summarized by
local temperature and rainfall; (2) Systematic environmental changes that occur on a planetary scale may
influence markets, geopolitics or other social systems differently than location-specific weather shocks that are
uncorrelated with weather in other locations; (3) Predictable changes in climate and unpredictable weather
shocks may generate very different social responses, even if they are otherwise identical. To circumvent these
concerns, we avoid local proxies for the global climate and instead directly relate global changes in conflict
risk to movements in the global climate; specifically, to the rapid annual shifts between El Nin˜o and La Nin˜a,
phases of the El Nin˜o-Southern Oscillation (Sarachik and Cane, 2010) (ENSO).
ENSO may plausibly influence multiple varieties of conflict, such as riots or genocides, however we restrict
this analysis to organized political violence. We examine the Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict
Dataset (Strand, 2006) that codes a country as experiencing conflict onset if more than 25 battle-related
deaths occur in a new civil dispute between a government and another organized party over a stated political
incompatibility (see Supplementary Methods Section 5.A.1 and Supplementary Table 5.A1 for data details).
Following common practice (Strand, 2006; Blattman and Miguel, 2010), a dispute is new if it has been at
least two years since that dispute was last active; however, individual countries may experience conflict
onset in sequential years if the government has disputes with different opposition groups. We define annual
conflict risk (ACR) in a collection of countries to be the probability that a randomly selected country in the
set experiences conflict onset in a given year. Importantly, this ACR measure removes trends due to the
growing number of countries (Blattman and Miguel, 2010) (Supplementary Fig. 5.B).
In an impossible but ideal experiment, we would observe two identical Earths, change the global climate of
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one and observe whether ACR in the two Earths diverged. In practice, we can approximate this experiment
if the one Earth that we do observe randomly shifts back and forth between two different climate states.
Such a quasi-experiment is ongoing and is characterized by rapid shifts in the global climate between El
Nin˜o and La Nin˜a, the phases of the El Nin˜o-Southern Oscillation (ENSO).
In order to identify a relationship between the global climate and ACR, we compare societies to themselves
when they are exposed to different states of the global climate (Holland, 1986). Heuristically, a society
observed during a La Nin˜a is the “control” for that same society observed during an El Nin˜o “treatment.”
We sharpen this comparison by separating the world into two groups of countries, those whose climate is
strongly coupled to ENSO and those weakly affected by ENSO. If climate influences ACR, we expect to
observe the larger ENSO signal in the ACR of the former group.
Originating in the tropical Pacific, ENSO influences virtually the entire tropics by radiating waves through
the atmosphere, linking climates around the globe through so-called teleconnections (Ropelewski and Halpert,
1987; Chiang and Sobel, 2002). During an El Nin˜o, the continental tropics mostly become warmer and
dryer, while effects in mid-latitudes are generally smaller and less consistent (Chiang and Sobel, 2002;
Sarachik and Cane, 2010). To capture this, we partition the globe into two groups based on how coupled
their climates are to ENSO, separating countries into teleconnected and weakly-affected groups (Fig. 5.3a;
also see Methods, Supplementary Fig. 5.B-5.B and Section 5.A.2). We identify teleconnected locations
using surface temperature instead of other variables Ropelewski and Halpert (1987); Sarachik and Cane
(2010) for theoretical reasons (Chiang and Sobel, 2002) and because it is less variable with broader spatial
coverage. Our partition preserves the well-documented structure of ENSO’s impact on countries’ average
surface temperature (Chiang and Sobel, 2002), precipitation (Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987), and agricultural
yields and revenues (Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008) (Supplementary Table 5.A2, Fig. 5.B and Section 5.A.2).
In the following analysis, we base our inferences strictly on correlations over time between ENSO and ACR
in the teleconnected group. We analyze ACR in the weakly affected group solely to check that there are no
confounding global variables that are correlated with ENSO.
The extremes of the ENSO cycle are distinguished by cold (La Nin˜a) or warm (El Nin˜o) sea surface
temperature anomalies in the eastern equatorial Pacific (Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987; Sarachik and Cane,
2010). We index ENSO by NINO3, the anomaly for the region in Fig. 5.3a (Fig. 5.Ba). Our results are
insensitive to using alternative indices (Fig. 5.B), but detecting ENSO impacts requires that we account
for the “spring barrier” (Sarachik and Cane, 2010) by averaging NINO3 from May to December only rather
than over the entire calendar year (see Fig. 5.3b; also Tables 5.A3-5.A4 and Section 5.A.3).
We regress the conflict measure ACR on NINO3 for both groups and detect a large and significant increase
in ACR associated with warmer NINO3 values only in the teleconnected group (Fig. 5.3a-b; Supplementary
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Section 5.A.4). We build a linear multiple regression model by including linear time trends and an additive
constant to all years after 1989 (inclusive), a common technique (Buhaug, 2010) to account for mean shifts
in ACR following the end of the Cold War (Table 5.1 rows 1-3). Using a non-parametric regression, we
note that ACR in the teleconnected group is most responsive to strong ENSO events and is less affected by
smaller deviations from the neutral state (Fig. 5.3b).
In the teleconnected group, ACR is 3% in the La Nin˜a state and rises to 6% in the El Nin˜o state; whereas
ACR in the weakly-affected group remains at 2% for all ENSO states (Fig. 5.3b). This implies that ENSO
may have affected one-fifth (21%) of all civil conflicts during this period (see Methods).
Because ENSO events occur after the April/May “spring barrier” (Sarachik and Cane, 2010) as shown in
Fig. 5.3b, we expect conflicts triggered by ENSO to occur in the later part of the calendar year. Fig. 5.3c,
based on the subset of conflict data available at monthly resolution, shows the within-year distributions of
conflict onsets for the teleconnected group in El Nin˜o and La Nin˜a years. The distributions of conflicts are
similar early in the year with substantial differences appearing only after ENSO events are underway.
The correlation we observe between ACR and NINO3 is robust to the battery of statistical models
advanced by previous studies (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Burke et al., 2009; Sandholt and
Gleditsch, 2009; Buhaug, 2010) (see Supplementary Materials Section 5.A.5). To ensure the entrance of new
countries into the sample do not drive our result, we restrict our sample to the post-colonial period (Burke
et al., 2009) (Table 5.1, row 4) and also estimate a country-level linear probability model (Burke et al.,
2009; Buhaug, 2010) (row 5). We limit the sample to exclude African countries (row 6) and find that the
correlation is not driven exclusively by Africa (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Burke et al., 2009;
Buhaug, 2010). Further, we find that non-linear probability models (Fig. 5.B), count models (Fig. 5.B)
and survival models (Table 5.A5) produce indistinguishable results. We find the relationship persists when
alternative ENSO indices are used (Table 5.A6). We estimate dynamic-panel and first-difference models
(Table 5.A7) and find no evidence that patterns of serial correlation in either variable drive our results. We
expand our sample to include several influential outlying observations (1946, 1948 and 1989, see Fig. 5.B)
and find the correlation persists (Table 5.A8). We remove country-specific constants and trends from our
longitudinal model (Buhaug, 2010) and find our estimates unchanged (Table 5.A9). When we include controls
for contemporaneous temperature and precipitation (Table 5.A10) or for lagged income, political institutions
and population (Table 5.A11; and see Fig. 5.B) we continue to find a large and significant influence of ENSO
on ACR. We then estimate a model with all of the above controls, as well as controls for gender balance,
urbanization, age-structure, income growth, agricultural reliance and cyclone disasters (Table 5.A12 and
Fig. 5.B) and find that our results persist across African and non-African countries. Finally, using standard
definitions (Strand, 2006), we find that neither large (> 1000 battle deaths) nor small (25 < # battle deaths
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< 1000) conflicts dominate our result (Table 5.A13). However, we find that increasing the required peaceful
period between conflicts (Strand, 2006) reduces the correlation between ENSO and large conflicts, indicating
that many of the large conflicts associated with ENSO are reoccurring conflicts (Table 5.A13).
El Nin˜o might accelerate the timing of conflicts that would have occurred later. By examining years
following ENSO events, we find suggestive but statistically insignificant evidence that approximately 40% of
the conflicts associated with ENSO are displaced in time (Table 5.A14).
We evaluate the relative sensitivities of different countries by estimating a separate regression for each
country (i), decomposing ACR into a baseline component (αi) independent of ENSO and a component (βi)
that varies linearly with NINO3: ACRi(t) = αi + βiNINO3(t) (see Supplementary Section 5.A.4). In the
teleconnected group, low income countries are the most responsive to ENSO (i.e. β is larger), while similarly
low income countries in the weakly-affected group do not respond significantly to ENSO (Fig. 5.3). Note
that the dependence of baseline ACR α on income is statistically indistinguishable between the two groups.
While we observe that the ACR of low income countries is most strongly associated with ENSO, we
cannot determine if (1) they respond strongly because they are low-income, (2) they are low income because
they are sensitive to ENSO, or (3) they are sensitive to ENSO and low income for some third unobservable
reason. Hypothesis (1) is supported by evidence that poor countries lack the resources to mitigate the effects
of environmental changes (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Hsiang, 2010; Jones and Olken, 2010). However, hypothesis
(2) is plausible because ENSO existed before the invention of agriculture (Sarachik and Cane, 2010) and
conflict induces economic underperformance (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Blattman and Miguel,
2010).
Our results do not provide an estimate of the full value of a global climate state, but the following thought
experiment relates the global climate to income in terms of their associations with ACR. In a teleconnected
country where average income per capita is $1000 (α = 4%, βi = 1%/◦C), the 3◦C shift associated with a
change from La Nin˜a to El Nin˜o increases ACR by 3% (Fig. 5.3b). Compare this to the 3% decrease in
baseline ACR associated with increasing average income tenfold (Fig. 5.3a).
Since the strong ENSO events that have the greatest influence on ACR may be predictable up to two
years in advance (Chen et al., 2004), use of our findings may improve global preparedness for some conflicts
and their associated humanitarian crises.
We find that the changes in the global climate driven by ENSO are associated with global patterns
of conflict, but our results might not generalize to gradual trends in average temperature or particular
characteristics of anthropogenic climate change. Generalizing our results to global climate changes other than
ENSO will require an understanding of the mechanisms that link conflict to climate. ENSO has a proximate
influence on a variety of climatological variables, each of which may plausibly influence how conflict-prone
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a society is. Precipitation, temperature, sunlight, humidity and ecological extremes can adversely influence
both agrarian (Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009b) and non-agrarian economies
(Hsiang, 2010; Jones and Olken, 2010). In addition, ENSO variations affect natural disasters, such as
tropical cyclones (Carmargo and Sobel, 2005), and trigger disease outbreaks (Kovats et al., 2003). All of
these have adverse economic effects, such as loss of income or increasing food prices, and it is thought
that economic shocks can generate civil conflict through a variety of pathways (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Miguel,
Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Furthermore, altered environmental conditions
stress the human psyche, sometimes leading to aggressive behavior (Larrick et al., 2011). We hypothesize
that El Nin˜o can simultaneously lead to any of these adverse economic and psychological effects, increasing
the likelihood of conflict. Further, the influence of ENSO may exceed the sum influence of these individual
pathways because it is a global-scale process that generates simultaneous and correlated conditions around
the world. This is possible if non-local processes, such as increasing global commodity prices (Brunner, 2002)
or conflict contagion (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Sandholt and Gleditsch, 2009), strongly influence local
conflict risk. Future work will examine the relative importance of these various mechanisms.
5.2 Main methods
Pixels with surfaces temperatures significantly and positively correlated with NINO3 for ≥ 3 months out
of the year are coded “teleconnected,” remaining pixels are coded “weakly affected.” Countries are coded
teleconnected (weakly affected) if > 50% of the population in 2000 inhabited teleconnected (weakly affected)
pixels. Group-level time-series regressions (Table 5.1, models 1-4) use a continuous variable for ACR; we
drop 1989 because it is a 3-σ outlier, presumably because of the end of the Cold War. Group-level standard
errors are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity. Country-level longitudinal regressions (models 5-6)
are linear probability models for conflict onset with standard errors that are robust to unknown forms of
spatial correlation over distances ≤ 5000 km, serial correlation over periods ≤ 5 years and heteroscedasticity
(?). We estimate the number of conflicts associated with ENSO by assuming all conflicts in the weakly-
affected group were unaffected and a baseline ACR of 3% for the teleconnected group would have remained
unchanged in the absence of ENSO variations. We then project the observed sequence of NINO3 realizations
onto our linear conflict model (∂ACR/∂NINO3 = 0.0081) and find 48.2 conflicts (21%) were associated
with ENSO. For additional details on methods, see online supplementary materials.
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5.3 Main figures
















(a) Red (blue) indicates an ENSO teleconnected (weakly-affected) pixel; NINO3 region in grey. (b) Correlation of monthly
NINO3 with NINO3 in December. The natural “tropical year” begins in May and ends the following April at the “spring
barrier” (grey). To match annual ACR data, an annual ENSO signal is isolated by averaging May-December NINO3.
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(a) Time series of NINO3 and ACR for the teleconnected group. (b) Linear and non-parametric fit (weighted moving average,
90% CI shaded) of ACR against NINO3. Time trends and post-Cold War effects are removed. (c) Solid (hatched) bars show
total monthly conflict onsets in teleconnected countries during one-third (18) of years most El Nin˜o-like (La Nin˜a-like). Monthly
data are available for only half of the conflicts.
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For each country i, estimate ACRi(t) = αi + βiNINO3(t). (α) Baseline ACR against log income per capita in 2007 (moving
average, 90% CI shaded). Teleconnected (weakly-affected) group in red (blue). (β) Same, but for the sensitivity of ACR to
ENSO.
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5.4 Main tables
Table 5.1: Regression of ACR on NINO3 averaged May-Dec.: 1950-2004
Model Teleconnected Weakly-Affected
(%/◦C) (%/◦C)
(1) group aggregate 0.76* 0.16
[0.39] [0.31]
n = 54 n = 54
(2) group aggregate 0.85** 0.06
linear trend [0.40] [0.30]
n = 54 n = 54
(3) group aggregate 0.81** 0.04
linear trend [0.32] [0.31]
post-1989 constant n = 54 n = 54
(4) same as (3) 0.95** 0.33
1975-2004 only† [0.34] [0.45]
n = 29 n = 29
(5) country-level panel 0.89** 0.04
country-specific trends [0.38] [0.29]
country-specific constants n = 3978 n = 3400
(6) same as (5) 0.84** -0.01
non-African countries only [0.41] [0.29]
n = 2084 n = 3203
Standard errors in brackets ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are proba-
bility responses in units of %/1◦C, 1.0 means the probability of conflict
in a given year (ACR) rises 0.01 for each 1◦C in NINO3. †After 1974, the
set of countries in the teleconnected group stabilized at 87-91 countries.
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5.A Supplementary Methods
5.A.1 Data sources and definitions
Table 5.A1 contains summary statistics for the main variables in this study.
Climate data To determine the relative teleconnectedness of local climates to ENSO, we use the National
Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) Climate Data Assimilation System 1 (CDAS1) reanalysis of
monthly surface temperatures during 1949-2009 (Kalnay et al., 1996). ENSO variations can be detected
using different indices, with the most commonly used being equatorial Pacific sea surface temperature (SST)
anomalies. We utilize monthly means of three such indices: NINO12 (10◦S-Eq, 90◦W-80◦W), NINO3 (5◦S-
5◦N, 150◦W-90◦W), and NINO4 (5◦S-5◦N, 160◦E-150◦W) (Kaplan et al., 1998). These indices measure
SST in different locations in the Pacific Ocean, with NINO12 measured furthest east and NINO4 measured
furthest west (see Fig. 5.B). These three indices differ both in the magnitude and timing of their variations,
but are correlated with one another. For example, the standard deviation of our NINO12 measure (1.02◦C)
is substantially larger than that of our NINO4 measure (0.58◦C). Our main text presents results for NINO3
because it is less influenced by coastal perturbations (compared to NINO12) and captures “medium-scale”
events reliably (compared to NINO4), although we find that the choice of NINO index is inconsequential.
Conflict data We use the Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict dataset compiled by the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute in
Oslo (PRIO) (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 2006). This dataset contains information on the magnitudes and
recurrence periods of conflicts. A conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related death” (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 2006). A conflict
onset is the date on which a certain fatality threshold has been crossed in specific conflict between a unique
government-opposition dyad (note that a country can experience conflict onset in sequential years if its
government fights with different opposition groups in sequential years). The dataset uses fatality thresholds
of 25 and 1000 battle-related deaths to distinguish events of different intensities. Should a conflict that has
subsided be reinitiated, it is counted as a new conflict only if the last time it surpassed the 25 battle-deaths
cutoff was more than X years ago, where 2 ≤ X ≤ 9. For example, “Onset2” records a new conflict onset
only if that conflict is new or if that specific conflict has been quiescent for at least two years. Our main
results utilize this 25 fatality and 2 year intermittency definition of conflict onset. We check the robustness
of this choice in a later section.
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A subsample of this data set (approximately half of the full data set) has monthly dates associated with
the timing of conflict onset (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 2006). This subsample is used to construct Fig.
5.3c in the main text.
Agricultural data To validate our partition of the world into ENSO teleconnected and weakly-affected
groups, we estimate the differential impact of ENSO on agricultural yields and agricultural revenue in each.
Cereal yields are obtained from the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO) FAOStat database (Food
and Agriculture Organization, 2009) and are available for 1961-2007. Agriculture revenue is acquired from
the United Nations National Accounts database (, 2007) and is available for 1970-2008. The total annual
agricultural revenue for each group is simply the sum of agricultural revenue across all countries in the given
year (see Fig. 5.B).
Income data Income data is obtained from the United Nations National Accounts database (, 2007).
Incomes are available for 1970-2008 in 1990 US dollars per capita.
Demographic data Population data is obtained from United Nations World Development Indicators (,
2008) and are available for 1950-2008.
Political institutions data Polity IV data describes the level of democratization embodied by the political
institutions of a country and is obtained from the Polity IV Project sponsored by the Political Instability
Task Force (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2009) and are available for 1950-2008. Polity IV scores take integer
values ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
Rainfall data Data merged from gauges, satellite observations and numerical simulations is obtained from
the Climate Predicition Center (CPC) Merged Analysis of Precipitation (Xie and Arkin, 1996) (CMAP) and
are available for 1979-2008.
Tropical Cyclone data Hurricane, typhoon, cyclone and tropical storm data are obtained from the
Limited Information Cyclone Reconstruction and Integration for Climate and Economics (LICRICE) model
(?) and are available for 1950-2008. The data describe the annual maximum windspeed spatially averaged
over each country.
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5.A.2 The ENSO-teleconnection partition
ENSO teleconnections
A central contribution of this work is to develop a simple and robust partition of the continents based on
their teleconnectedness to ENSO. Previous analyses have identified different types of ENSO teleconnections
using a number of statistical techniques on different data sets(Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987, 1989; Nicholls,
1989; Nicholson and Kim, 1997; Klein, Soden and Lau, 1999; Chiang and Sobel, 2002; Giannini, Saravanan
and Chang, 2003; Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008; Sarachik and Cane, 2010). Because of the heterogeneity in
these approaches, there are variations in the patterns of teleconnections that they characterize. Nonetheless,
there are many common patterns and we attempt to summarize this agreement with a simple approach that
partitions the world into locations that are either strongly teleconnected or weakly affected. While this a
crude simplification of the high dimensional and continuous structure of ENSO teleconnections, it provides
a surprising amount of power to global analyses of ENSO impacts, despite its simplistic nature.
El Nin˜o events are associated with abnormally warm sea surface temperatures in the central and eastern
equatorial Pacific, releasing large fluxes of thermal energy into the atmosphere. This warming of the tropical
Pacific free troposphere induces warming throughout the tropical free troposphere, generally stabilizing the
air column to vertical motions, inhibiting rainfall and warming the surface. For a fully developed discussion
of these dynamics, see Sarachik and Cane (Sarachik and Cane, 2010) (2010). While there are many other
local impacts of ENSO variations with complex structure in space and time, the simplest and most general
fingerprint throughout impacted regions, in comparison to rainfall Ropelewski and Halpert (1987) or cloud
cover (Klein, Soden and Lau, 1999), is near-surface warming induced by the increased static stability (Chiang
and Sobel, 2002). Furthermore, using surface temperatures to identify teleconnections benefits from the fact
that temperature data is the most reliably collected atmospheric statistic and it is well modeled in reanalyses
(Kalnay et al., 1996).
Construction method
To construct our global partition of ENSO teleconnections, we examine whether reanalysis grid cells exhibit
surface temperatures that are positively correlated with NINO3 on a monthly basis (with a two month lag)
for at least three months out of the year2. The details of this construction are as follows:
Let NINO(m, y) = the value of the ENSO index in calendar month m ∈ {1, ..., 12} and year y ∈ Y ≡
{1950, ..., 2004}. Similarly, let T (x,m, y) be the surface temperature at location x, month m and year y.
Let ρ(x,m,L) be the correlation coefficient (over all years y ∈ Y ) of NINO(m, y) and T (x,m + L, y) (ρ is
2In generating our partition we avoid using socioeconomic variables since these might themselves influence ACR, confounding
our analysis(Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
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plotted for each month in Fig. 5.B). Note that T lags NINO3 by L > 0 months to account for the fact that
signals from the tropical Pacific where NINO3 is measured need some time to propagate and influence the
rest of the world (Chiang and Sobel, 2002). In the main analysis L = 2. Now let ρ˜(x,m,L) = 1 if ρ(x,m,L)





is the number of months that grid point x exhibits interannual surface temperature variations that are
significantly correlated at a level ≤ 0.1 with NINO3 L months earlier.
Even with no mechanistic connection between surface temperatures at x and NINO3, most values of
MxL should be ≥ 1 since 1 in 10 random draws will be correlated at the α = 0.1 level. If the monthly
draws of temperature were all completely independent, MxL ≥ 3 would occur randomly 11% of the time3
(MxL ≥ 5 would occur 0.4% of the time). Independence is not a valid assumption in this case, but it is a
useful benchmark. For a cutoff value R, a point x is denoted ENSO “teleconnected” if MxL ≥ R. We define
a binary measure of “teleconnectedness” Vx(L,R) = 1 if MxL ≥ R and = 0 otherwise. In the main analysis,
R = 3. Fig. 5.Ba displays Vx (for L = 2 and R = 3, the values used in the main analysis).
To estimate country-level teleconnection index V¯i for country i, we take a weighted average of Vx over all









Values for V¯i will range from 0 in the least teleconnected countries to 1 for the most teleconnected countries.
The histogram in Fig. 5.Bb displays the distribution of V¯i for the values used in the main analysis (L = 2,
R = 3 and wx = the population of pixel x in the year 2000(CIESIN, Columbia University, 2009)). Because
it is so strongly bimodal, a partition into just two groups appears to be an excellent approximation. It is
surely an attractive simplification. We assign those countries with V¯i > 0.5 to the teleconnected group and
those with V¯i ≤ 0.5 to the weakly-affected group.
Robustness of the ENSO-teleconnection partition
In this subsection, we examine the sensitivity of our partition under different choices for w, L, and R. We
find that the gross features of the global partition are unchanged for a range of reasonable parameter choices










CHAPTER 5. CIVIL CONFLICTS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 141
Pixel Assignment Fig. 5.B illustrates changes to the partition that occur when L and R are modified.
Panel a depicts teleconnected pixels (Vx(L,R) = 1) as red for L = 2 and R = 3, the values used in the main
analysis. Panel b is the same, except L = 0. Almost no features change, suggesting that the selection of L is
inessential. Panel c displays the changes that occur when L is held fixed at 2 and R is changed. As described
before, setting R < 3 would admit too many chance assignments, but perhaps R = 3 is also too low. When
R = 5 is used, those pixels that are teleconnected are marked as green. Pixels that are teleconnected when a
cutoff R = 3 is used but are no longer teleconnected when R = 5 are yellow. Pixels that are weakly-affected
when either R = 3 or R = 5 are blue. Note that the red region in Panel a is the union of the green and
yellow regions in Panel c. When R is increased from 3 to 5, only the group assignment of the yellow region
changes. This region is small and represents the boundary of the moist tropics and the arid subtropics; it is
the region where the annual monsoonal rains stop in their meridional translation and reverse direction. The
primary effect of increasing R from 3 to 5 is to simply omit relatively dry pixels that do not have five rainy
months in a normal year.
Country Assignment Fig. 5.Ba displays countries assigned to the teleconnected group in red and the
weakly-affected group in blue, using the values from the main analysis, L = 2, R = 3. The histogram in Panel
b displays the distribution of the country-level ENSO teleconnection index V¯i when pixels are aggregated
using weights wx that reflect the population of each pixel. The histogram in Panel c displays how this
distribution changes if the weights are changed to reflect the area of each pixel; the overall distribution is
virtually unchanged. The histogram in Panel d displays how the distribution changes if population weights
are used but R = 5 instead of 3. Again, the structure hardly changes.
Negative temperature correlations When designating pixels and countries as teleconnected, we only
examined whether surface temperatures were positively correlated with NINO3 or not. One might be con-
cerned that we ignore significant negative correlations with NINO3 because such correlations are well known
Sarachik and Cane (2010), however most locations with negatively correlated temperatures are oceanic and
not continental Chiang and Sobel (2002). If large continental regions were negatively correlated with NINO3,
we might expect that ACR in those countries would have a response to ENSO that was opposite the response
in the teleconnected group. To check that such a pattern does not influence our results, we document that
only three countries in our sample (< 2%) have most of their population in locations where surface tem-
peratures are negatively correlated with NINO3 (see Fig. 5.B). Fiji, the Solomon Island and New Zealand
are the three countries that could plausibly be coded as “negatively teleconnected,” yet none experience any
civil conflict during the period of observation. In addition, Northern Mexico, the western United States,
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eastern Russia and eastern Indonesia also contain locations where surfaces temperatures anticorrelate with
NINO3, however these locations contain only a small fraction of these countries’ total populations.
Agreement with previous analyses Several previous studies have illustrated different types of ENSO
teleconnections using different environmental variables and statistical techniques (Ropelewski and Halpert,
1987, 1989; Nicholls, 1989; Nicholson and Kim, 1997; Chiang and Sobel, 2002; Giannini, Saravanan and
Chang, 2003; Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008). The pixels we designate as teleconnected to ENSO (Fig. 5.3a
in main text) is approximately the union of regions previously found to be teleconnected to ENSO. The
seminal work by Ropelowski and Halpert (Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987, 1989) demonstrated that several
regions in the tropics and subtropics exhibited rainfall anomalies (of both signs) in association with ENSO
(see Fig. 21 p. 1625 in [11]). Nicholls (Nicholls, 1989) showed the dependence of rainfall throughout eastern
Australia (see Fig. 4b p. 969 in [13]). Nicholson and Kim (Nicholson and Kim, 1997) illustrated impacts
throughout sub-Saharan Africa by utilizing more complete data sets than earlier work could access (see Fig.
7 p. 125 in [14]). Chiang and Sobel (Chiang and Sobel, 2002) explained the propagation of teleconnections
with Kelvin wave dynamics and demonstrated their results using 1000-200mb temperature anomalies, which
were correlated with ENSO throughout the tropics and some of the subtropics (see Fig. 2 p. 2618 in [16]).
Giannini, Saravanan and Chang (Giannini, Saravanan and Chang, 2003) demonstrated the dependance on
ENSO of rainfall and surface temperatures in the Sahel (see Fig. 4E-F p. 1029 in [17]). A large number
of other studies have illustrated flooding or ecological responses in more limited regions, many of which are
summarized in Rosenzweig and Hillel (Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008).
Our binary teleconnection partition is a dramatic simplification of the rich relationships studied in earlier
work. For many purposes it would be an oversimplification, but it serves our purposes here by providing a
structurally simple inclusive description of worldwide ENSO impacts. The binary assignment is justified a
posteriori by the sharpness of the division. However, this strong generalization does not allow us to identify
the specific mechanisms that are driving our main findings.
Partition validation using weather and agricultural outcomes
As a validation exercise of our global partition of ENSO teleconnection, we explore the effect of ENSO on
surface temperatures, rainfall and agricultural output (Table 5.A2) because these relationships are well estab-
lished (Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987; Chiang and Sobel, 2002; Cane, Eshel and Buckland, 1994; Rosenzweig
and Hillel, 2008; Sarachik and Cane, 2010).
CHAPTER 5. CIVIL CONFLICTS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 143
Temperature and rainfall First we check that temperature and rainfall at the country-level are correlated
with interannual variations in ENSO in the teleconnected group and not in the weakly affected group. The
partitioning technique was designed to isolate those countries that are strongly influenced by ENSO, however
it is possible that countries that have temperatures positively correlated with NINO3 for three months also
exhibit negative correlations in other months or do not exhibit annually averaged signals for some other
reason. Moreover, it is important to verify that rainfall patterns are negatively correlated with NINO3
in the teleconnected countries because rainfall was not explicitly used in the construction of the partition.
(Rainfall was not used in the partition construction because rainfall signals are more variable and rainfall
data is both less complete and noisier.)
To verify our partition with weather data, we estimate
Wi(t) = βNINO3(t) + γi + θi1t+ θi2t2 + i(t) (5.1)
where Wi(t) is either temperature or rainfall for country i in year t, NINO3 is averaged May-December,
γi is a country-specific constant (fixed effect) and θi1 and θi2 are country-specific linear and quadratic time
trends. This equation is estimated once for each country group and the resulting values for β are in rows 1
and 2 of Table 5.A2. In the teleconnected group, annual average temperature (precipitation) is significantly
and positively (negatively) correlated with the dominant NINO3 signal in each year. In the weakly affected
group, the estimated values of β are near zero and statistically insignificant.
Cereal yields Next we compare inter-temporal variations in cereal yields for individual countries in the
two groups with inter-temporal variations in ENSO. Using a longitudinal dataset of all countries between
1961-2007 we estimate the following dynamic model:
log(Yi(t)) = β1NINO3(t) + β2 log(Yi(t− 1)) + γi + θi1t+ θi2t2 + i(t) (5.2)
where Yi(t) is the cereal yield for country i in year t. The trend terms are intended to account for technologi-
cal innovation such as the “green revolution”. Equation 5.2 is estimated separately for the teleconnected and
weakly-affected groups. Standard errors are clustered by country (Liang and Zeger, 1986; Arellano, 1987;
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004) to account for unknown patterns of within-country autocorrelation.
Row 3 of Table 5.A2 presents the regression coefficient β and associated standard errors for the two groups.
For the teleconnected group, the coefficient is significantly negative while for the weakly-affected group the
coefficients are positive but insignificant, a result that is consistent with observed increases in rainfall for
some locations in the mid-latitudes (Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008).
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Agricultural income Finally, we check our teleconnection partition against agricultural outcomes by
using agricultural income data from another source (, 2007). In row 4 of Table 5.A2, we estimate equation
5.2 using country-level agricultural income and find that relative to the impact of ENSO on the teleconnected
group, the drop in agricultural income for weakly affected countries is smaller and not significant. We
also aggregate a single time-series of total agricultural income per capita A for the entire teleconnected
and weakly-affected groups for 1970-2007. For each group, this number represents the total value of all
agricultural output for roughly half of the world population (see Fig 5.B). Specifically, for each group, we
estimate the following auto-regressive model
A(t) = β0 + β1NINO3(t) + β2A(t− 1) + θ1t+ θ2t2 + (t). (5.3)
Row 5 of Table 5.A2 shows the regression coefficient β1. Consistent with the other panels in Table 5.A2, we
find that in the teleconnected group, an increase in NINO3 leads to large and significant negative impacts
in agricultural income while the coefficient for the weakly-affected group is smaller and not statistically
significant. (We have verified that these different agricultural responses are also robust across NINO12 and
NINO4 indices, results that are available on request.)
These results, which are consistent with previous regional and local-scale analyses (Ropelewski and
Halpert, 1987; Chiang and Sobel, 2002; Cane, Eshel and Buckland, 1994; Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008;
Sarachik and Cane, 2010), broadly validate our global partition of ENSO teleconnections.
5.A.3 ENSO timing and measurement error
Annual conflict onset data is organized by years that begin in January and end in December (Gleditsch et al.,
2002; Strand, 2006). NINO indices are collected for individual months and therefore must be aggregated into
years in order to match the conflict data. The simplest approach would be to average NINO indices over years
that begin in January and end in December, producing measures of ENSO that are exactly contemporaneous
with the conflict onset observations. However, ENSO “events” do not begin in January nor end in December.
ENSO events generally begin in May/June and persist until they break down in March/April of the following
year. For this reason, the period April-May is often termed the “spring barrier” and separates “tropical years”
from one another. Fig. 5.3b in the main text illustrates the spring barrier by plotting monthly correlations
between NINO3 values in December and other months. Importantly, the values of the NINO3 index in
January-April of Calendar Year t are unrelated to the dominant event observed in Tropical Year t.
To demonstrate that ENSO events are organized this way, Table 5.A3 tabulates the correlation coefficients
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for monthly NINO3 values over the period 1950-2008. Entries describe the correlation between the NINO3
values that are observed in two months of the same calendar year. The first three columns, marked early
season, have values near one for the first three rows, indicating that months prior to the spring barrier
have NINO3 values that are highly correlated with one another. The bottom seven rows have values close
to zero, indicating that NINO3 values before and after the spring barrier are not correlated. In any given
year, the annual average NINO value is dominated by measurements following the spring barrier. Thus,
if an El Nin˜o or La Nin˜a “event” occurs, the calendar year in which it begins (referred to as “Year 0” in
the climate literature) is the calendar year that exhibits the largest annually averaged signal. These events
are generally coherent across the months June-December, as indicated by the high values in the last seven
columns of Table 5.A3. The correlation coefficients associated with spring barrier months (April and May)
have intermediate values as this is the transition period between “tropical years”.
Because El Nin˜o or La Nin˜a events are dominated by signals following the spring barrier, including
early season measurements that are uncorrelated with these late season signals is equivalent to introducing
noise into estimates of a given year’s dominant climatology. Therefore, we omit early season months and
estimate the ENSO state of the global climate by averaging NINO index values over May-December only.
The NINO index values for January-April of the following year are omitted, despite their occurrence in the
same “tropical year,” because they follow all conflicts that are recorded in the matching calendar year.
Table 5.A6 demonstrates the result when the spring barrier is ignored in the “naive” approach described
above. Panel f displays the coefficients and standard errors when ACR for the teleconnected group is
regressed on annual average NINO indices using all months, ignoring the existence of the spring barrier.
Contrast this with Panel c displaying the results when index values for January-April are omitted from the
annual averages of NINO. Including January-April NINO values reduces the magnitude of the coefficients by
about 11-16% and increases the size of the standard errors by 13-49%. Thus, a “naive” estimate ignoring the
timing of ENSO events would suggest that there is no statistically significant relation between ENSO and
conflict onset. Tables 5.A3, 5.A4 and 5.A6 suggest that the inclusion of January-April NINO values lead to
“attenuation bias,” a well known statistical problem associated with classical (additive) measure error in a
regressor variable (?Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
In addition, recall that Fig. 5.3c of the main text displays the within-year distribution of additional
conflicts associated with El Nin˜o-like conditions. It demonstrates that conflict onsets preceding the spring
barrier are not driving our main result.
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5.A.4 Main statistical models
Table 5.1 in the main text presents the main results of this study: a shift in the global climate from a strong
La Nin˜a to a strong El Nin˜o increases the probability of conflict onset in the teleconnected group from
3% to 6% whereas the probability of conflict onset in the weakly-affected group remains unchanged at 2%.
Estimating the magnitude of these changes requires the use of statistical models, which are detailed here.
Framework: Let Ci(t) be a random variable that takes a value of one if country i experiences conflict onset
in year t and zero otherwise. We define the annual conflict risk of country i (ACRi) to be the probability
that i experiences a conflict in year t conditional on the state of the world in year t:
ACRi(t) = E[Ci(t)|t].
For a set of years, we can estimate the conditionally expected value of ACRi(t), given an observable statistic
X(t) describing the state of the world in year t,
Et[ACRi(t)|X] = f(X(t))
by applying data to the regression
ACRi(t) = f(X(t)) + i(t) (5.4)
where i(t) is the component of ACRi(t) that is not predicted by X(t). By substitution and iterated
expectations we also have
Et[Ci(t)|X] = f(X(t))
which we can estimate with data in the regression
Ci(t) = f(X(t)) + i(t). (5.5)
Equation 5.4 is the basis for our time series models and Equation 5.5 is the basis for our longitudinal (panel)
models. In theory, both approaches estimate the same function f(X(t)).
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Time series model of conflict risk : In our primary results, presented in Table 5.1 row 3, we estimate
a group’s average risk as
ACR(t) =






and then estimate the time-series model
ACR(t) = α+ βNINO(t) + θt+ post Cold War(t) + (t) (5.6)
where α is a constant, θ is a linear trend and post Cold War(t) is a constant term for all years following 1989
(inclusive) and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest is β, which describes how many more conflict onsets
per country are associated with a 1◦C increase in NINO. This model is estimated once for the teleconnected
group and once for the weakly-affected group. In each case, the observational unit is a “group-year” and the
comparison is between the time series of NINO and the time series of a group’s annual conflict risk, each
of which has 54 observations. The linear trend captures slow increases in overall conflict risk and NINO.
It also ensures that the estimated coefficients only represent high-frequency variations in ENSO and not
correlated trends. The introduction of a post Cold War constant is a common practice in statistical analyses
of conflict (Buhaug, 2010) because overall conflict levels changed qualitatively following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The standard errors presented for these time-series models are White standard errors and are
robust to heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form (White, 1980).
One drawback of Equation 5.6 is that country-level trends in conflict cannot be accounted for (eg. some
countries may have become more conflict-prone over the observation period), although the stationarity of
NINO indices suggest that this is not a major threat to unbiased estimation of β. However, the entry of new
countries into our sample (see Fig. 5.B) may bias our estimates if new countries are systematically different
from older countries (eg. they may be more violent) and they enter the sample differentially during different
ENSO states (eg. during more El Nin˜o-like conditions). It is for these reasons that we check our estimates
with the following second estimation procedure.
Longitudinal linear probability model of conflict risk : Rows 5 and 6 of Table 5.1 in the main text
presents the coefficients from a country-level panel data linear probability model. These results come from
the following specification:
Ci(t) = βNINO(t) + µi + θit+ i(t) (5.7)
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where Ci(t) is unity if country i begins a conflict in year t and zero otherwise, µi is a country-specific constant
and θi is a country-specific trend. Unlike the time-series model in Equation 5.6, the unit of observation for
this model is a “country-year”. For each country and year combination, there is one observation for a total
of 3978 observations in the teleconnected group and 3400 observations in the weakly-affected group. The
advantage of this technique is that it allows us to remove country-level trends in violence with the term θi
because each country is observed multiple times. It also allows us to control for new countries that enter the
sample during different ENSO states: the country-specific term µi removes any time-invariant characteristics
of a country that might make it more or less conflict prone.
One disadvantage of the longitudinal data approach is that it is more difficult to calculate appropriate
standard errors for our estimates of β. First, there may be serial correlation in conflict onset that are
observed for an individual country. For example, countries may go through violent periods when they
experience several conflict onsets over a short period. Second, all countries in a region are exposed to the
same NINO index in a given year. If there are other factors that give rise to spatial correlation in conflict
onsets4, then our observations will not be independent and we will underestimate the size of our standard
errors (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). We address these concerns
by computing standard errors using the generalized method of moments proposed by Conley (?) (1999) to
4Previous analyses(Sandholt and Gleditsch, 2009) have examined “contagion” as a process that may generate spatial corre-
lations in conflicts. If such contagion occurs in response to ENSO, it will be captured by our parameter β in Equations 5.6-5.7.
To see this, let the ACR of country i be a function of both ENSO and the conflict state of i’s neighbors:
ACRi(t,C 6=i(t)) = ψiNINO(t) +
X
j 6=i
f(Cj(t), Dij) + i(t)
where C 6=i is a vector describing the conflict state of all countries other than i, f(.) is some function describing how conflicts
spread across countries and Dij is some “distance” metric that describes how easily conflicts in j can influence ACR in i.
Because C 6=i is stochastic, we take expectations over its possible states conditional on t
EC6=i [ACRi(t,C6=i(t))|t] = EC 6=i
24ψiNINO(t) +X
j 6=i





EC 6=i [f(Cj(t), Dij)|t]
since  is mean zero by construction. Let us denote ACRi(t) = EC 6=i [ACRi(t,C6=i(t))|t]. Taking the total derivative of ACRi(t)






























Thus, the estimated effect of ENSO on the ACR of i (βi) is the direct effect of ENSO on i (ψi) plus the indirect effects of
ENSO that are transmitted to i from i’s neighbors j via contagion. Previous studies(Sandholt and Gleditsch, 2009) that were
concerned with isolating [an analogue to] the direct effect ψi had to make additional assumptions regarding D and f(.), however
our approach (Equations 5.6-5.7) does not require these structural assumptions and is suitable when the total average effect
of ENSO (β = Ei[βi]) is the parameter of interest. In addition, it is worth noting that once βi is estimated in our regression
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account for unknown forms of spatial correlation. Because ENSO is regional to global in scale, we allow for
spatial correlations in errors over distances up to 5000 km. In addition, we allow for serial correlation over
periods less than six years and heteroskedasticity of unknown form (White, 1980; ?).
A second issue associated with this longitudinal data model is that the variable Ci(t) can only take on
the values of zero or one (i.e. it is a “binary response” model) (?). Several methods have been developed to
estimate probabilities when only a binary outcome is observable. The linear model in Equation 5.7 represents
the simplest of these models and is the easiest to interpret. However, when using this type of model, two
issues must be examined to ensure that a linear model is appropriate. First, the predicted probabilities of
an event should not be lower than zero nor higher than one. Figure 5.B plots the predicted ACR for both
regions (labeled “OLS”) over the values of NINO3 that are observed. All predicted ACR values are well
within the unit interval. Second, the probability response function should be well approximated by a linear
function. Probit and logit models are two commonly used models that have been developed to deal with
the type of non-linearity commonly observed in probability response functions (?). Fig. 5.B also plots the
predicted ACR using these two other methods (labeled “Logit” and “Probit”). These response functions are
indistinguishable from the linear model, suggesting that linearity is a good approximation.
The similarity of the results between rows 3 and 5 of Table 5.1 in the main text provides strong support
for our main results. Two estimation procedures with different strengths and weaknesses provide almost
identical results.
Note on 1989 In the regressions presented in the main text, observations from 1989 are dropped. Fig.
5.Ba illustrates why we have done this. It plots the residuals for a regression in row 2 of Table 5.1 from the
main text. The number of conflicts in 1989 for the teleconnected group was three standard deviations from
the conditionally expected value. It seems likely that the large number of conflicts in that year were related
to events associated with the end of the Cold War. Yet, we note that once a constant for the post-Cold War
period is included in Equation 5.6 (a common technique in the literature (Buhaug, 2010)) our main result
appears robust to the reintroduction of 1989 to the sample (see Table 5.A6 Panel e). Fig. 5.Bb plots the
estimated residuals using this second model.
model







35 ·NINO(t) + i(t)
the residuals i(t) do not contain any “contagion effect” that is driven by ENSO, since β captures these effects. Thus, while
i(t) may exhibit spatial correlation due to other factors, such as regional geopolitics, this spatial correlation will not be driven
by ENSO. Nonetheless, this non-ENSO-related spatial correlation reduces the effective number of degrees of freedom in our
data, motivating our use of standard errors that are robust to unknown forms of spatial autocorrelation(?).
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Non-parametric estimates of conflict risk: Fig. 5.3b in the main text provides non-parametric es-
timates of our time-series model. Non-parametric techniques are employed to (1) validate that linearity
between NINO3 and conflict risk is a reasonable assumption, and (2) obtain a better sense of local behavior
around different parts of the NINO3 distribution. For Fig. 5.3b, a Nadaraya-Watson estimator (Nadaraya,
1964; Watson, 1964) was fit to the data using a Epanechnikov kernel with a 1◦C bandwidth. The 90%
confidence intervals are bootstrapped.
Hierarchical regression model of ENSO teleconnection and income: Fig. 5.3 in the main text
uses a hierarchical regression model to decompose conflict risk for each country into ENSO unaffected (α)
and ENSO-affected (β) components. Specifically, for each country i, we run the regression:
Ci(t) = αi + βiNINO3(t) + i(t) (5.8)
where the variables are defined as they were in Equation 5.7. We next conduct a local non-parametric
estimate for the relationship between income per capita and the two estimated terms αi and βi. Fig. 5.3a in
the main text plots αi against log income per capita in 2007 using a Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth
of 0.6. The 90% confidence intervals are bootstrapped. Fig. 5.3b is the same, but for βi.
5.A.5 Robustness of the main result
Earlier, we showed that the bimodal distribution of the country-level teleconnection index is largely insen-
sitive to parameters in the construction of the global teleconnection partition. Here we further test the
robustness of our results by using alternative NINO indices, explicitly modeling potential serial correlations,
altering the sample of years used in the model, including a large number of potentially confounding control
variables, estimating a distributed lag model, altering the definition of ACR, examining whether our results
hold outside of Africa and modeling conflict onset as a Poisson point process. Our main findings survive all
of these checks.
NINO index Table 5.A6 provides results when NINO12, NINO3 and NINO4 are used to check that our
results are robust to different measures of the global ENSO state. While the coefficients in thise table may
look as if they change substantially as the NINO index changes, this is partly driven by differences in the
scale of variation observed for each index. These coefficients are in units of % year
−1
1◦C , however the range of
degrees Celsius over which each index varies is not fixed. Table 5.A1 presents the standard deviations for
the three NINO indices. When the coefficients from our preferred specification (panel d in Table 5.A6) are
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converted to units of % year
−1
1 standard deviation , they look similar, ranging from 0.51-0.47.
Serial correlation In our time series analysis of ACR and NINO3, one might be concerned that patterns
of serial correlation in one or both variables could be affecting our central findings, however we do not find
that this is the case. Table 5.A7 presents our baseline results in models 1 and 6. The Durbin-Watson
d-statistic for the teleconnected group rejects the null hypothesis of serial correlation in errors, however the
same test for the weakly affected group fails to reject the null. When the residuals from the baseline model
are regressed on their lagged values (models 2 and 7) we again find no serial correlation in the teleconnected
group but some serial correlation in the weakly affected group. When we explicitly add lagged values of ACR
to the baseline model (models 3 and 8) we find no substantive change in our coefficient of interest. We also
model changes in ACR as a response to changes in NINO3 (models 4 and 9) and find that our results are not
statistically different from the baseline model. Finally we re-estimate our standard errors for our baseline
model using a Newey-West estimator (Newey and West, 1987) that is robust to both serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity (rather than the White estimator (White, 1980) that we used previously and is only robust
to heteroscedasticity). Regardless of whether we use a lag cutoff of three, five or ten years5, our estimated
standard errors and significance levels do not change in a meaningful way.
Sample selection In our main analysis, we focus on the period 1950-2004 and omit the observation in
1989. We begin our analysis in 1950 because the post-war years were extraordinary, containing two extreme
outliers (1946 and 1948). In addition, no other data sets except NINO reconstructions are available prior to
1950. We omit 1989 because it is also an influential outlier, probably related to the end of the Cold War.
Retaining these obvious outliers in our analysis would likely bias our estimates, however we examine whether
their inclusion in our analysis substantially changes our finding. In model 1 of Table 5.A8 we present our
baseline sample. In model 2 we add 1989 only and in model 3 we add the years 1946-1949 only. In model 4
we exclude only 1948 and 1989 (the largest outliers) and in model 5 we restrict the sample to years following
1975 (inclusive), when the sample of teleconnected countries stabilized. In model 6 we include all years in
the Conflict Onset and Duration Dataset. In all of these samples, we find that the coefficient on NINO3 is
statistically significant and statistically indistinguishable from our baseline model. However, these outliers
exert a large and probably unreasonable influence on our model, so they remain omitted in our primary
analysis.
5Greene (?) (2003) recommends using a cutoff length that is at least as large as the fourth-root of the number of observations,
which in this case is 2.7 years.
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Semi-parametric control variables Buhaug (Buhaug, 2010) (2010) suggested that the compelling longitudinal-
based results in studies such as this should not depend critically on using country-specific constants (fixed-
effects) or country-specific trends. Burke et al. (Burke et al., 2010) (2010) respond that such controls are
essential to reliable statistical inference. It is our view that such controls are generally appropriate, however
we check that our results are robust to their omission. Table 5.A9 presents results from our longitudinal
linear-probability model (Equation 5.7) with and without country fixed-effects (µi) and country-specific
trends (θi). None of these alterations affects our estimated coefficient of interest, however the omission of
country fixed-effects increases our estimated standard errors slightly.
Other control variables Because previous studies have identified many parameters that are correlated
with conflict, it may be worth it to try and include these variables in our longitudinal analyses. We do this to
check the robustness of our results in light of previous work, but do not present heavily-controlled regression
results as our main findings because we feel that such control is not methodologically sound (?Angrist and
Pischke, 2008), especially when our independent variable of interest (ENSO) is unquestionably exogenous.
Moreover, our preferred model generates results that appear weaker than the following heavily-controlled
models, suggesting that our preferred approach is the more conservative one.
We begin by introducing idiosyncratic country-level temperature and precipitation shocks that others
(Levy et al., 2005; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Burke et al., 2009; Bruckner, 2010) have suggested
influence civil conflicts. ENSO may influence conflict through temperature and precipitation, however it may
also affect conflict through a variety of other mechanisms including (but not limited to) the timing of rainfall,
altered wind patterns, humidity, cloud cover, disasters, ecological events, or other environmental changes.
It may also be the case that ENSO induced changes in temperature and precipitation have a fundamentally
different impact on conflict than idiosyncratic weather shocks because ENSO induced changes are experienced
by a large number of countries. Thus, it is not surprising that when monthly temperature or rainfall are
included in our longitudinal model, the coefficient on NINO3 remains large and statistically significant (Table
5.A10). When rainfall is introduced to the model our coefficient of interest becomes larger, however this is
partially an artifact of the subsample of years for which reliable global rainfall data is available. We do not
believe that this is a well-specified model because ENSO is known to affect temperature and rainfall (Angrist
and Pischke, 2008), however we present it here for completeness.
We now turn to three of the most commonly suggested correlates of civil conflict: income (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Blattman and Miguel, 2010), population (Urdal, 2008;
Bruckner, 2010) and political institutions (Buhaug, 2010). When all of our data is pooled together (Fig.
5.B) it appears that ACR increases with population, decreases with income and is greatest for countries that
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are “anocracies” (Polity IV scores near zero). We include lagged values for these controls one by one and
jointly into our fixed-effects model and present the results in Table 5.A11. In all of these models, the effect
of ENSO on ACR is large and statistically significant. This contrasts with the weakly affected region, where
correlations between ACR and NINO3 continue to be absent even in the presence of these controls (model
11). Further, when we stratify the teleconnected sample according to whether countries are in Africa or not
(models 9-10), both regions exhibit similar results. This contrasts with the effects of income, population and
Polity IV, all of which change in magnitude and/or sign between the African and non-African subsamples.
Polity IV is the only control that exhibits a reasonably consistent and significant correlation with ACR,
however the amount of variation it explains is small (Fig. 5.B) and it is known to be extremely endogenous
(Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Burke et al., 2010).
Finally, we estimate a “kitchen sink” model that contains the following controls. The paper that motivates
each variable’s inclusion is listed in as a citation.
1. country fixed-effects (Fearon and Laitin, 2003)
2. country-specific time trends (Burke et al., 2010)
3. log income per capita (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) (lagged)
4. income growth (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004) (lagged)
5. Polity IV score (Buhaug, 2010) [linear & quadratic] (lagged)
6. agriculture industry share (%) (Burke et al., 2009) (lagged)
7. percent urbanized (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) (lagged)
8. log population (Bruckner, 2010) (lagged)
9. percent female (Urdal, 2008) (lagged)
10. percent below 15 yrs old (Urdal, 2008) (lagged)
11. percent above 65 yrs old (Urdal, 2008) (lagged)
12. cyclone maximum windspeed (Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan, 2004) (area average)
13. monthly temperature (Burke et al., 2009) (12 variables)
14. monthly rainfall (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Levy et al., 2005) (12 variables)
Results from this heavily controlled model are presented in Table 5.A12. The full-sample estimates with
or without the weather controls (rows 1 and 4) exhibit large and statistically significant correlations between
ACR and NINO3 in the teleconnected group only. We check that a linear model for the ACR response
to NINO3 is a good approximation for the data in this “kitchen-sink” model (Fig. 5.B) and observe that
these results are not driven by outliers. When the sample is split into African and non-African countries,
we again see large coefficients for all groups. Only one teleconnected coefficient (model 3) is not significant
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despite being larger in magnitude that the analogous coefficient in our baseline model (Table 5.1 in the
main text, row 3). This is hardly surprising and occurs because our standard errors grow substantially with
such dramatic “over-fitting” in our statistical specification (?). Again, it is our view that including so many
endogenously determined and/or irrelevant control variables is not the correct approach to causal inference
since ENSO is known to vary over time exogenously. We only present these results as a robustness exercise.
Lag and lead NINO terms As discussed in the main text, we conduct tests to determine whether or
not (1) the conflicts induced by ENSO in the teleconnected group would have occurred in its absence and
(2) our main results might be spurious.
To check if ENSO simply advances inevitable conflicts, we add a one-year lagged NINO term into Eq. 5.6.
Model 1 of Table 5.A14 replicates our main result for the teleconnected group. Model 2 includes a lagged
NINO3 term while model 3 also includes an interaction term between current NINO3 and lagged NINO3
because sequential ENSO events may have compounding impacts. Model 4 includes two lagged NINO3
terms. Observe that the only significant coefficients in the four models are for current NINO3. Columns 2
and 4 show that when lagged NINO3 terms are included, the coefficient on the lagged terms are of lesser
magnitude than the current NINO3 coefficient. The point estimate suggests that about 40% of the observed
conflicts might be displaced, however we cannot reject the null that no displacement occurs.
As an additional check against potentially spurious results, model 5 of Table 5.A14 includes a future
NINO3 term which, as expected, is not a statistically significant predictor of current ACR.
Columns 6-10 replicate the analysis for the weakly-affected group and do not yield any statistically
significant coefficients.
Conflict size Next, we check whether our main result is driven by large or small conflicts and find that
neither is dominating our result. The UCDP/PRIO Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict database
separates conflict onsets into three categories: large conflicts that exhibit more than one-thousand battle-
related deaths in a single year, small conflicts that exhibit more than twenty-five battle-related deaths in the
year of onset but never exceed one-thousand cumulative deaths throughout the conflict, and intermediate
conflicts that exhibit more than one-thousand cumulative battle related-deaths throughout the conflict, but
never exceed one-thousand deaths in a given year. Because there are a very small number of intermediate
conflicts, they are dropped from the following analysis (although they are included in the main analysis).
Also note that the scale of conflicts is determined by the absolute number of battle related-deaths, not by
the fraction of individuals in a country that are killed. Thus, a large conflict in a large country may not be
of the same “intensity” as a large conflict in a small country. Nonetheless, we follow the existing literature
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and use these cutoffs (Strand, 2006; Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2010) despite their imperfections.
To check that our main results are not driven by only small or large conflicts, we re-estimate Equation
5.7 for small conflicts only and then again for large conflicts only (Table 5.A13 column 1, titled “Onset2”).
The sum of the coefficients for small and large conflicts should be approximately equal to the coefficient of
NINO3 in row 5 of Table 5.1 in the main text. If the coefficient for small conflicts were much larger (smaller)
than the corresponding coefficient for large conflicts, than that would indicate that small (large) conflicts
were driving our main result in Table 5.1. We find no evidence this is the case. The increase in conflict onset
risk associated with a 1◦C increase is identical for large (0.45%) and small (0.45%) conflicts.
Intermittency threshold Previous statistical analyses of conflict have demonstrated that altering the
definition of “conflict onset” may substantially influence their results (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 2006;
Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). One parameter that has been shown to affect results is the “intermittency
threshold” for conflicts (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Throughout our main analysis, if a specific conflict
has been quiescent for at least two years and then becomes active again, it is coded as a new conflict onset.
Borrowing the terminology of the UCDP/PRIO database, we call the binary variable that results from this
coding rule Onset2 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Strand, 2006). We allow the number of quiescent years X to
change when estimating Equation 5.7. Thus, OnsetX denotes a new conflict onset that occurs only after X
years of inactivity. Note that by construction all conflict onsets recorded in OnsetX will also be recorded in
Onset(X − 1), but the reverse is not true.
Table 5.A13 shows how the results for large and small conflicts change when the intermittency threshold is
increased6. As the intermittency threshold is increased, there is almost no effect on the coefficients for small
conflicts. However, increasing the intermittency threshold for large conflicts causes the NINO coefficients to
6One might be concerned that the existence of any intermittancy threshold may generate cyclical behavior in the ACR
which could generate artificially large responses to the quasi-cyclical timing of ENSO events. To see why this type of bias is
incapable of dramatically affecting our results, let
Ct = true ACR at time t
Nt = number of countries at time t
Assume conflict risk and the sample are stationary until the following year:
Ct = Ct+1, Nt = Nt+1
We observe CtNt conflicts in the data at time t. However, we only observe Ct+1(Nt+1 − CtNt) conflicts the following year
because the CtNt countries that had conflicts the preceding year were artificially excluded from observation (this is not true,
as explained in the text, but suppose it were).








however in the following year we would estimate
Cˆt+1 =





= Ct − C2t .
Therefore, the potential bias that would be introduced is of the magnitude C2. Given that we estimate an average ACR of 4%
in the teleconnected region, the introduced bias would be 0.16%. This bias is only 1
25
th of the signal’s magnitude and is well
below the estimated uncertainty of our preferred models (±0.84%).
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fall in magnitude. The coefficients are about half as large when Onset4 is used and one-fourth as large when
Onset9 is used, compared to Onset2. These results suggest that all types of small conflicts are affected by
the global ENSO state, while there may be two types of large conflicts: one of which occurs infrequently and
is associated with ENSO and one of which is more frequent and exhibits cycles of “flaring up” and “cooling
down” in association with the global ENSO state.
Non-African countries Most previous studies examining the relationship between weather and conflict
have focused on Africa (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Meier, Bond and
Bond, 2007; Burke et al., 2009; Buhaug, 2010). We find that while the effect of ENSO on conflict is strong in
Africa, it appears similarly strong and statistically significant on other continents as well. Row 6 of Table 5.1
in the main text displays the baseline longitudinal regression model using non-African teleconnected countries
only and the estimated coefficient is almost identical to the average value (row 5). Models 9-10 in Table
5.A11 display results for African and non-African countries in the longitudinal model with commonly used
control variables and the coefficients for NINO3 in both subsamples are similar to the average value (model
8). Contrast this with the coefficients for log(GDP/capita) which are opposite in sign and significant for the
two subsamples. Finally, Table 5.A12 displays the “kitchen sink” models for both subsamples and finds that
the coefficients on both subsamples remain larger than the baseline model (Table 5.1 row 4 in the main text).
In one of the specifications (row 3) the coefficient for non-African countries is not statistically significant,
but this appears to be due to an inflation in standard errors. This is probably a result of over-fitting the
model with too many irrelevant variables (?).
Conflict as a Poisson point process An alternative approach to modeling conflict onsets is to assume
that conflict onsets can be represented by a non-homogenous Poisson point-processes. Two techniques can
be applied in this setting: count analysis and survival analysis. We implement both and verify that our
central findings remain unchanged.
In our count analysis, we model the number of conflicts observed in the teleconnected group as if these








via maximum likelihood (notation is the same as in Equation 5.7). Here, we assume that the structure of
disturbances is such that
∑
i Ci(t) can be represented by a Poisson distribution. Figure 5.B shows
∑
i Ci(t)
in the teleconnected group against NINO3(t) for the period 1975-2005 when the sample of countries is
roughly constant. The regression line is an ordinary-least-squares fit to the data while the circles display
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predicted values using the Poisson regression described in Equation 5.9. Observe that movements in the
predicted mean are the same, regardless of which statistical model is used.
In our survival analysis, we model how long peaceful periods “survive” before a “failure,” i.e. a conflict,
occurs. Assuming that conflict onsets can be represented by a non-homogeneous Poisson point-process, we
allow the hazard rate h (instantaneous ACR) to change over time in response to ENSO. We estimate the
model:
h(t) = e(βNINO3(t)+µi+θit) (5.10)
again by maximum likelihood (notation is the same as in Equation 5.7). Table 5.A5 presents our estimates
for both the teleconnected and weakly affected groups. In row 1 we present our estimates of the hazard rate
increase associated with a 1◦C increase in NINO3. We find that the hazard rate response in the teleconnected
group is significant and matches our main result: a 1◦C increase in NINO3 increases the risk of transition
from a peaceful state into conflict by 25%. If one uses the temperature swing from La Nina to El Nino
(3◦C), the total risk of conflict doubles (e0.25×3 = 2.1). This magnitude matches our main results that we
estimated with ordinary least squares (recall Fig 5.3 in the main text).
Finally, for a sense of scale, in row 2 of Table 5.A5 we estimate how NINO3 influences the length of
uninterrupted peaceful periods. This is an alternative but equivalent interpretation of Equation 5.10. We
estimate that a 1◦C increase in NINO3 reduces the length of an average peaceful period in the teleconnected
group by 0.22 years. Thus, a shift from an Nin˜a to Nin˜o reduces the average peaceful period by 0.88 years.
Summed over all eighty countries in the teleconnected group, this same shift in NINO3 reduces the global
number of peaceful country-years by 70 (0.22 years1◦C × 4◦C × 80 countries = 70.4 country-years).
CHAPTER 5. CIVIL CONFLICTS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 158
5.B Supplementary Figures
Figure 5.A1: ENSO, ACR, and number of countries time series









































(a) Monthly sea surface temperature anomaly over the NINO3 region (5◦S-5◦N, 150◦W-90◦W). (b) ACR for the whole world.
(c) The number of countries in the dataset is growing over time, more than doubling over the period of observation. Because
conflict onset is coded as a binary variable for each country-year observation, it is necessary to normalize the total number
of observed conflict onsets by the number of distinct countries being observed. To check that this trend is not driving any of
our results, we re-estimate the model while restricting the sample to the period following 1975 (inclusive) when the sample of
teleconnected countries was stable; we also estimate a model with the raw panel data using country-specific constants in the
regression (country fixed-effects).
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Figure 5.A3: Pixel-level global ENSO partition
(a) Global ENSO teleconnection partition used in main analysis. Red: pixels coded as teleconnected when surface temperatures
are positively correlated with NINO3 two months earlier (L = 2) for at least three months (R = 3). Blue: weakly-affected
pixels failing this criteria. (b) Same, but L = 0. (c) Green: teleconnected pixels when R = 5 and R = 3 (and L = 2). Yellow:
teleconnected pixels when R = 3 but not when R = 5. Blue: weakly-affected pixels when R = 3 and R = 5.
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(a) Countries assigned to be teleconnected when pixels are weighted by population (wx = populationx,t=2000) are red, weakly-
affected countries are blue. Grey countries have no conflict data. (b) Countries are coded as weakly-affected (W.A.) or
teleconnected (T.) based on the fraction of their population that inhabited teleconnected cells in 2000. (c) The distribution of
countries changes little if teleconnected area is used instead of populations. (d) The distribution of countries changes little if
temperatures in teleconnected cells are required to correlate with NINO3 for five months instead of three.
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Log total agricultural revenue for the weakly affected group (top) and teleconnected group (bottom), both with a quadratic fit.
During 1990-1994 values for the weakly affected group are unreliable, probably due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, and are
omitted from the analysis.
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Figure 5.A7: NINO index regions















The NINO12, NINO3 and NINO4 regions in the equatorial Pacific Ocean. NINO index values are defined as the average sea
surface temperature over a NINO region minus the long-term mean sea surface temperature in that region.
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The linear probability model used for our country-level analysis (see main text Table 5.1 row 5) is virtually indistinguishable
from non-linear probability models. For both regions, logit and probit models produce almost identical results to the linear
probability model used in the main analysis. We prefer (and present) the linear probability model because it is simpler.
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May−December NINO3 (˚C)
Teleconnected group 1975−2004 (observations)
Predicted with Poisson regressionOrdinary least squares
1989 dropped
Our model for ACR could instead be modeled with standard statistical techniques for “count data” such as a Poisson regression.
Unfortunately, such an approach is difficult to interpret when the sample size of countries is changing over time (See Fig. 5.B).
Nonetheless, we can use a Poisson regression to model the number of conflicts for the period 1975-2004, when the sample of
countries is almost constant. However, we find there is no obvious gain in prediction over ordinary least squares.
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Figure 5.A10: 1989 as outlier
(A) Residuals (it) estimated with a linear trend (see main text Table 5.1 row 2 and Equation 5.6). 1989 is a 3 standard
deviation outlier and therefore has been dropped from all models, for both the teleconnected and weakly-affected groups. (B)
When a post-1989 (inclusive) constant term is added to the regression (see Table 5.1 panel d and Equation 5.6), 1989 is less of
an outlier. However, for consistency in models, it is still dropped from the estimation. We re-introduce the 1989 observation in
Table 5.1 Panel e using this specification and find our results are largely unchanged.
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Bivariate non-linear fits of ACR against three standard correlates and NINO3. While population and income are correlated
with conflict risk across countries, when country means (fixed-effects) are included, the correlation is not significantly different
than zero (Table 5.A11). Only Polity IV (a measure of democratic institutions) remains statistically significant, however it
explains very little variation in conflict risk over time when compared to NINO3.
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Linearity of teleconnected ACR regression on NINO3 when both are partialled-out on 35 time-varying controls, country fixed-
effects and country-specific time trends. Dashed line is the OLS fit (with 95% confidence interval), and solid line is a non-linear
fit. The density of observations following this partialling-out transformation is the histogram at the bottom.
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5.C Supplementary Tables
Table 5.A1: Summary statistics of primary variables
variable mean SD min max years
ENSO index [◦C] May-Dec average
NINO12 0.088 1.02 -1.49 3.53 1950-2008
NINO3 0.117 0.829 -1.38 2.75 1950-2008
NINO4 0.117 0.583 -1.36 1.11 1950-2008
Annual probability of conflict onset [%/yr]
Whole world 3.08 2.51 0 11.2 1950-2004
Teleconnected region only 4.14 2.43 0 11.2 1950-2004
Weakly-affected region only 1.90 2.02 0 9.09 1950-2004
Agricultural output in teleconnected group
Cereal yields [kg/ha] country-level obs. 1500 924 0 8900 1961-2007
Value-added per capita [1990 US$] country-level obs 168 105 12.4 771 1970-2007
Value-added per capita [1990 US$] group 142 12.8 128 181 1970-2007
Agricultural output in weakly-affected group
Cereal yields [kg/ha] country-level obs. 2880 1720 0 9190 1961-2007
Value-added per capita [1990 US$] country-level obs 425 355 40.1 2500 1970-2007
Value-added per capita [1990 US$] group 254 45.2 202 352 1970-2007
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Table 5.A2: Validating the global partition with temperature, precipitation and agriculture responses to
NINO3 (1950-2004)
Independent Variable: NINO3 averaged May-Dec. (◦C)
Dependant variable Model Teleconnected Weakly-Affected
(1) Temperature country-level panel 0.048*** -0.017
(◦C) country-specific trends [0.009] [0.011]
country-specific constants n = 4067 n = 3461
(2) Precipitation country-level panel -0.12*** -0.00
(mm/day) country-specific trends [0.02] [0.01]
country-specific constants n = 2323 n = 1835
(3) Cereal yields country-level panel -1.00** 0.68
(%) country-specific trends [0.40] [0.45]
country-specific constants n = 3381 n=2435
(4) Agricultural Income country-level panel -0.46** -0.25
(%) country-specific trends [0.18] [0.21]
country-specific constants n = 2878 n = 2195
(5) Agricultural Income group total -0.85*** -0.08
(%) trends [0.28] [0.35]
n = 34 n = 29
Standard error in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All trends have linear and quadratic
terms. SE in rows 1-4 are clustered by country. SE in row 5 are robust to heteroscedasticity. In
rows 3-5, coefficients are in units of %/1◦C, 1.0 means yields (or income) decline 1% for each 1◦C
in NINO3. Models 3-5 include one lag dependent variable. Temperature and precipitation are
spatially averaged. 1990-94 dropped in W.A. row 5 due to unreliability.
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Table 5.A3: Monthly correlation coefficients for NINO3 (1950-2008)
early season “spring barrier” late season (Year 0)




M 0.85 0.92 1
(transition)
A 0.62 0.73 0.85 1
M 0.39 0.50 0.66 0.86 1
(little/no correlation) (transition) (high coherence)
J 0.15 0.25 0.41 0.64 0.88 1
J -0.00 0.09 0.25 0.47 0.71 0.90 1
A -0.08 0.01 0.20 0.44 0.68 0.85 0.96 1
S -0.05 0.03 0.20 0.44 0.68 0.80 0.88 0.94 1
O -0.10 -0.03 0.12 0.35 0.63 0.79 0.86 0.90 0.96 1
N -0.10 -0.03 0.10 0.31 0.59 0.77 0.825 0.86 0.92 0.98 1
D -0.11 -0.06 0.07 0.29 0.59 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.90 0.96 0.98 1
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Table 5.A4: The importance of accounting for ENSO dynamics for signal detection
Dependent Variable: Conflict Risk (%/yr)
Independant variable
(1) Jan-Dec. NINO3 0.51
all countries [0.40]
n = 54
(2) Jan.-Dec. NINO3 0.76
teleconnected only [0.59]
n = 54
(3) May-Dec. NINO3 0.46*
all countries [0.24]
n = 54
(4) May-Dec. NINO3 0.85**
teleconnected only [0.40]
n = 54
Heteroscedasticity robust S.E., ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.;
1989 dropped. Models all contain a linear trend.
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Table 5.A5: Survival analysis for peaceful periods between civil conflicts (1950-2004)
Independent Variable: NINO3 May-Dec
teleconnected weakly affected
(1) ∆ proportional hazard per 1◦C 25%** 6%
[11%] [12%]
(2) ∆ average survival time per 1◦C -0.22 yr** -0.06 yr
[0.09 yr] [0.12 yr]
Observations 4929 4346
The peaceful periods between civil conflicts are modeled with survival analysis.
The hazard function is assumed to be invariant in the length of time since the
last failure (i.e. conflicts are a Poisson point-process) but has an exponential
form in response to ENSO (it is non-homogenous). Row (1) describes the pro-
portional change in the hazard rate associated with a 1◦C increase in NINO3.
A value of “1%” implies that the probability a peaceful period ends is 1.01×
the baseline hazard rate. Row (2) describes the same model, but interpreted in
terms of survival time. A value of “-0.1 yr” implies that the average peaceful
period (across all countries in a sample) decreases by 0.1 years for a 1◦C in-
crease in NINO3. All models include country-specific constants and a common
linear trend (the model does not converge with country-specific trends). 1989 is
dropped. Standard errors clustered by country in brackets: ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.A6: Changes in annual conflict risk in response to ENSO (1950-2004)
Independent variable: NINO12 NINO3 NINO4 NINO12 NINO3 NINO4
(a) Global time series
Dependent Variable: conflict onsets / countries
Jan-Dec NINO coeff.: 0.33 0.57 0.87* - - -
[0.24] [0.39] [0.49] - - -
Observations: 54 54 54 - - -
teleconnected group weakly-affected group
(b) Regional time-series
Dep. Var.: conflict onsets in region / countries in region
May-Dec NINO Coeff 0.59* 0.762* 0.842 -0.022 0.160 0.623
[0.304] [0.390] [0.535] [0.215] [0.307] [0.495]
Observations: 54 54 54 54 54 54
(c) Same as (b) plus linear trend
May-Dec NINO Coeff 0.625** 0.852** 1.07* -0.071 0.059 0.430
[0.310] [0.396] [0.555] [0.202] [0.300] [0.470]
(d) Same as (c) plus post-1989 dummy
May-Dec NINO Coeff 0.634** 0.813** 0.879* -0.065 0.036 0.319
[0.252] [0.318] [0.482] [0.208] [0.305] [0.446]
(e) Same as (d) plus 1989 obs
May-Dec NINO Coeff 0.589** 0.737** 0.679 -0.054 0.054 0.360
[0.249] [0.320] [0.507] [0.208] [0.305] [0.450]
(f) Ignoring the “spring barrier” obscures signal
Jan-Dec NINO coeff.: 0.542 0.762 0.901 - - -
[0.374] [0.586] [0.622] - - -
(g) Country-level longitudinal-data linear probability model
Dep. Var.: conflict onset in a country (binary)
May-Dec NINO coeff.: 0.674% 0.893 1.0 -0.108 0.038 0.414
[0.38]* [0.415]** [0.522]* [0.154] [0.266] [0.471]
Observations: 3978 3978 3978 3400 3400 3400
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Coefficients are probability responses in units of %/1◦C, 1.0 means the probability
of conflict in a given year rises 0.01 for each 1◦C increase in NINO averaged May-
Dec. All panels except (e) drop 1989. Panel (f) includes a linear trend. Panel (g)
includes county-specific constants (fixed-effects) and country-specific linear trends with
estimated standard errors clustered by country.
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Table 5.A9: Fixed effects or country-specific trends do not drive the result
Dependent Variable: Conflict Risk (% / yr)
Independent Variable: May-Dec NINO3 (◦C)
Panel model Teleconnected Weakly-Affected
(%/yr◦C) (%/yr◦C)
(1) No controls 0.85* 0.20
[0.44] [0.33]
(2) Country fixed effects 0.89** 0.13
[0.40] [0.33]
(3) Country-trends 0.90** 0.13
[0.39] [0.33]
(4) Country fixed effects 0.89** 0.04
Country-trends [0.39] [0.32]
Observations 3978 3400
Conley? SE in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1989 dropped.
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Table 5.A10: ENSO influences ACR holding local temperature and rainfall constant
Dependent Variable: Conflict Risk (% / yr)
Independent Variable: May-Dec NINO3 (◦C)
Panel model Teleconnected Weakly-Affected
(%/yr◦C) (%/yr◦C)
(1) No weather 0.89** 0.04
[0.39] [0.32]
n=3978 n=3400
(2) Include temperature 1.02*** 0.13
(monthly, 12 vars) [0.39] [0.30]
n=3978 n=3400
(3) Include temp & rain 1.66*** 0.36
(monthly, 24 vars) [0.48] [0.33]
n=2234 n=1774
Conley? SE in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1989
dropped. All models include country specific constants (fixed ef-
fects) and country-specific trends.
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Table 5.A12: The “kitchen sink” model
Dependent Variable: Conflict Risk (% / yr)




(1) All Countries 1.35*** 0.03
[0.47] [0.31]
n = 2464 n=1827
(2) Africa Only 1.63** 0.27
[0.76] [0.53]
n=1349 n=96




(4) All Countries 1.83*** 0.46
[0.53] [0.33]
n=1973 n=1467
(5) Africa Only 1.95* 0.54
[1.01] [1.79]
n=1083 n=75
(6) Not Africa 1.49** 0.50
[0.66] [0.34]
n=890 n=1392
Conley? SE in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1989
dropped in all models. Controls include country fixed-effects,
country-specific linear trends, lagged log income per capita,
lagged per capita income growth, lagged Polity IV score (with
quadratic term), lagged agriculture industry share (%), lagged
percent urbanized, lagged population, lagged percent female,
lagged percent below 15 years old, lagged percent above 65
years old. Models 4-6 include 12 monthly temperature vari-
ables, 12 monthly precipitation variables and annual average
maximum tropical cyclone windspeed.
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Table 5.A13: Robustness analysis under different definitions of conflict risk (1950-2004)
Dependent Variable: Binary conflict indicator for teleconnected group countries
Onset2 Onset3 Onset4 Onset5 Onset6 Onset7 Onset8 Onset9
“Small” Conflicts 0.454 0.372 0.342 0.379 0.411 0.411 0.449 0.449
“Large” Conflicts 0.453 0.291 0.210 0.121 0.093 0.064 0.102 0.102
“Small” conflicts had between 25 and 1000 battle related deaths. “Large” conflicts had more
than 1000 battle related deaths. Each coefficient is a separate regression. Coefficients are
percent probability responses in units of %/1◦C, 1 means the probability of conflict in a given
year rises 0.01 for each 1◦C increase in NINO3 sea surface temperature. OnsetN indicates
that a conflict must be dormant for N years before renewed violence marks the “onset” of a
new conflict. NINO3 SSTs are measured using May-December means. Models contain country
constants (fixed effect) and country-specific time trends. 1989 dropped.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lessons for Future Research and Policy Implications
We are still in the nascent stages of understanding anthropogenic climate change and its mitigating policies.
Ongoing methodological developments will be needed to study a phenomenon that has no precedent in
human history. This dissertation and the methodologies developed intend to advance this research agenda
by tackling central questions on climate mitigation, adaptation, innovation and impacts.
This concluding chapter serves two purposes. First, I will discuss natural extensions and broader research
implications that follow from this dissertation. In particular, this discussion will provide suggestions on how
empirical research on the costs and benefits of climate policy may proceed. At the same time, potential
irreversibility in the climate system suggests that society may not necessarily want to wait for cost-benefit
research to reach maturity before political action is taken. In the second part of this conclusion, I discuss
several challenges in enacting climate policy that touch upon political economy issues raised by parts this
dissertation.
6.1 Directions for future research
6.1.1 Alternative sources of private information
Forecasting the impacts of unprecedented phenomenon inevitably require a combination of data and model-
ing assumptions. When data were sparse, forecasts of the cost and benefits of climate policy placed heavier
weights on modeling structure provided by a recognized set of specialized experts. In recent years, increasing
availability of alternative data sources has granted researchers access to previously unobserved private infor-
mation sets. Chapter 2 uses one such source, prediction markets, to ask how much would U.S. cap-and-trade
policy cost to firms. This paper is one of a growing literature using alternative information aggregation
mechanisms for forecasting (Cowgill, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2009; Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2012;
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Gillen, Plott and Shum, 2012).
What is the added value of this information and is it in any sense “better” than information sets held
by recognized, trained experts? Unfortunately, for the Waxman-Markey bill studied in Chapter 2, this
question is untestable as the policy was never realized. However, during the same 2009-2010 period, the
prediction market exchange Intrade provided a similar market on the likelihood that the U.S. Congress
may pass health care reform. Because that policy was eventually realized, one could use that context to
examine 1) the advantages of using prediction market prices in event studies over traditional binary event
studies and 2) the forecast accuracy of prediction market event studies over comparable analyses performed
by computable general equilibrium models. If indeed there is a divergence in estimates, one could impose
additional structure (i.e. preferences, production functions) into the prediction market event study approach
to explore how different expectations may drive such differences.
What other climate-related questions can we answer using alternative sources of private information?
Chapter 2 explores the cost to firms of U.S. cap-and-trade legislation. While firm profits is a useful measure, a
more relevant statistic is the marginal abatement cost or, equivalently, the allowance price, under an emissions
trading system. The regression discontinuity result shown in Figure 2.10 testing for whether profits were
anticipated for industries receiving free allowances may provide a setting to recover the underlying allowance
price of the policy.
An emerging issue in the climate impacts literature asks how various outcomes shown to respond econo-
metrically to historic weather variability may be aggregated into global damage functions used by Integrated
Assessment Models of optimal climate policy. Currently, there is no natural way to perform this analysis,
particularly since little is known about the magnitude of various cross partials effects. It is possible that
prediction markets, for which contracts on the likelihood of future warming are available, may capture addi-
tional private information and thus can be used to examine whether expected changes in the climate affect
the market value of firms.
6.1.2 Spatial correlation and the predictability of climatic variation
Chapters 3 and 5 provide an important deviation from existing climate impacts research. Whereas previous
research focused on estimating the effects of the spatially uncorrelated component of weather fluctuations,
Chapters 3 and 5 explicitly explore the effects of spatially correlated and possibly predictable variation in
historic weather patterns, two features that are likely to characterize future anthropogenic climate change.
As such, the environmental variables constructed in Chapters 3 and 5 may provide better historic analogs
to future climate change than those previously used.
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Standard economic theory suggests that risk sharing may fail under large aggregate shocks. Under
such circumstances, existing trade networks may not be able to smooth price deviations driven by large-
scale climatic variation. Thus, welfare effects of future climate change may not be adequately captured
by examining only an output response due to historic idiosyncratic weather fluctuations. Following this
intuition, one natural extension to Chapter 5 is to examine the spatial implications of ENSO variation by
linking food prices with a simple model of international trade. This theoretical linkage will inform the degree
to which existing trade networks have withstood historic climatic variation and may be used to forecast the
welfare effect of aggregate shocks under future climate change.
Chapter 3 finds behavioral adjustments by farmers in response to predictable future rainfall in southern
China. If such behavior is present in other contexts, this result has implications on how researchers previously
interpreted the effects of “unpredictable” weather shocks In particular, previously estimated coefficients may
in part capture adaptation behavior and may even be poorly identified if such behavior is correlated with
an unobservable determinant for an outcome of interest.
6.2 Implications for the political economy of climate policy
Underlying much of this dissertation is the implicit assumption that the decision to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions will depend on an assessment of aggregate costs and benefits of climate policy. However,
climate policy may be needed before this research is fully mature. Furthermore, even if rigorous analyses
favored policy implementation, sufficient policy intervention may not occur given existing political economy
constraints. This section discusses a few such constraints within the U.S. political system.
6.2.1 Political cycle and the time horizon of climate policy
The long residence period of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations implies that to be effective, climate
policy too must persist over a long period. Maintaining a fixed policy over time may be difficult given
short political cycles and commitment problems faced by elected officials and political parties. The dramatic
increase in corporate R&D expenditures following a loss in political access found in Chapter 4 suggests that
the uncertainty of regaining political access is sufficiently large to encourage investments in an input with
long return intervals. Uncertainty about whether policy may change over time also affects interpretation of
my Waxman-Markey estimates in Chapter 2. If market participants held beliefs that Waxman-Markey would
be eventually revised, as has happened with the EU-ETS and the U.S. SO2 trading scheme (Schmalensee
and Stavins, 2012), then it is no longer clear which particular policy is captured by my estimates.
Is the commitment problem sufficient to make serious climate policy impossible? Is the structure of our
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political system fundamentally at odds with enactment of long-term policy? On this point, I am optimistic.
In Chapter 2, I find that markets expected Waxman-Markey to result in a net loss across all U.S. listed
firms. However, heterogeneity analyses show that the policy has many winners as well. Of the set of
winners, some may be anticipating profits from the allocation of free allowances (see Figure 2.10), others
may expect high pass-through rates onto inelastic consumers (see Figure 2.12), and yet other firms may
foresee the development of new low-carbon technologies. For this last set of firms, uncertainty is over the
potential for induced technological change, some of which may be resolved upon the introduction of a carbon
price. In other words, the learning process may eventually reveal a clear set of winners from climate policy,
who in term may constitute a new base of support for maintaining or perhaps even tightening the policy over
time. Indeed, many policies in the U.S., once introduced, are rarely eliminated in the future. Furthermore,
adjustments made along the intensive margin have typically been in favor of policy tightening. By induction,
this implies that it is far more difficult to enact a new policy in the first place.
6.2.2 Pivotal interest groups at the extensive margin
If simply “getting started” is crucial when it comes to climate policy, what are the prerequisites for that to
happen? Chapter 2 offers a few insights. The current prevailing wisdom is that legislative success for U.S.
climate policy requires the political support of carbon intensive producing sectors. However, several lines
of evidence suggest that carbon intensive firms were supportive of Waxman-Markey. During the drafting of
Waxman-Markey at the start of 2009, several major U.S. corporations and environmental groups formed the
U.S. Climate Action Partnership (US-CAP). This coalition, which included some of the country’s largest
fossil-fuel dependent companies, many of whom were major lobbyers for Waxman-Markey (see Table 2.12),
publicly supported cap-and-trade conditional on the inclusion of favorable provisions. Indeed, details of the
final Waxman-Markey bill closely followed US-CAP’s policy proposal.1
A second line of evidence is provided by the discontinuity presented in Figure 2.10 of Chapter 2 which
shows that markets expected manufacturing firms to profit considerably from the distribution of free al-
lowances. Indeed, the level of allowance compensation provided by Waxman-Markey far exceeds the 15%
full profit compensation rule suggested by (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2001). Table 2.6 of Chapter 2 provides
a final piece of evidence showing, surprisingly, that market participants anticipated firms in manufacturing,
construction, mining, and utilities sectors to incur relatively small losses from the policy. Instead, markets
expected greater percentage losses in various goods and services sectors such as information, finance and in-
surance, real estate, and accommodation and food services. This suggests that markets anticipated relatively
high pass-through with much of the welfare cost of the policy borne by consumers.
1See their policy document here: http://www.us-cap.org/PHPages/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/USCAP_Blueprint.pdf
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In Chapter 2, I argued that daily fluctuations in cap-and-trade prospects during 2009-2010 captured by
Intrade’s prediction market price were driven by political announcements made by key members of Congress
during this period. However, this doesn’t explain the overall downward trend in cap-and-trade prospects from
late 2009 to mid 2010. In hindsight, it is believed that the rise of grass-roots tea-party politics and the great
recession ultimately affected U.S. cap-and-trade prospects. Together, these multiple lines of evidence suggest
that the pivotal interest group in climate policy may have now shifted from carbon intensive industries to
consumers. If such indeed is the case, future U.S. climate policy debates will need to reconsider how and to
whom cap-and-trade generated revenue is distributed in order to ensure that the policy is political feasibility.
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